December 4, 2006

The Iraq Study Unconference

James Joyner asks in TCSDaily why we haven't learned yet that commissions are a horrible idea:

The idea that blue ribbon committees of greybeards can come up with novel ways of solving problems that everyone would then agree on has long had great appeal. We're positively overrun with the Blue Ribbon Panel on This and the Bipartisan Commission on That.

Just a quick Google search reveals the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (aka "The 9-11 Commission"), the National Commission on Social Security Reform (not to be confused with the 1998 National Commission on Retirement Policy or the 2001 President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security), the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy, the Commission on No Child Left Behind, and the bipartisan Commission to Strengthen Confidence in Congress. The gold standard has to be the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which was headed by former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford. It just doesn't get any more bipartisan, moderate, and statesmanlike!

[ . . . ]

Any solution that Baker, Hamilton, and their colleagues could agree to was destined to be so watered down as to be meaningless. Get more international cooperation! Make the Iraqi leadership take responsibility! Make a more concerted effort to solve the Palestinian crisis! Because nobody currently in office ever thought of those things?

Commentary

The post "History's End, History's Beginning" considered whether states might benefit from decentralizing and networking much of their operations. If so, then perhaps commissions could be replaced with "unconferences." Wikipedia defines them thus:

An unconference is a conference where the content of the sessions is driven and created by the participants, generally day-by-day during the course of the event, rather than by a single organizer, or small group of organizers, in advance. To date, the term is primarily in use in the geek community. Unconference processes like Open Space Technology, however, have been around for over 20 years in other contexts.
For a subject like Iraq, the key would be to include more people, some younger people, and then only give them a few days instead of several months. Unconferences have become very popular in the tech world. Software developer and investor Dave Winer has written this:
The idea for an unconference came while sitting in the audience of a panel discussion at a conference, waiting for someone to say something intelligent, or not self-serving, or not mind-numbingly boring. The idea came while listening to someone drone endlessly through PowerPoint slides, nodding off, or (in later years) checking email, or posting something to my blog, wondering if it had to be so mind-numbingly boring. This observation may turn out to be the Fundamental Law of Conventional Conferences:
The sum of the expertise of the people in the audience is greater than the sum of expertise of the people on stage.
It’s probably much worse than that. My guess is that if you swapped the people on stage with an equal number chosen at random from the audience, the new panelists would effectively be smarter, because they didn’t have the time to get nervous, to prepare PowerPoint slides, to make lists of things they must remember to say, or have overly grandiose ideas about how much recognition they are getting. In other words, putting someone on stage and telling them they’re boss probably makes them dumber. In any case it surely makes them more boring.
So what to do?
First, you take the people who used to be the audience and give them a promotion. They’re now participants. Their job is to participate, not just to listen and at the end to ask questions. Then you ask everyone who was on stage to take a seat in what used to be the audience. Okay, now you have a room full of people, what exactly are they supposed to do? Choose a reporter, someone who knows something about the topic of discussion (yes, there is a topic, it’s not free-form) and knows how to ask questions and knit a story together.

Real reporters are often the best discussion leaders. Put your DL at the front of the room, with a mike in hand. A couple of people roam the room with handheld wireless mikes to put in the face of the people who are speaking. No one lines up for a mike. Think Donahue or Oprah. The DL’s job is is to craft a story from the expertise in the room. Everyone is a source, about to be interviewed by someone who’s listening. The DL may actually call on people, so no one should get the idea that they can fall asleep or daydream. Pay attention, you might be the next speaker!

Sounds much more interesting than the things most conferences produce. John Steinbeck once did a little riff on parties:
. . . And it is also generally understood that a party hardly ever goes the way it is planned or intended. This last, of course, excludes those dismal slave parties, whipped and controlled and dominated, given by ogreish professional hostesses. These are not parties at all but acts and demonstrations, about as spontaneous as peristalsis and as interesting as its end product.
Mr. Steinbeck, I give you the Iraq Study Group.

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December 3, 2006

IED Hunter

At least someone in the world has a sense of humor about Iraq. Also, looks the Marines in Ramadi have some spare time here and there.

[Via Hotair.]

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November 30, 2006

A Red Harvest in the "Conflict Ecosystem"

Tigerhawk points to Ralph Peters' argument that Iraq is not in a state of civil war. From Peters:

The good news - and, unfortunately, the bad news - is that Iraq is not in a state of civil war in the textbook sense. If it were, our military and political mission would be easier.

In a civil war, you have clearly defined sides struggling for political power, with organized military formations and parallel governments. You know who to kill and who is empowered to negotiate with you. You can pick a side and stick to it.

