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April 13, 2006
Iran Extravaganza Post
This post will be about Iran, and divided into four parts. Each is more or less unrelated, except that they are all things that have been kicking around in my skull for the last few days and weeks. Take from them what you will.
Part I
In Kenneth Pollack's work, The Persian Puzzle
The problem with the Grand Bargain is that it doesn't work in practice. Every American administration since Reagan has put the Grand Bargain on the table and tried to coax the Iranians into accepting it. In particular, the Grand Bargain was the explicit core of the Clinton initiative. When Clinton administration officals spoke to Khatami's unofficial interlocutors, as well as to various European countries that tried to play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran, the course that they consistently laid out was a process of negotiations that would lead to a comprehensive deal over all of the different problem issues that lay between the two countries -- this is where the term "Grand Bargain" came from. The problem that lies at the heart of the Grand Bargain -- the problem that the Clinton administration stumbled over, much to its disappointment -- is the fundamental problem that lies at the heart of the Iranian-American confrontation.While that settles in, consider this excerpt from Bush's State of the Union address in January:Whenever American officials are able to talk to Iranians about what it is that they would want from a Grand Bargain, and whenever American citizens are able to talk to Iranian officials about what it is that they would want from a Grand Bargain, one of the foremost things that the Iranians invariably say is, "Respect." In my own conversations with Iranians, in and out of government, I have found that it is usually the first of their demands -- and they often say it immediately and then have to think hard as to what their other demands might be. "Respect" is an abstract concept that needs to be made tangible if it is going to be part of a deal. So, like good negotiators, the Americans inevitably ask, "What do you mean by respect?" Typically, the Iranians cannot define what respect would be, but they are full of illustrations of disrespectful American behavior that would have to end for Iran to be willing to accept a Grand Bargain. For instance, the Iranians never fail to observe that saying that Iran was part of an "Axis of Evil" was disrespectful. The sanctions are disrespectful. Criticizing the (flagrantly rigged) February 2004 Majles elections for being flagrantly rigged was disrespectful. Any criticism of Iran's internal affairs, such as its kangaroo-court judicial procedures and its arrest of political dissidents on ridiculous charges, is disrespectful. A senator calling Iran the world's worst terrorist state is disrespectful. American newspapers writing articles about problems in the Iranian economy is disrespectful. The State Department stating that Iran supports terrorism rather than acknowledging that Iran is a victim of terrorism (both of which are true) is disrespectful. Claiming that Iran is harboring Al-Qaida personnel is disrespectful. I have personally heard every one of those statements made by Iranians in response to my question as to what "respect" means . . .
As it has for the past fifty years, the United States remains not only Iran's greatest political stumbling block but its greatest psychological stumbling block. The Iranians have so much emotional baggage attached to the United States that they simply cannot move past it. Just as the taking of the embassy in 1979 was more about seeking psychological gratification for twenty-five years of Iranian grievances against the United States (real and imagined), so today any political relationship with the United States remains captive to that same insurmountable sense of grievance. When Iranians talk about getting "respect" from the United States, they are demanding that the United States treat them better than we treat any other nation on earth -- that we refrain from all criticism whatsoever and not just by the administration itself, but by the Congress and even the media. We don't treat our closest allies that well.
And, tonight, let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: America respects you and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran. [emphasis added]Well, that's certainly interesting . . . read into it however you like.
Part II
George Friedman's latest Strategic Geopolitical Intelligence Report (subscriber-only) is about the conflicts between idealism and realism in foreign policy. He goes through several past examples and summarizes them with this pithy line:
A doctrine emerges in looking at these three examples: the pursuit of political principles is possible only when one is willing to look at the long term; the near term requires ruthless and unsentimental compromise.Friedman then goes on to state that he believes this is very relevant to the present because the US just might make a deal with Iran about Iraq:
The United States may well wind up making a deal with Iran over Iraq. Alternatively, a Sunni coalition led by Saudi Arabia might give Washington the opportunity to negotiate with the Baathist guerrillas in the Sunni Triangle. Whichever path is followed, it will be condemned by both left and right for dozens of excellent moral reasons.You know, I just am not sure that I'm buying this. Well, to clarify: there is no doubt that ruthless and unsentimental compromise is a necessity in the execution of strategy. But Friedman states the necessity of such compromise with Iran in passing; he makes no detailed case for it, and I find it hard to see one.Bush has been pursuing the path of pragmatism, however clumsily or adroitly, for months now. He will make a deal with someone because going it alone is not an option. The current situation in Iraq cannot be sustained, and all presidents ultimately respond to reality. Bush might have to eat some words about democracy and the United States' commitment thereto, but if Roosevelt could speak of the Four Freedoms while working with Josef Stalin, all things are possible.
