« Global Crisis Watch Special Edition | Main | Are political categories dissolving? Could they? »

October 11, 2006

A Nuclear Leviathan in the Pacific

Westhawk argues that the biggest loser of North Korea's nuclear test is China.

China remains by far the biggest loser from North Korea’s actions. America’s security alliances with Japan and South Korea will become more important and these bonds will be strengthened. Japan, now led by the unapologetic nationalist Shinzo Abe, will scrap any remaining restraints on its military doctrine and will invest in an offensive military strike capability. Japan could also very quickly become a nuclear weapons state itself, something that could occur after further provocations.
Joe Katzman argues at WindsofChange that the focus should not be on North Korea, but on China:
The truth is that North Korea is an irrelevant bit player in this whole drama. The real player here is China. They have helped North Korea at every step, and North Korea's regime cannot survive at all without their ongoing food and fuel aid. Kim Jong-Il's nuclear plans may be slightly inconvenient to the Chinese - just not not inconvenient enough to derail a strategy that still promises net plusses to those pursuing it within China's dictatorship.
Both of them think that the best way to influence China, and thereby to influence North Korea, is to make it clear that Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan, will be encouraged or given tacit approval by the US to strengthen their militaries.

Westhawk:

The U.S. and its allies in the region will be forced to bypass an ineffectual China when formulating their security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific theater. And this will result in a strengthening American-led, anti-Chinese alliance in the region. This is exactly opposite the outcome China wished to see occur.
And Katzman:
In other words, China won't move unless its current strategy is seen to cost them, big-time.

The biggest cost, and the only one that will be real to them in any sense, is to have Kim Jong-Il's nuclear detonation result in parallel nuclear proliferation among the nearby states China wishes to dominate/ bully. That would be a foreign policy disaster for the Chinese, and would cause the current architects of China's North Korea policy to be buried along with their policy. Which, as we noted earlier, is the only kind of policy education that works in a system like theirs.

David Frum, former Bush speechwriter, takes a similar tack, in an article in the New York Times (here via AEI):
A new approach is needed. America has three key strategic goals in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test. The first is to enhance the security of those American allies most directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons: Japan and South Korea.

The second is to exact a price from North Korea for its nuclear program severe enough to frighten Iran and any other rogue regimes considering following the North Korean path.

The last is to punish China. North Korea could not have completed its bomb if China, which provides the country an immense amount of food and energy aid, had strongly opposed it. Apparently, Beijing sees some potential gain in the uncertainty that North Korea's status brings. If China can engage in such conduct cost-free, what will deter Russia from aiding the Iranian nuclear program, or Pakistan someday aiding a Saudi or Egyptian one?

Frum offers a four part plan for dealing with the crisis and accomplishing his three steps [emphasis added]:
Step up the development and deployment of existing missile defense systems.

[ . . . ]

End humanitarian aid to North Korea and pressure South Korea to do the same.

[ . . . ]

Invite Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore to join NATO--and even invite Taiwan to send observers to NATO meetings.

[ . . . ]

Encourage Japan to renounce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and create its own nuclear deterrent.

Commentary

What Frum proposes would most certainly punish China, but how much punishment is too much? Consider the panoply of security architectures that have comprised the US alliance system in the Pacific. The US has a security treaty with Japan. It has similar agreements with South Korea. It has guarantees, explicit and otherwise, with Taiwan. The US used to have an alliance with Australia and New Zealand called ANZUS; but New Zealand protested the stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear ships in its ports in the 1980s, forcing the US to come to refer to New Zealand as a "friend, not an ally." The alliance with Australia on the other hand, is one of the strongest that the US maintains.

At the same time, each of these countries has dramatically differing relations with each other. Australia maintains an alliance with New Zealand. Japan has no security relationship with South Korea, though it has offered to help defend Taiwan from China. A diagram of the existing security relationships might look like the following. I've included all alliances as arrows, whereas other lesser defense partnerships are lines without arrows. All of the US relationships are included; not all of those between the other countries are:

Slide1.jpg

One can quickly see that this situation lends itself to balance-of-power politics: since the relationships between each state are not symmetrical, a third-party, one that is not included on the chart, is free to attempt to co-opt any of the members in various ways, thereby inserting itself into the entire balance of power. That third party is, of course, China.

