November 8, 2004
Gotterdammerung II: Insurgent Operational Plans
What is the operational plan of the insurgents?
1. Continue to control key areas of the country, specifically urban areas.
2. Use terrorism and other unconventional warfare to sow discord between the US military, the Iraqi military, the US government, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi polity and the US polity. When as many of these factions are united in the cause to defeat the insurgents, it increases or preserves our reserves of national will. When they are divided, it depletes them.
3. Enlist the aid of any group that will offer it.
4. Achieve sympathetic consideration from other countries through skilled media manipulation.
Beyond this, in the realm where operational considerations and tactics collide, we have these options for the insurgents, as they are fighting in Fallujah.
From the insurgent point of view (using the understudy method )
Shaping the Battlefield and Prosecuting the Defense of Fallujah: A centralized view
As the insurgent commander, I have massed a significant base for myself within the city of Fallujah, and have alternate bases in Ramadi and other smaller cities in Al-Anbar province and inside Baghdad. As the US assault approaches, I have several options before me:
1. Stand and fight with my fellow believers.
2. Disperse my believers such that the Americans will control Fallujah but we will fight another day.
3. Some combination of both.
I believe that I cannot bear the loss of Fallujah as a sanctuary for my insurgency. I also believe that the battle for Fallujah should be as painful as possible to the Iraqi people and to the Americans.
I will disperse some of my key personnel to other cities. Of my two best lieutenants, I will send one into hiding as a redundancy in case I am lost. He will not like this, but it is for the best. The other I will keep with me to manage the defenses here in the city and to control the battle as it rages.
I will use my dedicated couriers to send messages to the cells of believers who operate in other cities, letting them know how to coordinate attacks in their own cities once the Americans begin their siege of my own.
I will choose my best and most dedicated followers. Half of them I will keep in Fallujah to insprie the less forthright, and to direct the attacks against the infidels. The other half I will send out to other places, where they will lie in wait until the Americans think they have beaten me. At that point, they will launch another wave of coordinated and violent attacks against the Iraqi populace and the Americans. Just as the Americans use their "special forces," I will use my most ardent followers.
I will issue calls for other believers to come and join in the battle; I will do so through the rudimentary communication networks I have created throughout the mid-east. Other followers will issue calls for young men to come and fight with me.
At the height of the battle, when the Americans have reached certain positions, if all looks lost, I will slip out of the city if possible, and will join other believers elsewhere. I won't tell my subordinates of this plan."
The above analysis is written as though the insurgent forces have extremely centralized command and control. More than likely, the opposite is true. They are a diverse mix of forign fighters seeking adventure and glory, veterans of previous campaigns of Jihad (Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, etc), strung-out Ba'athists with nowhere to run, troops sponsored by Iranian and Saudi mullahs, and so forth. In this case, it is difficult to predict what kind of planning they may have.
Posted by Chester at November 8, 2004 10:46 PM
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