Cutting deals across unsavory lines will be necessary regardless of the goal. But getting out of Iraq may not be that goal. The Iranians are a huge threat. If they can be used against the Ba'athist insurgency, then the Sunnis can alternatively be used against the Iranians.
There are lots of goals in the Middle East and each has little subgoals as well:
a) destroy al Qaeda (and capture those who might be more useful alive)
b) prevent Iran from having nukes (and circumscribe its influence in all parts, and foster regime change there if possible)
c) destroy the insurgency (both the Ba'athist one and Muqtada Al Sadr's simmering one)
d) foster Iraqi democracy (while at the same time keeping the place from splitting apart, or becoming too theocratic)
It's hard to say at any one point which of these is the most important to the US and Bush; the US probably prefers it that way so that its adversaries cannot guess its true intentions (Bush is rumored to have been a tremendous poker player while at business school). But my own guess is that preventing Iran from having nukes is probably going to trump all the others in the near term. And I think Friedman ascribes more power to the insurgency than actually exists. Soon they'll be gone. Violence will spike some more in the future and after the government is formed, then decline gradually over time. But Iran is a huge problem and getting worse.
Moreover, the same American government that invaded Iraq on the pretext of the danger from the nexus of rogue state, terrorism, and WMD is more or less still in place. They may have eaten a bit of crow on the issue of how the US might know when such an invasion is necessary, given how abysmal our intelligence is. But their initial logic has not been refuted: WMD in the hands of unstable regimes who support terrorism IS an enormous threat to the world. Arguing that pre-emptive action is impossible because our intelligence is horrendous is really to quibble about the execution of the policy of pre-emption, not to rebut the basic premise. Moreover, even if intellilgence is lacking, perhaps the Iranian regime's own admissions of their intent obviates the need to rely solely on the boys at Fort Meade and Langley.
Part III
Mark Steyn's latest article in Cityjournal discusses the idea that the leaders of Iran, since its Revolution, have always viewed themselves as much more than the leaders of any one country or state:
What, after all, is the issue underpinning every little goofy incident in the news, from those Danish cartoons of Mohammed to recommendations for polygamy by official commissions in Canada to the banning of the English flag in English prisons because it’s an insensitive “crusader” emblem to the introduction of gender-segregated swimming sessions in municipal pools in Puget Sound? In a word, sovereignty. There is no god but Allah, and thus there is no jurisdiction but Allah’s. Ayatollah Khomeini saw himself not as the leader of a geographical polity but as a leader of a communal one: Islam. Once those urbane socialist émigrés were either dead or on the plane back to Paris, Iran’s nominally “temporal” government took the same view, too: its role is not merely to run national highway departments and education ministries but to advance the cause of Islam worldwide.Steyn is here hinting at something that is little discussed outside of the abstract: how Iran would use its new nuclear status. Everyone generally assumes that its entry into the club would be bad because it would empower the Iranian state. But what Steyn touches upon is the idea that instead Iran is making its bid for supremacy over an entire religion. An earlier section in the same essay:
Take Iran: it doesn’t fit into any of the groups. Indeed, it’s a buffer zone between most of the important ones: to the west, it borders the Arab world; to the northwest, it borders NATO (and, if Turkey ever passes its endless audition, the European Union); to the north, the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation’s turbulent Caucasus; to the northeast, the Stans—the newly independent states of central Asia; to the east, the old British India, now bifurcated into a Muslim-Hindu nuclear standoff. And its southern shore sits on the central artery that feeds the global economy.If you divide the world into geographical regions, then, Iran’s neither here nor there. But if you divide it ideologically, the mullahs are ideally positioned at the center of the various provinces of Islam—the Arabs, the Turks, the Stans, and the south Asians. Who better to unite the Muslim world under one inspiring, courageous leadership? If there’s going to be an Islamic superpower, Tehran would seem to be the obvious candidate.