But what Frum proposes, the idea that all of these countries would be allowed to join NATO, would revolutionize the security system in Asia in two ways:

a) every state's relationship with the US would be upgraded to the highest status: that of an alliance, wherein the US gives security guarantees; and,

b) every state's relationship with all the others would be upgraded in the same way.

Provided that the US was the only nuclear power of all of these member states, the resulting security landscape would look something like this:

Slide2.jpg

Such a defense arc would truly be a diplomatic coup and a boon for the US; the creation of such a regime might even constitute the life's work of a statesman.

But the fly in the soup is encouraging Japan to obtain nuclear weapons. This is for several reasons:

a) The most difficult aspect of the above alliance would be the South Korean-Japanese relationship. A nuclear Japan would be inordinately more powerful than South Korea, possibly leading South Korea to decline joining the alliance.

b) A nuclear Japan might just be "punishing China too much," as alluded to above. If a nuclear Japan fostered a crisis with China, it would do so knowing that the US would have no choice but to respond with its nuclear forces should China attack Japan. China might therefore seek to massively expand its own nuclear arsenal, currently estimated at a mere 150 or so weapons. The prospect of a third superpower nuclear arsenal introduces too much complexity into the system of nuclear deterrence (see this previous post, and this article on Nuclear Primacy in Foreign Affairs).

c) Finally, as the nuclear guarantor of the world's security, the United States has an obligation to oppose proliferation everywhere -- friendly nation or not, democracy or not. Just as a third nuclear superpower introduces complexity, so does a number of competing regional nuclear powers. Complexity creates risk, misunderstanding, and increases the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, an event in the best interests of no one.

Creating a security alliance such as Frum describes though would severely hamper China's ambitions in the 21st century. If that is the price that they must pay for their continued support of Kim Jong Il, then so be it.

Posted by Chester at October 11, 2006 4:07 AM

Trackback Pings

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.theadventuresofchester.com/MT/mt-tb.cgi/954

Comments

While these seem to be viable choices in the current situation, they all have long term consequences that may be just as bad or worse than the current threats posed by N Korea.

Arming Japan would then encourage S Korea to get their own nukes. Taiwan would be right behind them. Nuclear weapons in Japan, S Korea, Taiwan would be China's worst nightmare. It would be huge deterent to China and maybe stop them from continuing to support N Korea. But what happens afterwards?

Do we really want all these countries to have nukes? Wouldn't greatly increase the likelyhood that one or more of these countries actually launches their weapons in a future conflict? Would it not increase the likelyhood that such technologies be stolen or bought by other countries such as Burma (or whatever it is called now), Malaysia, Indoesia, or more? Could they then spread to the 'stans or other Asian countries? Wouldn't it also be more likely that AQ or other terrorists get their dangerous hands on such weapons?

Lets not trade today's issue for a worse one next decade. We've done that too many times before and the stakes get higher each time we do.

A better solution would be to get Japan to allow us(US) to station an ABM base there and possibly some of our nukes in Japan. Base at least one Naval Task Force and two Trident subs in Japan. And get Taiwan to also base our Naval forces. Just beginning the negotiations for such would get the ChiComs attention bigtime.

Also tell them that the western world cannot participate in their 2008 Olympics if they continue to support such a terrible rigime as that in N Korea. And point out the terrible wave of refugees they will be faced with should it become necessary to take even limited military action.

Posted by: thewiz at October 10, 2006 9:57 PM

I think the idea of including ROK, Japan and Taiwan the Nato alliance would be a good start, each of those countries would bring unique assets to an alliance. I spent 18 months in Japan at Misaswa AB and was able to watch JSDF personnel in training ops, they are a defense force in name only. they have over 331 combat aircraft with 160 F-15J/DJ. 16 Subs, and multiple sea and air anti submarine/mine assets.
Taiwan flys the F-16 and Mirage 2000, and i believe the ROC bring about 560,000 troops into the mix along with F-16's and possibly a few
F-15's.
But this biggest way to hurt the chinese would be to boycott their olympics, it would cause them to lose face in the whole region (and face goes along way out there) and mark the Chinese games as a huge failure which would leave a nice little mark in the history books.

