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September 25, 2006

David Frum and Containment

David Frum, former speechwriter for the Bush Administration, has made an argument in two separate places that the Bush team is not preparing at all to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, and is instead "acquiescing" to their desires.

Frum first made the case last week in his blog at National Review:

1) Any prudent war planner has to assume that the rulers of Iran will strike back . . .
2) Despite the accusations of America's critics, the United States does not bomb other countries out of a clear blue sky . . .
3) Nor has there been diplomacy outside the UN . . .
4) Finally, through Washington there echoes the hushed sound of back doors being opened to quiet negotiations . . .
Then he seconded these emotions with a piece in Canada's National Post (via AEI), arguing that the Bush Administration is preparing for a campaign of containment against Iran:
Iran is going nuclear. Sanctions will not be imposed. The U.S. hesitates to strike. And the Bush administration's new big idea will not work. Brace yourselves.

Commentary

In his post at NRO, Frum mentions that perhaps the real goal is a deal. If this is true, then the Bush administration can't be faulted for its pursuit, no matter how unlikely it seems. For while there is a certain clamoring in the right for action against Iran, there is at the same time little substantive discussion of the fact that such action will be the beginning of what could be a very large war, and while justified and perhaps necessary, it will not be clean and simple by any means. If a favorable outcome -- a non-nuclear Iran -- can be obtained without the use of force, then by all means, let's do it.

But if not, then we are in for a very interesting next few years, as a nuclear Iran is a prospect no sane and serious individual should be willing to entertain lightly.

What might a policy of "containment" look like vs Iran? A glimpse was perhaps provided earlier this year in an article in the Times of London on the Proliferation Security Initiative:

A PROGRAMME of covert action against nuclear and missile traffic to North Korea and Iran is to be intensified after last week’s missile tests by the North Korean regime.

Intelligence agencies, navies and air forces from at least 13 nations are quietly co-operating in a “secret war” against Pyongyang and Tehran.

It has so far involved interceptions of North Korean ships at sea, US agents prowling the waterfronts in Taiwan, multinational naval and air surveillance missions out of Singapore, investigators poring over the books of dubious banks in the former Portuguese colony of Macau and a fleet of planes and ships eavesdropping on the “hermit kingdom” in the waters north of Japan . . .

The United States and its allies are now preoccupied by what Kim might do with the trump card in his arsenal — his stockpile of plutonium for nuclear bombs.

“The real danger is that the North Koreans could sell their plutonium to another rogue state — read Iran — or to terrorists,” said a western diplomat who has served in Pyongyang. American officials fear Iran is negotiating to buy plutonium from North Korea in a move that would confound the international effort to stop Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme.

The prospect of such a sale is “the next big thing”, said a western diplomat involved with the issue. The White House commissioned an intelligence study on the risk last December but drew no firm conclusions.

From the perspective painted here, the Proliferation Security Initiative seems to be two things: both a good picture of what "containment" against another rogue nuclear power resembles, and a race against the clock to make sure that it does not sell or pass nuclear material to other states or non-states.

Iran is a much larger and more powerful entity than North Korea, and more strategically located to boot. If the picture above is an accurate portrayal of a containment strategy, one must ask how much more difficult such a strategy would be if aimed at Iran.

Furthermore, one must not be too hasty in comparing such strategies to those used against the Soviet Union. A central part of that doctrine, as we all know, was mutually-assured destruction. Attack us and we will destroy you, though we may well be destroyed in the process, to paraphrase.

Is it possible some new doctrine of offensive use of nuclear weapons might apply to situations in which states are likely to sell nuclear materials or pass them to proxies? How might such a doctrine be formulated? If containment is truly to be the policy of the US, then it should have such a strict expression of offensive capability as one of its key platforms.

Such are the dilemmas we'll be facing if Iran becomes a nuclear power.

Posted by Chester at September 25, 2006 10:24 AM

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Comments

While containment may be the only rational strategy for a democratic nation that's already demonstrated its squeamishness about preventive war, it will not be effective long term. Why? 1) Because China and Russia (not to mention other Islamic nations) will not only fail to support effective containment measures but will work in direct opposition to them in order to support their own economic interests. 2) Because, as you say, Iran is a large nation and its already been established that we're stretched thin and thus caught flat-footed when it comes to intelligence assets on the ground in effective positions. 3) Because what Iran really wants is not to use its nukes, but rather--by threatening to use them--to make its terrorist incursions into the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Asia that much easier. 4) Because Iran's ambitions will not be rationally deterred--especially in light of what they've learned these past few months and years of our utter fecklessness in the West.

Posted by: Kobayashi Maru at September 25, 2006 12:26 PM

I think that those who advocate containment don't really stop to consider what exactly it means: containment was the foreign policy of the United States for several decades. It organized nearly all of our efforts abroad.

I think many who today would advocate containment against Iran fail to think in such terms; instead, they merely affix a sort of wish-it-would-all-go-away mentality to problems and call it "containment."

Posted by: Chester at September 25, 2006 3:18 PM

The biggest drawback to using a containment strategy against Iran is that it will result in a highly destabilizing three-sided arms race in the Middle East, the worst place on Earth for an arms race. An Iranian nuclear weapons capability will result in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and perhaps Turkey also taking up the nuclear sword. With Israel and Iran in the game, the result would be an exceptionally fragile situation. Any who advocate a containment strategy must also be compelled to explain how they would attempt to manage this nightmarish likelihood.

In August 2005, we reviewed 14 options the U.S. government might employ to deal with the problem of Iran (part 1) and (part 2), ranging from relatively passive diplomacy up to full-scale military scenarios. We concluded at that time that containment, combined with a punitive “deterrence for rogues” policy that would apply collective punishment against all rogue states for any nuclear incidents, was the least-worst option.

At the time, it seemed like an American military campaign against Iran, without a clear casus belli, could very well result in the formation of a strong, global anti-U.S. military alliance. Thus we settled on containment.

Over the past year we have also come to the view that of all the players in this drama, the U.S. is the least threatened by Iran. Successes in missile defense research and stepped-up border and shipping container security will reduce the Iranian threat to the U.S. homeland.

The remaining problem for U.S. policymakers would be defending U.S. allies in the Middle East against outright Iranian attack, intimidation, or subversion. The solution to this problem is 25% military and 75% diplomatic and political. Implementing this solution would also go a long way to solving the arms race and instability problem described above.

Iran is more of a problem for others than for the U.S. Those others that are more threatened must show what they are willing to do to defend themselves. The U.S. does not need to over-extend itself on the Iranian issue, and end up paying the most for a solution from which it benefits the least.

The U.S. government seems to be nearly silent on the issue of Iran, even after Iran violated the UN Security Council’s August 31st deadline for suspending nuclear enrichment. Is the U.S. government now following our advice?

Posted by: westhawk at September 26, 2006 11:19 AM