Unleashed, our military could smash any enemy in an open civil war. Even our diplomats would have trouble preventing an American victory.

But the violence in Iraq comes from overlapping groups of terrorists, militias, insurgents, death squads, gangsters, foreign agents and factionalized government security forces engaging in layers of savage religious, ethnic, political and economic struggles - with an all-too-human lust for revenge spicing the mix.

There is a genuine problem here: The ever-accelerating pace of change since the end of the Cold War has left us with an inadequate vocabulary. Words literally fail us. We don't know what to call things. No military lexicon offers a useful term to describe the situation in Iraq.

Commentary

Who's the best counterinsurgency theorist you know? I guarantee the best you've never heard of is David Kilcullen, an Australian, currently serving in the US State Department. Kilcullen led Aussie infantry units in East Timor and went on to get a PhD in the history of insurgency in Indonesia. Since the war in Iraq began he's written several articles describing the differences between classical counterinsurgencies and the one we face today. One article, Counterinsurgency Redux, contains this tidbit:

In modern counterinsurgency, the security force must control a complex "conflict ecosystem" -- rather than defeating a single specific insurgent adversary.

Classical counterinsurgency focuses on securing the population rather than destroying the enemy. But it still fundamentally views the conflict as a binary struggle between one insurgent (or confederation) and one counterinsurgent (or coalition). Modern insurgencies belie this binary approach, since there are often multiple competing insurgent forces fighting each other as well as the government, and the "supported" government's interests may differ in key respects from those of its allies. Hence we might conceive of the environment as a "conflict ecosystem" with multiple competing entities seeking to maximize their survivability and influence. The counterinsurgent's task may no longer be to defeat the insurgent, but rather to impose order (to the degree possible) on an unstable and chaotic environment.

That's the term that Peters is looking for: conflict ecosystem. Not only does it view things in organic and biological terms, but it allows for multiple actors pursuing multiple goals.

And not only that. Robert Kaplan famously wrote in 1994 of "The Coming Anarchy":

The degree to which Van Creveld's Transformation of War complements Homer-Dixon's work on the environment, Huntington's thoughts on cultural clash, my own realizations in traveling by foot, bus, and bush taxi in more than sixty countries, and America's sobering comeuppances in intractable-culture zones like Haiti and Somalia is startling. The book begins by demolishing the notion that men don't like to fight. "By compelling the senses to focus themselves on the here and now," Van Creveld writes, war "can cause a man to take his leave of them." As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, "technicals" in Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, I vicariously experienced this phenomenon: worrying about mines and ambushes frees you from worrying about mundane details of daily existence. If my own experience is too subjective, there is a wealth of data showing the sheer frequency of war, especially in the developing world since the Second World War. Physical aggression is a part of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational, and cultural standard is this trait tranquilized. In light of the fact that 95 percent of the earth's population growth will be in the poorest areas of the globe, the question is not whether there will be war (there will be a lot of it) but what kind of war. And who will fight whom?

[ . . . ]

Also, war-making entities will no longer be restricted to a specific territory. Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic identity and control will mean more. "From the vantage point of the present, there appears every prospect that religious . . . fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict" in the West than at any time "for the last 300 years," Van Creveld writes. This is why analysts like Michael Vlahos are closely monitoring religious cults. Vlahos says, "An ideology that challenges us may not take familiar form, like the old Nazis or Commies. It may not even engage us initially in ways that fit old threat markings." Van Creveld concludes, "Armed conflict will be waged by men on earth, not robots in space. It will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large-scale conventional war." While another military historian, John Keegan, in his new book A History of Warfare, draws a more benign portrait of primitive man, it is important to point out that what Van Creveld really means is re-primitivized man: warrior societies operating at a time of unprecedented resource scarcity and planetary overcrowding.

Kaplan's incredible vision, nearly 12 years old, has come to pass. But where he sees an anarchy that betrays attempts to tame it, Kilcullen sees an ecosystem -- and ecosystems merely appear chaotic. In actuality, they are highly ordered, reflecting a sort of emergence that many complex systems display.

Spengler, the pseudonymous columnist for the Asia Times, once wrote that the best strategy for the US in Iraq would be to adopt the philosophy of Dashiell Hammett's Continental Op, a nameless private detective, who in the novel Red Harvest, orchestrates a gang war, then sits back to watch. Spengler quotes the Continental Op:

"Plans are all right sometimes ... And sometimes just stirring things up is all right - if you're tough enough to survive, and keep your eyes open so you'll see what you want when it comes to the top."
Spengler elaborated:
Americans want their tough guys to have a heart of gold. In the Kurosawa-Leone-Hill adaptations, the Toshiro Mifune-Clint Eastwood-Bruce Willis characters take great risk to aid a lady in distress. Hammett's Op cares neither about lady nor risk. His object is the mutual destruction of the contending parties, which he arranges with humor and enjoyment.