(http://www.cdi.org/issues/Asia/japanmil.html)
(http://www.taiwanairpower.org/af/index.html)
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/army.htm)

Posted by: sackett at October 10, 2006 11:31 PM

You write:

"If a nuclear Japan fostered a crisis with China, it would do so knowing that the US would have no choice but to respond with its nuclear forces should China attack Japan."

Why? If a nuclear Japan fostered a crisis, it wouldn't need the Americans to punish China in the event of an attack - it HAS ITS OWN NUKES.

That's the point. And because of that point, China finds a huge crimp in its plans to bully the states around it into making it first a regional hegemon, then an Asian one. Which is a big, big loss given their geo-political position and strategy.

Big enough to make them do something about their client Kim Jong-Il, in order to avoid that.

Posted by: Joe Katzman at October 11, 2006 12:16 AM

Joe,

Basically, I thought Frum's third and fourth points at odds with each other. If Japan fostered a crisis and Japan and the US are tied by NATO then the US has to respond -- just like today, when they are tied by a similar bilateral agreement.

But if Japan fosters a crisis, has its own nukes, AND is part of a bilateral or multilateral agreement, then the US also has to respond.

In short, I don't think Japan should have nukes. There's a lot of fast and loose talk about this now. More nuclear powers means more opportunities for a crisis and more chance of an exchange. The ultimate goal of the US should be preventing an exchange -- and this is not just a moral point. The strength of the US lies on the international system that an exchange anywhere would undermine tremendously, if not catastrophically.

Posted by: Chester at October 11, 2006 12:23 AM

Message to China: Curb your dog or we shall let Japan do it for you.

Posted by: DWMF at October 11, 2006 10:07 AM

I don't think Japan "should" have nukes either...but that's beside the point, if Kim Jong Il really throws himself into the nuclear nutcase role, they're probably going to build them anyway. This possibility should be enough to seriously concern the Chinese: one would hope to the point where they will use whatever leverage they have with the NK's to keep this from happening.

Maybe that's the trouble...that they don't use their leverage because they really don't have much. What do you do with a regime that won't do its sums like everybody else ?

Posted by: El Jefe Maximo at October 11, 2006 10:19 AM

please don't be offended but the frum's et al are all recycling polished up state department tripe. every one of these petty tyrants follows the same script. they have since the beginning of time.

i have said along that we should pull all of our troops out of korea. should have 20 years ago. they are cannon fodder. despite all the hoopla n. korea is s. korea's problem. if they don't want to solve the problem so be it. japan and taiwan should arm up and we should help them. peace through strength.

as to the UN, china, russia etc doing anything about n. korea, slim chance. why the US continually falls for the canard that the rest of the world would do anything that remotely agrees with a US policy is cause for alarm. the aftermath being our continued embarrassment and apparent naivete and diplomatic failure. south korea, not china, not russia, not the US controls the situation on the korean peninsula. why? because that's where the majority of the dead bodies will be. china and russia will, for their own persoanl reasons, continue to prop up 'tin pots' for their propaganda purposes. there is no risk in this position. why? because if any of these tinpots double cross either party they will be immediately murdered, no if's and's or but's. that why their dipolmacy is alway very effective but crude.

Posted by: patrick neid at October 11, 2006 10:43 AM

Chester, I think that an inclusion into NATO isn't the way to go. As the current failings in Afghanistan show, NATO is not what it used to be. A new organization will be required for this endeavor. Perhaps a United Pacific Coalition, or something along those lines.

Also, I agree that Japan will not need to go nuclear if such on organization is set up.

Posted by: Final Historian at October 11, 2006 3:57 PM

Yes, we agree that it is unnecessary at this point to add any more nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific area. Hopefully the mere knowledge that Japan and Taiwan could quickly become nuclear weapon states in short order will be enough to cause the Chinese leadership to re-think its Korean policy, such as it is.