The excellent little book Grand Strategies in War and Peace
Are not the Iranians pursuing a similar strategy now? Surely they've sent influence abroad, but it has been of the softer kind than invasions. Instead, they are focusing on getting nukes -- the ultimate guarantor of state security -- and then, as Steyn mentions, they'll really be able to flex their muscles.
Fortunately for all of us, the essay on Commie strategy described above was written by none other than Condoleezza Rice.
Part IV
Back in January, I quoted Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles
Thus far I have implied a link between proliferation and deterrence, suggesting that the society of states as a whole can determine when proliferation poses a systemic threat by asking whether a state's acquisition of nuclear weapons strengthens of weakens the prevailing system of nuclear deterrence. That system is currently underpinned by United States nuclear forces. It rests on the assumption that the United States will not use nuclear weapons as a means of aggression, but that it will actually destroy another state if that state cannot be otherwise dissuaded from attacking a state protected by the American nuclear deterrent. If the United States were to change its policies in either aspect, the current system of deterrence would be difficult to sustain, as formerly protected states raced to arm themselves and formerly deterred states began to explore the rewards of coercion.Now let's just say for argument's sake that you completely disagree: deterrence will work in an "n-polar" world, even if one of those poles is Iran. Let's consider the assumption there that the Iranians are rational actors. There are many who argue that Ahmadinjad is a "madman," thus attempting to rebut those who think deterrence would work, even with him.This present system would be gravely undermined by multipolarity -- the acquisition of a third superpower nuclear arsenal -- for two reasons. First, multipolarity introduces a complexity that tends to weaken American commitments by blurring the identity of the states to be deterred: in a tripolar or n-polar world, responsibility is diffused. The persuasiveness of the argument, often heard in the United States during the Cold War, that the United States must act to suppress international violence or parry aggression, because if the United States doesn't, no one else will, fades in a multipolar world. The sheer complexity of deterrence in a multipolar world, coupled with an understandable American willingness to let other powers take up burdens long carried by the United States, creates a situation similar to that of the paralyzed crowds that attend emergencies. Second, the system of deterrence is stressed whenever a crisis triggers the threat of the use of nuclear weapons to deter aggression; such crises call the American bluff and require the United States to run potentially fatal risks to enforce dissuasion. Multipolarity can only increase, perhaps exponentially, the number of nuclear crises. We could have had another system of nuclear deterrence, perhaps managed by other powers, but this is the one we have, and this is the system bequeathed us by the Long War. [emphasis in original]
"Madman" is so simplistic. What might be a more complex way of describing his thinking? Since my desire to find new material for you loyal readers out there knows no bounds (or because I'm truly addicted to this stuff, I don't know which is worse), one evening I found myself trolling through the RAND site, where I encountered this splendid paperby David Ronfeldt: Beware the Hubris-Nemesis Complex: A Concept for Leadership Analysis. The hubris-nemesis complex is defined thus:
In the years ahead, the United States will assuredly find itself in new international crises involving nations or groups that have powerful leaders. In some cases, these leaders may have a special, dangerous mindset that is the result of a "hubris-nemesis complex."What are some of the attributes of the complex?This complex involves a combination of hubris (a pretension toward an arrogant form of godliness) and nemesis (a vengeful desire to confront, defeat, humiliate, and punish an adversary, especially one that can be accused of hubris). The combination has strange dynamics that may lead to destructive, high-risk behavior. Attempts to deter, compel or negotiate with a leader who has a hubris-nemesis complex can be ineffectual or even disastrously counterproductive when those attempts are based on concepts better suited to dealing with more normal leaders.