At one point the Op arranges "a peace conference out of which at least a dozen killings ought to grow ... pretending I was trying to clear away everybody's misunderstandings ... and played them like you'd play trout, and got just as much fun out of it ... I looked at [the police chief] and knew he hadn't a chance in a thousand of living another day because of what I had done to him, and I laughed, and felt warm and happy inside."

And explained:
Fortunately for the United States, there still exist a few of the genuine article. In the 1920s, Hammett's character worked for the Continental Detective Agency. Today, he might be a contractor for the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations.

Instability is his natural element. He acts unpredictably, even quirkily, to keep the other side off balance and to discover openings. The point is not so much that he despises authority, but rather that it is meaningless to give him orders. The more textbook counterinsurgency fails, the more responsibility will devolve to him. Frustrated military commanders will whisper, "Take care of this for me, and don't tell me how you did it," and let slip this particular dog of war.

That's the trick isn't it? The US electorate may occasionally be asked to send their sons to die for democracy or their own freedom. But what if the truly necessary acts are simply the inducement of, and thriving upon, chaos? For that it takes a cynic, and cynicism doesn't well rally the public.

All of this is a far cry from the idea pummelled into our minds for nearly four years: the absolute necessity of "a plan" for the war. Yet in a conflict ecosystem, the law of the jungle may well apply instead of the law of the operations order. Perhaps anarchy is our best friend.

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November 29, 2006

Damned if you do . . .

It's hard to know what to make of the New York Times. In its latest escapade, the Times has published an article titled, "Bush Adviser's Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leader," which excerpts a classified report from National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to the President. The memo supposedly questions Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's ability to control sectarian violence in Iraq and recommends that steps be taken to bolster his position.

The memo was reportedly produced by Hadley after a trip to Iraq and a meeting with Maliki that took place on October 30th.

Stop for a moment and completely disregard the content of the memo. Instead ask yourself: how long has the Times had this information? The memo is exactly one month old. Now ask yourself: why are they releasing this story on the very same day that Bush is set to meet with Maliki?

It is really hard to know what to make of the Times.

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November 28, 2006

"For the brothers who have not used weapons before, please take this advice . . ."

Zeyad at Healing Iraq has a long post which excerpts posts from neighborhood message boards in Baghdad. I believe they are mostly Sunni neighborhoods. Talk about learning on the fly. Here's an excerpt:

Abdul Rahman – Iraq:
For the brothers who have not used weapons before, please take this advice:
1- Check your weapon if you have not used it before. You can ask your neighbour to teach you how to attach the magazine and to load and fire. Do not be ashamed that it would be said you don’t know how to use a weapon, as many people have not had a chance to.
2- Choose the appropriate spot on your roof that can provide you with cover and make it hard for the enemy to target you.
3- It is best if every two families gather in one house when the alarm of an attack is raised to keep spirits high.
4- When you shoot, try to make it intermittent so you do not waste your ammunition. Be patient until more fighters arrive and your neighbours start shooting too.
5- You may feel fear upon using a weapon for the first time or that something bad would happen to you, but think of your family and what awaits them if you are hesitant. Keep your honour and your children in front of your eye, and remember that they have burnt children with kerosene.
6- Make sure that you have an extra magazine because in the midst of action you may take away your weapon and forget your extra magazine. It is preferred that you tape two magazines together. Ask your neighbours how to do that. Practice with it several times.
7- Fear of using weapons will disappear with the first shot. Do not hesitate to pull the trigger and concentrate on hitting the enemy.
Read the whole thing.

Commentary

Al Qaeda's attacks on Sadr City last week seem to have set Baghdad ablaze. From the tenor of the message boards, the posters are all exchanging intelligence on militia movements (it's telling that they refer to the Mahdi militia as the "Antichrist" militia) and locations, and advice on small unit tactics.

Zarqawi may be laughing from the grave. After the bombing of the golden mosque earlier in the year, the predominant narrative in the media was of increasing sectarian violence. Now, after the attack on Sadr City over the weekend, the Mahdi militia is out for blood. His civil war may have come.

Al Qaeda's timing, as always is impeccable. Just as this latest violence is instigated, President Bush flies to Jordan for talks with Maliki. Westhawk wondered last week whether Maliki's trip might be one-way.