A relatively minor boost of Japan's GDP allocation to defense spending, from 1% to 1.5% or even 2% would add great pressure to Chinese defense planning. With such a boost, Japan could add very significant air and naval offensive strike capabilities, along with enhanced air and missile defenses. This would set back China's timetable to gain regional military influence by at least a decade.

But most important has been the wisdom of U.S. diplomacy in the region, a record for which several U.S. administrations can take credit. U.S. friendships in Asia now constitute a diplomatic cordon around China, another outcome exactly opposite to what China has intended. This cordon of relationships will be very useful to the U.S.

And over the next two decades or so, the U.S. "special relationship" will be with Japan, and perhaps India, not with Great Britain.

Westhawk

Posted by: westhawk at October 11, 2006 4:59 PM

I would like to suggest a different read on the situation and a different response.

I think China has deliberately encouraged and enabled North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons as a means of waging asymetrical warfare (or at least cold warfare) against the United States and its allies through the use of a surrogate. China has sufficient influence over North Korea that could turn off the North Korean nuke program in a heart-beat if it wanted to. The fact that it hasn't -- and moreover has blocked U.S. efforts at the UN to stop the North Korean program -- should be taken for what it self-evidently is: smoking gun evidence that China wanted North Korea's progam to succeed.

It's an inconvenient truth, but it's one that's been hiding in plain sight for years: China is not our pal. It is certainly not our partner in maintaining regional stability in its corner of the world. It wants us out of the region and it sees the creation of a anti-American nuclear rogue states as a way of furthering this aim.

I think the appropriate reposte for this is a step similar to the deployment of the Euro-missiles at the end of the Cold War -- but with a twist.

We should offer to sell both North Korea and Japan an off-the-shelf nuclear deterrent -- say 200 state-of-the-art nuclear war heads each along with the cruise and ballistic missiles needed to deliver them. Anti-missile technology could also be included in the package.

And to encourage them to accept the offer, we should inform them that if they don't in the event of a nuclear strike on them by a hostile country we will no longer guarantee that we will retailiate with nuclear weapons on their behalf. In other words, instead of encouraging them to shelter under the American nuclear umbrella, we will sell each of them of one their own, but one which they will have to hold themselves.

This would accomplish several things.

First, it would render North Korea's massive investment in nukes -- and its massive investment in conventional arms -- largely useless, much as the deployment of the Euro-missiles neutralized the massive Soviet military build-up of the 1970s and 1980s. It's not clear what the consequences of this would be for the future of the North Korean regime, but it's hard to imagine it would improve its prospects of survival.

Second, it would be the perfect payback for China for nuclearizing anti-American rogue states. (It's worth recalling the Chinese have also been assisting the Pakistani program and, most likely, the Iranian one; they have certainly obstructed efforts at the UN to block them). The message would be, "if you threaten us through the creation of hostile nuclear surrogates, well two can play at that game."

Third, it would relieve us of having to risk getting into a nuclear war that could lead to the loss of one or more American cities just because a Kim Jong Il has a particularly bad brain day and decides to nuke his neighbors. Better to give South Korea and Japan the tools and let them deal with Kim. It's their countries and their neighborhood.

Granted, the downside is the expansion of the nuclear club, but is this really such a downside in the case of Korea and Japan? Both countries have reasonably democratic governments and politically mature leadership, as well as modern, educated societies. Chances are good that they could handle the responsibilities that come with nuclear arms -- including keeping their old hatreds under control. An expansion of the nuclear club becomes alarming only when violent, totalitarian regimes with demented leaders -- like North Korea and Iran -- try to join. That's why its important to demonstrate to such countries in an unmistakeable way that going nuclear will create more problems for them than it will solve -- and for their enablers as well.

Posted by: pauldanish at October 14, 2006 2:52 AM

I think our growing relationship with India, and India's growing blue-water Navy, has a place in this discussion.

Right now I would side with those who would argue for a POTO [Pacific Ocean Treaty Organization] versus NATO alliance. But we tried that before with SEATO and CENTO, didn't we?

Posted by: Lloyd at October 14, 2006 4:34 PM