- a destructive-constructive messianism;THe study goes on to list some leaders who exhibit this complex: Castro, Saddam Hussein, Hitler, Khadafi, Khomeini, and probably Slobodan Milosevic, Kim Il Sung, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Some who are unsavory but nonetheless have different personalities are: Lenin, Stalin, and Mao.-high, moralizing ideals that justify violence;
-a demand for absolute power, loyalty and attention;
-a fierce sense of struggle that may turn self-sacrificial;
One interesting aspect of the study is its mention of fictional examples. Captain Ahab in Moby Dick and Satan in Milton's Paradise Lost come in for scrutiny:
Aboard ship, Ahab imposes an "irresistible dictatorship" to go after a superpowerful beast, Moby Dick, that had injured him physically, and in Ahab's view, intellectually and spiritually too. This "grand, ungodly, godlike man" fulminates like a vengeful match for any power in heaven, in hell or on earth. His consuming pride and rage for revenge against the White Whale blaze in the great speech before his crew where he proclaims, "I will wreak that hate upon him . . . I'd strike the sun if it insulted me." And while others think him mad, Ahab knows he is but "demoniac" -- and that "for this hunt my malady becomes my most desired health." The Whale of course proves to be his nemesis.This made me want to pull Melville off my shelf and read one memorable part again:
Toward thee I roll, thou all-destroying but unconquering whale: to the last I grapple with thee: from hell's heart I stab at thee: for hate's sake I spit my last breath at thee.Can Mahmoud Ahmadinejad be the Captain Ahab of the Muslim world? It's a thought worth considering, whether he exhibits hubris-nemesis tendencies. Ronfeldt wrote his study on behalf of the CIA.
Posted by Chester at April 13, 2006 10:27 PM
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Comments
I found your discussion of Rice's essay in "Grand Strategies" very interesting. Haven't read the essay in a few years, and I'm operating away from my books today, so I'm working on memory.
As I recall the debate between the ideologists who wanted to spread the revolution and the "Socialism in one country" crowd -- Somebody had to make the decision which way to go, and that Somebody was Stalin, who went with the the "one country" group. Maybe what we have here, with Iran, is the victory of the spread the revolution crowd. Something similar occurred with the French, in 1793, when the Jacobins decided to divert attention from their home problems by a campaign to spred their revolution all over Europe.
I don't think there is any "respect" we could give the Persians, or, more correctly, the group ruling them, that would be enough. Seems like Edward Luttwak, in his book "the Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union" talked about the need of the Soviet leaders to have similar respect, in that it was a real problem for them to have outside centers of power pursuing anti-Soviet policies -- even indirectly anti-Soviet in the sense of freedom of the press -- because they undermined communist control. How much more true must this be in a country with an economy that is maybe 30 percent of what it was in 1979 ? This isn't even accounting for the Islamic dimension.
As for the thoughts from Steyn, I don't know if Iran can be a superpower, but the only way Persia will be a superpower again is if it's the Islamic superpower. They need to be bigger to do it...and from a marketing perspective of sorts, the most efficient way for them to be bigger, given the ethnic and historical differences between Iran and the neighbors is to play up Islam, and play down nationalism. Islam seems to have problems with nationalism and nationality anyway.
I wonder how much backing the mullahs really have ? My horseback guess is that they have plenty of rural and lower class support, with much less support in the cities and among the educated. Interesting, that despite the Islamic pretentions of the regime, their most reliable prop is likely to be plain old Persian nationalism in a pinch.
I think the Iranian leaders have simply made a calculation that the US is too weak to stop them from getting a nuke, and that Europe doesn't care. They may be a few years away, but it appears that the calculation has been made to force a crisis now, rather than later, probably because they think we're too boxed-in to move. I've blogged on this issue myself here: >
Sorry this comment has wandered, but this was an interesting post, and the subject is much on my mind.
Posted by: El Jefe Maximo at April 14, 2006 9:35 AM
Parts I (can't get no respect) and IV (Hubris-Nemesis) are, in my view, both aspects of the same thing: a shame-based social system. See the work of Leon Wurmser and others for a view of pathological shame-based personality disorders. By outlining the extreme cases, this will give you a fair notion of the range of behaviors we're facing, and the dynamics behind them.
I've mentioned this before, so I won't go into all the details here but it seems to me that the only just answer to the Iranian demands for "respect" is to tell them plainly: "That is not in our power to give. Only you can give yourselves the respect you crave." This is nothing less than the truth, and a very important truth.
Even if one wanted to pander to their crippling weakness on this score, one would still be obliged to tell them the "great truths" regardless of the impact on their sense of shame and honor. All that would change is the manner of the saying -- couching everything in an outward show of respect. Think "court of Louis XIV."