Al-Sadr may soon, perhaps next week, make his play for power over Iraq’s Shi’ites. It would not surprise us if Mr. al-Maliki’s flight to Amman to meet Mr. Bush turned out to be one-way only. Should the al-Maliki government collapse, Iraq will not get another “national unity” government. What, if anything, has the U.S. done to prepare for this scenario?
His larger point is that we have fine relations with the Kurds, and are developing a relationship with Sunni tribes, but if Sadr seizes the southern section of Iraq, what influence will the US have then?

Where is the vaunted Western press corps now? Surely they can observe fighting from the balconies of their hotels?

The next few days may be decisive in Iraq. Things to look for are:

-a collapse of the national government
-a mass exodus from Baghdad (Westhawk's post points to evidence that 150 Baghdad residents are entering Fallujah daily)
-de facto partition lines in the city (geography would indicate the Tigris, but you never know)
-the declaration of shadow or oppositional governments

If the government does collapse, the US should immediately put Iraq's military into receivership, as I recommend in my latest TCS column. Otherwise the units will evaporate, or choose sides. Even if it means installing American leadership in them or over them, it will be best if they are preserved and kept out of the fighting.

The prevailing image of the aftermath of a precipitous US withdrawal from Iraq has been a repeat of the last helicopter lifting off from Saigon in Vietnam. But those who either abhor this future or welcome it are wrong: the exact same effect was produced with far less drama at the ballot boxes in middle America on November 7th. Psychologically, the helicopters are long gone and everyone knows it. Now that America has departed, the aftermath continues apace. One aspect of magical realism is the inversion of cause and effect, such that "a character may suffer before a tragedy occurs." We are witnessing it.

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November 22, 2006

. . . But somebody's got to do it

Der Spiegel carries a slideshow of photos of assassinated Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayal. He is seen in turn with various members of his family, including his wife, when they were married.

Gemayal%20marriage.jpg

The Washington Post reports the details of Gemayal's death.
Gemayel, a 34-year-old father of two and an up-and-coming politician, was killed when his car was ambushed by men from one or two cars that collided with it in the suburban neighborhood of Jdeideh. At least three gunmen opened fire with automatic weapons equipped with silencers, hitting him in the head and chest, officials said. Television footage showed the tinted driver's-side window pocked with at least eight shots and the glass on the passenger's side shattered. The silver sedan's hood was crumpled from the collision.

Doctors said Gemayel was dead when he arrived at the hospital, and his bodyguard later succumbed to his wounds.

Commentary

Is this a consolidation or an overextension? Iran announces it is seeking a new set of centrifuges. Syria tells James Baker it'll help in Iraq in exchange for the Golan Heights. Iran invites Iraq and Syria to a conference. Syria and Iraq re-establish diplomatic ties. Syria offs another prominent Lebanese politician.

Are Syria and Iran overplaying their hands? Have the carefully leaked deliberations of the Iraq Study Group been so much theater, meant to force an over-reaction? Victor Davis Hanson wrote in his book The Soul of Battle that upon hearing of the German offensive that came to be known as the Battle of the Bulge, Patton's inclination was to let the Germans go as far west as they could, and then take his Third Army and cut off their rear, blocking their retreat.

Patton, of course, knew from his initial conversation with Bradley that he would be under orders to go north, not to continue east: "That's too daring for them. My guess is that our offensive will be called off and we will have to go up there and save their hides."

Tony Blankley, writing at RealClearPolitics, says this:

In fact, even those Americans who today can't wait to end our involvement in the "hopeless" war in Iraq will -- when the consequences of our irresponsibility becomes manifest -- join the chorus of outrage.

Expedient Washington politicians, take note: Your public is fickle. They may cheer your decision today to get out of Iraq but vote you out of office tomorrow when they don't like the results . . .

Iran has been our persistent enemy for 27 years -- Syria longer. They may well be glad to give us cover while we retreat, but that would merely be an exercise in slightly delayed gratification, not self-denial, let alone benignity. So long as Iran is ruled by its current radical Shi'a theocracy, she will be vigorously and violently undercutting any potentially positive, peaceful forces in the region -- and is already triggering a prolonged clash with the terrified Sunni nations. Our absence from the region will only make matters far worse.

We need to start undermining by all methods available that dangerous Iranian regime -- as the Iranian people, free to express and implement their own opinions and policies, are our greatest natural allies in the Muslim Middle East.

