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May 25, 2005
Operation New Market
News is sparse on Operation New Market. Not even CentCom has any mention of the new op. Perhaps something new will be up in the morning.
It looks like most of the major news outlets are regurgitating the intial AP report on the battle, seen here in its ABC News incarnation. Ellen Knickmeyer of the Washington Post, who reported on Matador, was interviewed this morning via phone by NPR. She related details of the news about Zarqawi though, not about New Market.
We know this so far:
1. It involves about 1000 US and Iraqi military personnel. Same in size then as Matador, but with Iraqi involvement:
A small reconnaissance unit of Iraqi soldiers was participating in the attack on the northwestern city.
2. At least one of the battalions involved, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, was involved in Matador. So there is some overlap of forces. I believe that a portion of 3/25 was moved to the far west for Matador to reinforce 3/2 for that operation. Haditha is where the bulk of 3/25 is normally operating.
3. Ten or so terrorists have been killed. One was a local cleric who fired at the Marines.
The operation's description sounds much like a "cordon and search" mission.
Helicopters swept down near palm tree groves and armored vehicles roared into this Euphrates River city before dawn Wednesday . . . Marines brought by helicopters blocked one side of Haditha, while other troops on foot and in armored vehicles established checkpoints and moved toward the city's center.Though I have no satellite imagery for you this week, a quick study of the map shows that Haditha is located due west of a north-south run of the Euphrates. This sheds some light on the tactical movements described: the terrain on the city's east, closest to the Euphrates, is likely much greener and much more vegetated -- this explains the reference to helicopters dropping Marines off in palm tree groves. This type of terrain is better for dismounted infantry. On the other side, the terrain becomes less and less vegetated as one leaves the river and heads toward the desert. This is where armored vehicles have likely set up "checkpoints" as they "moved toward the city's center." The axis of advance is therefore from west to east into the city so that armored vehicles -- tanks, amtracs, and LAVs -- can be integrated into an urban fight there. This would not be possible to attempt if moving from east to west unless a river crossing were established. And as we know from Matador, the river crossing took much longer than had been planned. So the terrain is dictating the nature and direction of the advance in this case . . .
There is no mention of the operation having been planned for some time, as was the case with Matador. This is telling. Perhaps it is exploiting newly found intelligence, as a result of Matador, Squeeze Play, or some other source? Any guess would be pure speculation, but for now, this attack seems more like an exploitation than a deliberate offensive action planned over several weeks or months.
Cordon and search operations are meant to find something. But assuming either that the target is Zarqawi, or that the target is any one individual or group is to put a great deal of faith in our intelligence capabilities. Not impossible, but worth caution in inferring. Even more so, when coupled with this statement by the CO of Regimental Combat Team 2:
"A lot of this is like bird hunting. You rustle it up and see what comes up," said Marine Col. Stephen W. Davis.Wretchard is right to point out that one thing not found thus far is fortified positions with defenses in depth:
So far -- and it is early days yet -- there have been no reports of theIf newly gathered intelligence has led to this operation, perhaps it is the result of the Information Dominance Center, as reported by Middle East Newsline:
fights to the death in fortifications that characterized Operation Matador.
The United States has introduced prototype technology to improve intelligence on insurgency movements in Iraq.It seems like there are two things being discussed here: new technologies, which are unnamed and rightly so, and new organizations for processing and disseminating their collected take, of which the Info Dominance Center is a part.The U.S. Army has been testing technology meant to rapidly gather intelligence and reconnaissance data and distribute the information to other forces. The technology was meant to respond to a study conducted in 2003 that identified faults in intelligence gathering.
So far, the technologies introduced in Iraq have been regarded as effective. Officials said the army conducted a review in December 2004 that reported successes by U.S. commanders.
Introduced by the army, the Information Dominance Center has integrated intelligence from a range of sources as well as translated the data into graphs and other visuals. Officials said the center, based in Baghdad, would be linked to combat units throughout Iraq.
On another note, Bill Roggio raised the question of whether our forces are using a "search and destroy" or a "clear and hold" set of tactics in Iraq.
A limiting factor in continually executing a clear and hold strategy is troop availability. The Marines used to execute Matador were pulled from local garrison duties to execute the assault. It appears there is no significant rapid reaction force available to conduct operations such as Matador.This is an interesting jumping off point for a discussion of the concept of the reserve. Reserves are, as we know, forces held back to be committed when absolutely necessary, or to fill a gap that opens, or to reinforce the committed forces. The joint doctrinal definition is, "Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement."
Here we see that the common conception of a "reserve" is the opposite of its true intent. The usual perception is that a reserve is meant to be husbanded and preserved for future use in other, different engagements or actions. But a more realistic way of seeing the reserve is that of a force that is integral to the execution of a planned engagement. In the offense, the reserve would be the fresh troops that relieve other that have been badly bloodied at a key moment in time or space. In the defense, a reserve might be the counterattack force -- and having a counterattack force is the key to any good defense: when committed at the right time, a counterattack can overwhelm the offense.
The question of whether the US has significant "rapid reaction forces" for operations like Matador or New Market is an interesting one. I believe that while operationally (that is, within division-sized areas of operations), commanders are ensuring they have a reserve in the form of a rapid reaction force, at the theater level (that is, the theater of Iraq as a whole), there is no reserve to speak of.
Take Anbar Province. At the operational level, comprising the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force and its 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Air Wing and 2nd FSSG, plus attachments, I think the Division has created a reserve consisting of its non-infantry combat battalions: 2nd Amphibious Assault Battalion, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and the 2nd Tank Battalion. These units are usually employed in supporting roles for the infantry. I believe some portion of them are normally set aside in a rapid reaction role, and some others can be shifted as needed to attach to task-organized units for particular operations. Finally, aircraft and air units are probably forming a large part of a reserve/rapid reaction force. So, conceiving of the reserve as a combined-arms concept is the best way to unravel it. This seems to be the way folks are doing business.
At the theater level, for Iraq as a whole, I don't believe there is a theater reserve. There does not seem to be a certain combat unit or units that are regularly shifted about the battlefield to reinforce smaller engagements at the battalion or regimental level. Take the 2nd Battle of Fallujah in November. That operation involved six infantry battalions in the city, with an Army regiment surrounding it to cut it off. Moving enough forces into place for this battle took some significant planning and lead time: The Black Watch was moved from the British sector north and attached to the 24th MEU temporarily. This allowed an Army battalion to be attached to the 1st Marine Division for the battle. Also, the 31st MEU, including 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, was attached to the 1st Marine Division for the fight. This was certainly not a hasty move. MEUs are strategic-level or national-level assets. Committing one of them to a battle far inside Iraq took at least a couple of weeks of planning at the very least, not including transit time from wherever they were. All of these indicators lead me to believe that there is no single unit dedicated to being a theater-level rapid reaction force or reserve, however you choose to conceive of it.
Posted by Chester at May 25, 2005 11:42 PM
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