In the end, it's no use. They must change, willy-nilly. A shame-based culture is simply too brittle for a world in which one does not and cannot have absolute control over the behavior of all significant others. You see the "Islamic radicals" now claiming and angling to gain such control, hoping against hope that they can go on as they have done for so many generations, time out of mind. But it won't do. They will be forced to change or to commit such offenses as will turn the whole world against them.
Their only other "out" is to redefine the path of honor as some set of actions more in line with reality. This sort of change takes time, and I'm not sure the modern world affords them the time they will need.
We in the West have only one option, really. We simply must stick to our own position -- defending our right to be who and what we are, and affording the Iranians, the Arabs, and anybody else, the same rights.
I think we in the West have to take the position that their lives and their humanity are real, but their shame is not. They have created their own shame, and only they can undo it. If they seek to undo their shame by attacking us, we must be ready to strike back with overwhelming force. Only if the avenue of "undoing by retaliation" is closed to them will they seek another way out of their shame. The only way to close the avenue of "undoing by retaliation" is to make the cost astronomically high.
Most people in the West have a hard time understanding how desperate these people are. If they could feel the annihilating force of real shame for even one minute, they would understand why so many people in these cultures find death a welcome release.
I think it's incumbent on us to stand firm, and to wait it out. Sooner or later, they will recover their equilibrium and realize they are useful and valuable human beings, no different than anyone else. It may be a very scary wait, though. It will require great courage and firmness on our part.
Posted by: Mark T at April 14, 2006 10:48 AM
I tried to send a trackback. You might wanna this news to the roundup. According to James Risen, Clinton gave Iran nuke plans with minor flaws through a Russian double-agent scientist.
Posted by: Jay at April 14, 2006 10:54 AM
Chester:
Very interesting articles. A few thoughts:
1. The demand for respect is deeply rooted in Islamic thought and practice, from the practice of dhimminitude forced on non-muslims to the emphasis on "honor" which is so much a part of Islamic culture. More disturbing is the Iranian demand that "respect" (read, kowtowing to them) be forced on non-muslims. Note they demand a non-muslim country refrain from criticizing them in our own newspapers! Clearly, they believe themselves superior to us and entitled to force us to acknowledge ourselves inferior to them.
2. Their willingness to sponsor terrorism clearly shows they consider themselves at war with the "great satan" and they desire to defeat us, not just get themselves a place in the sun. The embassy hostage affair, the use of terrorism world wide, etc all are part of a war.
3. Clearly, the US has no current deterrent with ran. By that I mean our actions have demonstratedd to the Iranians that we are not serious about resisting them and do not have the will to fight them. They see how concerned we are with civilian casualties and how we agonize over our own. They believe we do not have the will to attack them decisively. Therefore it does not matter what our capability is, Iran does not believe we will use it.
4. It then follows that Iran has no reason not to use nuclear weapons to attack the great satan and the little satan once they are built. So, we must regard an Iranian nuclear attack as inevitable once their weapons are ready.
5. Consequently, our only defense is the one thing we have no will to do: preemtive nuclear strike.
Posted by: BattleofthePyramids at April 14, 2006 11:21 AM
We in the west are looking for a solution to this problem with Iran through secular eyes. The Iranian mullahs and Amedjan are looking at this issue through spritual eyes. The Iranian leadership has tagged the US as the Great Satan and they think of the UN as satan too, but the US as a greater evil. So, those on the political left think that we can just talk this out and come to an agreement where everyone is "respected". But, if that occured then the leadership of Iran would have to turn around to its own people and say we have just made a deal with the devil. Not a good postion for them to be in nor should we belive that they would keep shuch a deal with "satan".
I know that if I had made a deal with satan I would be looking for any way to cheat out of the deal and not feel the least bit of guilt about doing that since I would be sticking satan in the back and God would not only approve but applaud my actions.
There are two paths to acheive a final resolution. One is for the west to throw off its Judeao Christian belief system and fully without question accept the shia brand of Islam. Two is for the west, which really means the US, to treat Iran as we treated Japan during WWII with no mercy until they capitulate. The Japanese had a very similar spritual belief system in that they were committed to the point of total destruction. Or it seemed that way until they faced the reality of Tokyo fire bombed beyond reconigtion most of their armies laying dead on South Pacific islands and finally two major cities nuked to ashes.
Surley there must be a third solution. I await further comments in looking for that solution. But remember you must look through the spritual lense.