We have only two choices: Get out and let the ensuing Middle East firestorm enflame the wider world; or, stay and with shrewder policies and growing material strength manage and contain the danger. [emphasis added]

Jules Crittenden writes that "It's a dirty job . . .
This is the thing about dirty jobs that need to be done. They can only be ignored or left half-done for so long . . .

This is why the current move to restrain the militias in Baghdad must be stepped up. This is why the calls for more troops there must be heeded. This is why the United States must pursue and destroy militias there ruthlessly and in force.

This is why these regimes need to know that their missteps will cost them, and that their own infrastructure, seats of power and persons are not immune from our threat of force as long as they abet murder, spread instability through the region, and seek weapons of mass destruction.

But will any of this happen? What prevents it from happening right now? It is not a lack of resources. It is only a perception that all is lost, held by a large part of the political class. Fortunately, they are wrong. Sadly, they don't know it.

Belmont Club takes the pessimistic argument: The Rout Continues:

The most comical aspect of this whole rout is the way the diplomats will continue to prepare for the big meeting with Syria and Iran to broker a regional peace, something they believe "only a Superpower" can achieve. Alas, the habits of self-importance die hard. The countries are already making their own arrangements with the new victors, because those countries realize better than Barack Obama that you cannot charge a price for what you have already given away. And what will come of it all won't be peace. It will be war on a scale that will either draw America back into a larger cauldron or send it scurrying away behind whatever line of defense it thinks it has the will to hold. More than 60 years ago, Winston Churchill told the appeasers they had a choice between war and dishonor. They had chosen dishonor, and added that now they would have both war and dishonor.

If Bush lied and people died, then Pierre Gamayel is probably dead today because Nancy Pelosi told the truth last week: Bringing the war to an end is my highest priority as Speaker. James Baker didn't stage that.

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The Death Squads

The blog Healing Iraq points us to a BBC Channel Four special on Death Squads, which is available here on GoogleVideo. It's a very interesting report, running about 45 minutes. There's a bit of mandatory front-line reporter theatrics, but overall, very interesting.

What do you readers think?

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November 20, 2006

I'm not asking you to ask, I'm telling you to listen

Iran judges itself the victor in the Iraq war. It is now inviting Syria and Iraq to Tehran for a conference.

Iran has invited the Iraqi and Syrian presidents to Tehran for a weekend summit with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to hash out ways to cooperate in curbing the runaway violence that has taken Iraq to the verge of civil war and threatens to spread through the region, four key lawmakers told The Associated Press on Monday.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has accepted the invitation and will fly to the Iranian capital Saturday, a close parliamentary associate said.

The Iranian diplomatic gambit appeared designed to upstage expected moves from Washington to include Syria and Iran in a wider regional effort to clamp off violence in Iraq, where more civilians have been killed in the first 20 days of November than in any other month since the AP began tallying the figures in April 2005.

The Iranian move was also a display of its increasingly muscular role in the Middle East, where it already has established deep influence over Syria and Lebanon.

"All three countries intend to hold a three-way summit among Iraq, Iran and Syria to discuss the security situation and the repercussions for stability of the region," said Ali al-Adeeb, a lawmaker of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party and a close aide to the prime minister.

Commentary

What do victors do next? They consolidate their gains. Belmont Club notes:

It was Mark Steyn who said that however evasively the Democratic party phrased it, the platform upon which they ran would be understood by its true name throughout the Middle East. George Packer, writing in the New Republic, said that now was the time to make arrangements to evacuate the thousands of Iraqis who believed in America; and that those Iraqis were even now making deals with whoever they thought would be in charge -- after the policy with the unstated name was implemented -- in order to survive.

But the Iranians can hardly contain their glee. They know what last elections meant; and so do Iraq and Syria. There may be no need to wait for the Baker report. It is being overtaken by events.

What will the conversations be like in Tehran? Hard to say, but one thing is sure: Tehran won't be asking for anything, but dictating terms instead. After the meeting, no one should be surprised at what comes next. Talabani might even change his tune as to how many US troops are needed for how long.

Phase One of the "Global War on Terror" is over. It has seen two vicious regimes destroyed in the Middle East. Thousands of Al Qaeda operatives have been killed or captured. A fledgling democracy grips power by its fingernails in Iraq. Iran is emboldened and is now the dominant power in the region. A new regional war looms around the periphery of Israel and another is beginning around the periphery of Somalila. Pakistan has ceded territory to the Taliban in Waziristan. The US military now has hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened veterans.

