The Adventures of Chester: Israel's Beka'a Dilemma

In the past few days, Tigerhawk has excerpted two reports from StratFor discussing the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Syria. First was an excerpt on Friday with this tidbit:

Israel will not put ground forces in Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa Valley, without first eliminating the Syrian air force; to do otherwise would be to leave Israel's right flank wholly vulnerable. If al Assad does nothing, Israel will have to assume that Syria is waiting for an opportune moment to strike, and will act accordingly.

In other words, if Israel prosecutes the war such as to eliminate Hezbollah's presence int he Beka'a Valley, it will be extremely vulnerable to Syrian attacks. Israel is therefore awaiting some indication from Syria that it will not stop Israel or attack its forces in their pursuit of Hezbollah into the Beka'a.

The second StratFor article excerpted by Tigerhawk here contains further detail:

The uncertain question is Syria. No matter how effectively Israel seals the Lebanese coast, so long as the Syrian frontier is open, Hezbollah might get supplies from there, and might be able to retreat there. So far, there has been only one reported airstrike on a Syrian target. Both Israel and Syria were quick to deny this.

What is interesting is that it was the Syrians who insisted very publicly that no such attack took place. The Syrians are clearly trying to avoid a situation in which they are locked into a confrontation with Israel. Israel might well think this is the time to have it out with Syria as well, but Syria is trying very hard not to give Israel casus belli. In addition, Syria is facilitating the movement of Westerners out of Lebanon, allowing them free transit. They are trying to signal that they are being cooperative and nonaggressive.

The problem is this: While Syria does not want to get hit and will not make overt moves, so long as the Syrians cannot guarantee supplies will not reach Hezbollah or that Hezbollah won't be given sanctuary in Syria, Israel cannot complete its mission of shattering Hezbollah and withdrawing. They could be drawn into an Iraq-like situation that they absolutely don't want. Israel is torn. On the one hand, it wants to crush Hezbollah, and that requires total isolation. On the other hand, it does not want the Syrian regime to fall. What comes after would be much worse from Israel's point of view.

This is the inherent problem built into Israel's strategy, and what gives Hezbollah some hope. If Israel does not attack Syria, Hezbollah could well survive Israel's attack by moving across the border. No matter how many roads are destroyed, Israel won't be able to prevent major Hezbollah formations moving across the border. If they do attack Syria and crush al Assad's government, Hezbollah could come out of this stronger than ever.

All of these considerations become more clear when taking a look at the battlespace:
This image was grabbed from Google Earth. It shows a tilted view of the operational space of the current war, facing northeast from northern Israel. The Beka'a Valley is represented by my poorly drawn hashed area in the middle of the picture. It is extremely restricted terrain; there is not a great deal of room for maneuver. Its entire length runs parallel to the Syrian border. Even though much of that border is made up of mountain ranges, this still leaves any attacking force vulnerable to armored attack through gaps, or to indirect fire, whether via missile or artillery. As the map shows, there is a significant difference in elevations within the Valley as opposed to either side. (For another good map of the Valley from a different perspective see here.)

Hence the Israeli dilemma: Hezbollah cannot be destroyed unless its facilities, camps and logistics dumps in the Beka'a are destroyed. To create a buffer zone in south Lebanon is only to cause Hezbollah to seek longer-range rockets or missiles in the future. But, a ground assault to destroy that logistics infrastructure requires that the risk of Syrian interference be mitigated somehow. There are many ways to do so. The most obvious is to pre-emptively attack Syria. This was recommended today in The New Republic by Michael Oren (registration required):

The answer lies in delivering an unequivocal blow to Syrian ground forces deployed near the Lebanese border. By eliminating 500 Syrian tanks--tanks that Syrian President Bashar Al Assad needs to preserve his regime--Israel could signal its refusal to return to the status quo in Lebanon. Supporting Hezbollah carries a prohibitive price, the action would say.

Oren proposes more than just the military actions necessary to ensure the security of an expeditionary force operating in Lebanon. He suggests that Assad's rule itself should be threatened.

There was one report over the weekend that Israel had given Syria 72 hours "to stop Hizbullah’s activity," and "bring about release of kidnapped IDF troops." A deadline implies consequences. This was the only report of the deadline, so it seems unconfirmed.

Some readers may be tempted to ask, "How can the Israelis strike Syria? It will bring a declaration of war from Iran!" Well, how would anyone know the difference?

My guess is that there's a 50/50 chance of the war being confined to Lebanon. Diplomacy may convince the Israelis not to strike Syria. Or their goals may be smaller in scale than the destruction of Hezbollah. Either way, the clock is ticking. A commenter in a previous thread noted that it takes 3 days to activate Israeli reservists for defensive action, and three more for offensive action. That clock has been ticking for about 4-5 days now. Decisions are being made and soon the trains will have left the station.

If the war expands into Syria, my guess is there's a 90% chance that the US will then get directly involved in some way. Iran will declare war on Israel, and might even include the US too, just to link them together. Even if it does not, it would more overtly attack our interests and this will demand a US response.

If it comes to this, the US will be given a rare and fleeting chance to act decisively to frustrate the regional hegemonic and nuclear ambitions of Iran's mullahs. Proxy war may be Iran's core competency, but open battle is that of the United States.

Posted by Chester on July 17, 2006 6:16 PM to The Adventures of Chester