Bill out.
Posted by: Bill at April 14, 2006 11:57 AM
The Iranian demand for "respect" seems to be a close philosophical cousin to both the political correctness movement and the credo of the average street gang. When the standard is how a group feels rather than the rules to which individuals' actions will be held accountable, we are truly through the looking glass - into a world in which "off with her head" is the standard of (ir)rational discourse.
Posted by: Kobayashi Maru at April 14, 2006 12:42 PM
Exceptionally well done post - I'll be linking to it soon
Posted by: mark safranski at April 14, 2006 1:03 PM
Can Mahmoud Ahmadinejad be the Captain Ahab of the Muslim world is an irrelevant question.
The real question is, is George W. Bush the Captain Ahab of the western world?
Posted by: Alan at April 14, 2006 1:30 PM
Excellent post, Chester.
And very thoughtful responses, too, until we get to Safranski's which is predictable enough.
Let's also keep in perspective that the Iranian people, overwhelmingly, do NOT support the mullahcracy as shown by the rigged elections and virtual boycotts since 2004. Clearly the population is held in check only by the brutal, stalinistic methods employed by the mullahs. The regime's game is the same as all illegitimate regimes: keep themselves in power by WHATEVER MEANS necessary, including nukes.
It is somewhat irrelevant which particular psychosis the mullahs operate under. They cannot be negotiated away, bought off or held in check. We need to do some serious work the most restive of Iran's many restive regions and sponsor a popular, but local uprising against the regime that we can then support with air power. The creation of a Kurd-like autonomous region in Iran, perhaps on the border with Iraq or Afghanistan where we have logistical advantages, might be the spark that ignites the rest of Iran against the mullahs. Not a great option, i admit, but as all agree, we are fresh out of "great options" now and enabling Iranians to clean their own house is much preferable to muslim pride than having us doing it again.
Posted by: TS Alfabet at April 14, 2006 2:14 PM
Excellent post, Chester.
And very thoughtful responses, too, until we get to Safranski's which is predictable enough.
Let's also keep in perspective that the Iranian people, overwhelmingly, do NOT support the mullahcracy as shown by the rigged elections and virtual boycotts since 2004. Clearly the population is held in check only by the brutal, stalinistic methods employed by the mullahs. The regime's game is the same as all illegitimate regimes: keep themselves in power by WHATEVER MEANS necessary, including nukes.
It is somewhat irrelevant which particular psychosis the mullahs operate under. They cannot be negotiated away, bought off or held in check. We need to do some serious work the most restive of Iran's many restive regions and sponsor a popular, but local uprising against the regime that we can then support with air power. The creation of a Kurd-like autonomous region in Iran, perhaps on the border with Iraq or Afghanistan where we have logistical advantages, might be the spark that ignites the rest of Iran against the mullahs. Not a great option, i admit, but as all agree, we are fresh out of "great options" now and enabling Iranians to clean their own house is much preferable to muslim pride than having us doing it again.
Posted by: TS Alfabet at April 14, 2006 2:16 PM
Whether the Iranians support the regime or not is open to question -- remember 17 million voted for Ahmadinejad. In any case, they certainly support their country's right to nuclear technology, and resent it when foreigners try to dictate to them, just as they resented the US imposing the Shah on them.
Like it or not, the Iranians are people who love their country too.
Posted by: Hass at April 14, 2006 3:22 PM
It is almost a historical commonplace to hear today that the United States "imposed the Shah" on Iran, in place of the supposedly beloved Dr. Mossadegh (the Prime-Minister appointed by the self-same Shah, who then ran him out of the country).
Dr. Mossadegh was certainly no paragon of democracy: dissolving the Supreme Court, suspending elections to the Majlis, abolishing the Senate and sitting on media and politicans opposed to him. His overthrow by the Tehran rent-a-mob and the Army in favor of Shah Mohammad Reza was not unpopular -- and this event would not have been even possible unless that were the case.
The Left of course, in Iran, in Europe, and here, never liked it -- because Dr. Mossadegh was chummy with the Tudeh.
Posted by: HaleCullom at April 14, 2006 4:49 PM
You may enjoy an analysis I wrote on my blog, re Carter and Iran:
http://forgottenprophets.blogspot.com/2006/02/39-13-x-3.html
(Isn't Steyn great?)