Writing in the Weekly Standard of his latest trip to Ramadi, Michael Fumento concludes thus:

People always ask how the Iraqis feel about Americans and the war in general. I respond that they just tell you what they think will prove advantageous to them, a combination of complaints and praise for Ameriki (America). Non-embedded American reporters run into the same thing. I asked one of the north Ramadi farmers through the translator if he thinks Ramadi is getting safer. He starts out with a few complaints, such as lack of water from the Euphrates for his fields because of rationing, and then tells me: "But safety is 100 percent better now that the Americans have come along." Baloney. Things got a lot more dangerous when we first came along. They may or may not be safer now than a year ago, but this guy isn't going to tell me. None of them will tell me.

Soldiers also give different accounts of the extent of progress in Ramadi. A Cougar driver told me nothing had changed since his last deployment, yet the very fact that he was driving into Ramadi in a convoy of just four trucks indicated otherwise. Another told me Ramadi is now "a thousand times better." Ultimately each was simply another blind man feeling his part of the elephant. With my three embeds in Anbar, I'd like to believe I've felt quite a few parts of the elephant.

There are pluses and minuses. The war is not over, but the first part of it is largely ended. It might be presumptuous to end a chapter now, but the largest use of US force has been in Iraq, and that enterprise is now destined to wither away in one form or another. It's hard to know what comes next: an interlude, or Phase Two. The previous post The Golden Mean argued that those who favor attacking Iran are now largely in the wilderness. It's hard to know if there will even be a Phase Two. But for now, the last page has been turned and it will be time to wait for the sequel in whatever form it takes.

Depressed? No. Thinking we won't eventually win? Not at all. Just being realistic. They don't call it a "long war" for nothing.

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November 19, 2006

In defense of "Adaptation"

Phil Carter, a well-respected blogger and Captain in the US Army Reserves, recently returned from a year in Iraq, takes issue with my article, "Adaptation" in the Weekly Standard's Daily Standard, in which I argued that through engagement in Iraq, the US military is slowly adapting to fighting irregular warfare. Phil offers several critiques [emphasis in the original], which I'll respond to one at a time:

Continue reading "In defense of "Adaptation""

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November 16, 2006

Two more great Iraq articles

No time to analyze at the moment, but check these out:
Reality Check II: Examining the consequences of redeployment
by Fred Kagan and
Six Steps to Victory: The bottom-up plan to defeat the insurgency
by Eric Eglund.

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Adaptation: What the US military is learning in Iraq

I've written an article for the Weekly Standard's online edition arguing that the US military is learning in Iraq how to adapt to irregular warfare. Check it out here.

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November 15, 2006

All Together Now

The Guardian reports US Plans Last Big Push in Iraq:

President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make "a last big push" to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration's internal deliberations . . .

Point one of the strategy calls for an increase rather than a decrease in overall US force levels inside Iraq, possibly by as many as 20,000 soldiers . . . The reinforcements will be used to secure Baghdad, scene of the worst sectarian and insurgent violence, and enable redeployments of US, coalition and Iraqi forces elsewhere in the country.

Point two of the plan stresses the importance of regional cooperation to the successful rehabilitation of Iraq. This could involve the convening of an international conference of neighbouring countries or more direct diplomatic, financial and economic involvement of US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait . . .

Point three focuses on reviving the national reconciliation process between Shia, Sunni and other ethnic and religious parties. According to the sources, creating a credible political framework will be portrayed as crucial in persuading Iraqis and neighbouring countries alike that Iraq can become a fully functional state . . .

Lastly, the sources said the study group recommendations will include a call for increased resources to be allocated by Congress to support additional troop deployments and fund the training and equipment of expanded Iraqi army and police forces. It will also stress the need to counter corruption, improve local government and curtail the power of religious courts.

Commentary

This all sounds eerily like the well-argued Weekly Standard article from earlier this week, Doubling Down in Iraq:

Consider these data: Between November 2004 and February 2005, according to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index, the number of coalition soldiers in Iraq rose by 18,000. In that time, the number of Iraqi civilians killed fell by two-thirds, and the number of American troops wounded fell by three-fourths. The soldiers were soon pulled out; by the summer of 2005, American and Iraqi casualties rose again. Later that year, the same thing happened again. Between September and November of 2005, another 23,000 soldiers were deployed in Iraq; once again, both Iraqi and American casualties fell. In the early months of 2006, the number of soldiers fell again, and casualties spiraled up.

The picture is clear: More soldiers mean less violence, hence fewer casualties. The larger the manpower investment in the war, the smaller the war's cost, to Iraqis and Americans alike. Iraq is not an unwinnable war: Rather, as the data just cited show, it is a war we have chosen not to win. And the difference between success and failure is not 300,000 more soldiers, as some would have it. One-tenth that number would make a large difference, and has done so in the past. One-sixth would likely prove decisive.