:-)
Best,
J
Posted by: Jack H at April 14, 2006 6:45 PM
Yes, Dr. Mossadegh certainly had his autocratic tendencies, but it's also fair to say they were brought out by the West. He didn't have many problems taking on democratic institutions because he believed they were being manipulated by the West (especially Britain, who wanted its oil back), and for the most part he was right.
And the fact still stands that we imposed the Shah, who was undoubtedly much worse than Dr. Mossadegh. Much worse, whereas nations tend to be eager to forget past abominations of their own making, therefor whatever crimes Dr. M committed, they're eager to hold any slight offense inflicted upon them by a foreigner, and the Shah was much more than a slight offense.
Posted by: William at April 14, 2006 7:04 PM
Regarding the Hubris-Nemesis complex: Alan Prendergast has an in depth article on Harris and Klebold of Columbine infamy in Westword.com April 13-19 edition. The "complex" seems to apply equally well to our two arrogant little narcissists from Colorado, as it does to Ahmadinajad.
Posted by: Bob Agard at April 14, 2006 9:53 PM
El Jefe,
You raise an interesting point: who has forced this crisis? them or us? It takes two to tango I suppose, but I believe you are right: they have calculated that for the moment we are operating froma position of weakness, so Iran is trying to force a decision. Perhaps this explains why Ahmadinejad is eager to declare nuclear status early, whereas the US believes there are a few years left in the process.
Ken Pollack describes Iran as having two clocks ticking: one for democracy as its economy worsens and its population grows younger and more eager to embrace modernity; the other for nuclear weapons. It is hard to judge at any one time which clock is ticking faster. But the Mullahs are aware of the two clocks as well and want to speed the latter while slowing the former.
Perhaps their thinking goes like this: Our nuke clock is still 2-3 years from "going off", but the US is bogged down in Iraq right now. So, best to declare early and try to make our nuclear status a fait accompli. Otherwise if we wait two years until when we actually have a testable device, the US will be in a much stronger position to oppose us. Plus, by then, who knows how the democracy clock will hae progressed?
The interesting thing about this logic is that it assumes that the US position in Iraq is a bad thing. Well, perhaps it assumes the Iraqi engagement is good geostrategically and logistically for the US, but weakens us internally as it seems Americans don't particularly care for the war. In any case, I'm not so sure this is a smart assumption: American support for ground action is tenuous at best. But ground action is not required. All kinds of aerial campaigns are possible and would likely be very effective.
The other observation about Iran's choice to force a decision now it that the US is not just sitting idly by. Their gamble might seem to have been a more effective one if we had just sat on our hands, but it seems Bush was wise to let the EU handle things for a bit -- to placate them and build consensus while progress could be made in Iraq. Now Condi can come in as the closer, take things to the Security Council, and get the freakin' ball rolling toward stopping them.
Bush has said Iran won't be a nuclear power. If he changes his mind about this foreign policy issue, it will be a rare occurrence indeed.
Posted by: Chester at April 15, 2006 7:45 AM
El Jefe,
You raise an interesting point: who has forced this crisis? them or us? It takes two to tango I suppose, but I believe you are right: they have calculated that for the moment we are operating froma position of weakness, so Iran is trying to force a decision. Perhaps this explains why Ahmadinejad is eager to declare nuclear status early, whereas the US believes there are a few years left in the process.
Ken Pollack describes Iran as having two clocks ticking: one for democracy as its economy worsens and its population grows younger and more eager to embrace modernity; the other for nuclear weapons. It is hard to judge at any one time which clock is ticking faster. But the Mullahs are aware of the two clocks as well and want to speed the latter while slowing the former.
Perhaps their thinking goes like this: Our nuke clock is still 2-3 years from "going off", but the US is bogged down in Iraq right now. So, best to declare early and try to make our nuclear status a fait accompli. Otherwise if we wait two years until when we actually have a testable device, the US will be in a much stronger position to oppose us. Plus, by then, who knows how the democracy clock will hae progressed?
The interesting thing about this logic is that it assumes that the US position in Iraq is a bad thing. Well, perhaps it assumes the Iraqi engagement is good geostrategically and logistically for the US, but weakens us internally as it seems Americans don't particularly care for the war. In any case, I'm not so sure this is a smart assumption: American support for ground action is tenuous at best. But ground action is not required. All kinds of aerial campaigns are possible and would likely be very effective.