To take one point at a time:

-Sending 20,000 more troops: Ever the contrarian, just when a new Democratic congress is claiming its victory as a mandate for withdrawal, Bush is ready to throw fuel on the fire.

But why 20,000? Why not more? The answers are probably: a) force availability, and b) the desire not to become fully engaged (even though we are already decisively engaged, as far at the operational theater goes. It seems that the "all hands on deck" approach is being dismissed.

Even so, 20,000 more troops can't hurt. It may prove very helpful indeed.

-Regional cooperation: The idea that Syria or Iran will help much here is laughable. But asking Kuwait or Saudi Arabia for assistance of some sort, whether diplomatic, financial, or of an intelligence nature, could pay great dividends. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are primarily Sunni states, and it will not please them to know that the US is abandoning Iraq to be dominated by Iran, and probably for its Sunni population to be ethnically cleansed. It is in their interests to assist us -- if only for the realpolitik goal of thwarting Iran's regional ambitions.

-Reviving reconciliation: This will be the most difficult of these tasks. For the Shias and Sunnis, the last three years have seen increasing levels of vengeance and vigilantism. A shrewd effort here might pay off, but what will be done differently that we aren't already doing?

-Increased funding for a variety of goals: Hard to know what to make of this. On its face, it seems kind of undefined. But the key word in the entire phrase might be "Congress." It might merely be an attempt to get Congress to fund the war without a lot of grandstanding, in order to create a bipartisan consensus for the whole thing. Then, a rising tide will lift all boats, or in this case, political ambitions.

Perhaps the most worrisome part of the plan, at least in the Guardian's portrayal, is it's time-based essence. "One last big push" implies an end, or, in other words, a timetable. Otherwise, one last push before what?

The Guardian infers that the "what" is the US presidential election. "The "last push" strategy is also intended to give Mr Bush and the Republicans "political time and space" to recover from their election drubbing and prepare for the 2008 presidential campaign, the official said."

Without a doubt, part of the "what" is in fact driven by domestic politics. But perhaps the other part is baldly enriching uranium next door . . .

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Iraq The Model on the Ministry of Education kidnappings

Iraq the Model believes that Iran was behind yesterday's brazen kidnapping of dozens of Iraqi Ministry of Education employees:

The mass abduction that shocked Baghdad yesterday was intended to be a clear message from Tehran-through its surrogates in Baghdad-to anyone who thinks productive dialogue with the Islamic republic over Iraq and Middle East peace is a possible option.

The operation was a show of victory and it was so smooth and perfect that neither the MNF nor the Iraqi military could do a thing to stop it.
And today the show continues with the assassination of the colonel who's in charge of internal investigation in the department of national police, also known as the police commandos, one day after an investigation was ordered.

Perhaps choosing a ministry like the higher education (which belongs to the Sunni Accord Front) is also a warning message to Sunni politicians who are preparing to send a delegation to Washington especially that the Accord bloc announced recently that they were looking forward to "clear the misunderstanding and mistrust" between them and the US administration to search for solutions for the situation in Iraq.


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November 9, 2006

The Thousand Fathers

All of a sudden, everyone's got an Iraq plan. The Small Wars Journal excerpts a subscription-only article from Inside the Pentagon:

A small group of officers assembled by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to draw up alternatives to the U.S. military strategy in Iraq is expected to conclude its work in December, according to defense sources. Some observers anticipate the recommendations will call for a dramatic change of course in the Persian Gulf nation and perhaps in the war on terrorism more broadly...

The Joint Staff review is being carried out in extraordinary secrecy. A spokesman for Pace said this week the group has no formal name but its role is “to assess what’s working and what’s not working” in Iraq and beyond. The spokesman did not respond by press time (Nov. 8) to a number of follow-up questions posed by a reporter.

Pace’s exploration of Iraq alternatives comes as a congressionally mandated study group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), is conducting an independent review of the strategy to combat the insurgency and sectarian violence in the war-torn nation.

Some experts speculate the Marine Corps general decided to convene his own panel to develop new alternatives for Iraq in case the Baker-Hamilton “Iraq Study Group” offers recommendations the military or the Bush administration find unacceptable...

Participants include Army Col. H.R. McMaster, who until earlier this year commanded a cavalry regiment that pacified the Iraqi insurgent stronghold of Tall Afar, though violence has since returned to that town. Another team member is Army Col. Peter Mansoor, who directs an Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency school at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Marine Corps reportedly has sent Col. Thomas Greenwood, director of the Marine Command and Staff College, and the other services are represented on the study team, as well.