The other observation about Iran's choice to force a decision now it that the US is not just sitting idly by. Their gamble might seem to have been a more effective one if we had just sat on our hands, but it seems Bush was wise to let the EU handle things for a bit -- to placate them and build consensus while progress could be made in Iraq. Now Condi can come in as the closer, take things to the Security Council, and get the freakin' ball rolling toward stopping them.
Bush has said Iran won't be a nuclear power. If he changes his mind about this foreign policy issue, it will be a rare occurrence indeed.
Posted by: Chester at April 15, 2006 7:45 AM
Excellent post, ecellent comments. I thought Jay's commments on the concept of "respect" -- that of an inferior to a superior, are worthy of their own exploration. Perhaps the following thoughts might be of interest to you: http://www.dinocrat.com/archives/2006/04/16/irans-rhineland-moment/
Thanks very much,
Jack Risko
Posted by: jack risko at April 16, 2006 9:06 PM
Perhaps when Iran asks for "respect", it is asking to be treated as an independent state – on equal terms. It doesn't recognise America as having the right to give it orders. The pressures being put on Iran do not appear to be working, from a Western perspective, and may be counterproductive. It is time to reconsider the approach.
Iran has observed (by looking at the example of North Korea) that the possession of nuclear weapons is a guarantee that America will not intervene militarily in its affairs. Further, it has seen (through the example of India) that economically important countries are forgiven for developing nuclear weapons and are welcomed as allies anyway. And recent rhetoric is giving the impression that America is actively considering strikes on Iran, possibly involving depleted uranium or worse.
These American policies, taken together, are providing Iran with reasons to develop nuclear weapons. And America is not well placed to either persuade or coerce Iran to stop doing so.
Military strikes on Iran would be to make it even easier for Islamic extremists to recruit more terrorists, by portraying America as the Great Satan. As Britain learnt, to its cost, last year (7/7) it is all too easy to radicalise moderate Muslims by appearing to attack the whole Islamic community. America would certainly win the battle in the short term, but at the price of yet further deterioration in world security in the medium to long term.
Iran says that its research is intended for peaceful purposes: nuclear power rather than weapons. It appears to be (at least partly) cooperating with United Nations weapons inspectors. There are fewer long-term risks in a UN-based approach, as extremists would find it much more difficult to demonise the world as a whole than to demonise America. On this occasion, the weapons inspectors should be given time to do their work and America should avoid talking itself into military actions that would further damage relations with the Islamic world.
Posted by: Martin Scalway at April 16, 2006 11:47 PM
Perhaps when Iran asks for "respect", it is asking to be treated as an independent state – on equal terms. It doesn't recognise America as having the right to give it orders. The pressures being put on Iran do not appear to be working, from a Western perspective, and may be counterproductive. It is time to reconsider the approach.
Iran has observed (by looking at the example of North Korea) that the possession of nuclear weapons is a guarantee that America will not intervene militarily in its affairs. Further, it has seen (through the example of India) that economically important countries are forgiven for developing nuclear weapons and are welcomed as allies anyway. And recent rhetoric is giving the impression that America is actively considering strikes on Iran, possibly involving depleted uranium or worse.
These American policies, taken together, are providing Iran with reasons to develop nuclear weapons. And America is not well placed to either persuade or coerce Iran to stop doing so.
Military strikes on Iran would be to make it even easier for Islamic extremists to recruit more terrorists, by portraying America as the Great Satan. As Britain learnt, to its cost, last year (7/7) it is all too easy to radicalise moderate Muslims by appearing to attack the whole Islamic community. America would certainly win the battle in the short term, but at the price of yet further deterioration in world security in the medium to long term.
Iran says that its research is intended for peaceful purposes: nuclear power rather than weapons. It appears to be (at least partly) cooperating with United Nations weapons inspectors. There are fewer long-term risks in a UN-based approach, as extremists would find it much more difficult to demonise the world as a whole than to demonise America. On this occasion, the weapons inspectors should be given time to do their work and America should avoid talking itself into military actions that would further damage relations with the Islamic world.
Posted by: Martin Scalway at April 16, 2006 11:51 PM