The Joint Staff strategy review kicked off in late September and was originally slated to last 60 days, though it now appears work will continue into December, according to officials familiar with the group who are not authorized to speak for it...

It's the secret group to develop a backup plan in case the president doesn't like the public group's plan. Or, the secret group, being close to the top, has maybe already gotten wind of the public group's plan and decided it's awful . . .

Meanwhile, Ralph Peters mentions the "all hands on deck" concept:

One proposal under discussion within the administration is to "send everything we've got" - to deploy every possible Army and Marine unit, no matter how worn and weary, for six months to "clean things up."
Now there's an option for you!

John McCain said yesterday that Moqtada Al-Sadr needs "to be taken out," and that the "Mahdi Army continues to pose a threat."

Heck, even the preacher at the Duke Chapel is getting in on the game. I was out of town one weekend and missed it, but he delivered an eloquent sermon about Iraq on October 29th to what is probably a left-leaning congregation -- and he did it on parents' weekend to boot, just for maximum effect:

A number of people have asked me to preach a sermon about Iraq. Imagine you've let yourself into someone else's home and you find yourself in the kitchen. You reach up and open a cupboard door. Out fall a deluge of tightly stacked items, crashing down on your head and tumbling all over the floor. As well as being in a lot of pain, you may well feel pretty stupid. You may be saying to yourself, "I shouldn't be in this house. I certainly shouldn't have opened the door without checking what was inside." But feeling stupid and full of shame shouldn't stop you doing the one thing you simply must do. And that is, to get on your knees, clean up after yourself, and try to put everything back in the cupboard as best you can.

That's pretty much all I have to say about Iraq. [laughter]

He was kidding. Read the whole thing.

Commentary

This is the golden window for not only making significant changes, but for also building bipartisan consensus, before the show trials begin in January. If the Democrats are on board with an Iraq plan, even the media will drag themselves kicking and screaming toward slightly better coverage. They know where their bread is buttered.

As to my preacher, I have my differences with his view, but I'll take it. Whatever is necessary to not abandon Iraq.

James Baker is a brilliant diplomat and should not be misunderestimated. The events in the next week will spell salvation or doom in Mesopotamia.

Nancy Pelosi has her own take, recorded for posterity on HotAir. When interviewed by Fox News, "Asked if it was more important to win or leave Iraq, presumptive Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, told Fox this:"

The point is, this isn't a war to win, it's a situation to be solved. And you define winning any way you want, but you must solve the problem.

It will be a very smart move to make some major changes to our strategy in Iraq before January, when this woman becomes the Speaker. At the same time, get as much buy-in from her posse as possible.

McCain's right too: No American voters are going to be upset if al Sadr goes away. In fact, best to kill The Man With One Red Shoe now, because if we do pull out of Iraq, he'll probably be the next dictator of Shiastan.

Bob Owens notes that the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, was an advisor the the first President Bush when he screwed the Shi'ites, leading to the deaths of nearly a hundred thousand of them.

The obvious question is, "Did Bob Gates have a hand in shaping Bush's call for rebellion?"

If so, would he also partially responsible for failing to support the rebellion, leading to one of Saddam's greatest genocides? I do not know the answers to these questions, but they must be asked before he is confirmed as the next U.S. Secretary of Defense.

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November 8, 2006

Help Bill Roggio Go To Iraq

What's going to happen in Iraq? Bill Roggio wants to know. So he's going.

Hello, everyone. I am planning an embed to Iraq in the next three to four weeks. My goal is to embed with the Army in Baghdad and the Marines Ramadi. These two cities are the flash points in Iraq.

If you are not already aware, I have devoted all of my time and energy to this endeavor. This is my full-time job. I need your support to make this happen.

I believe this war is too important for me to sit back and let others do the work. I learned early on that our greatest deficiencies in this war are partisan free reporting, education on the nature of our enemy, and honest, informed reporting on how our troops are doing on the ground. Currently, there are 11 embedded reporters in Iraq, while the United States has over 150,000 troops in country.

I really need your help to keep this project going. Please support this embed by donating via PayPal.

Or, if you wish to send a check, email me at billroggio@gmail.com and I will send you an address.

Additionally, if you would like to donate a specific item, such as life insurance, an airline ticket or camera, email me and we can discuss the options.

Thank you as always for your support.

Follow the link to donate to Bill. He's already embedded once each in Iraq and Afghanistan and did a great job.

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The Best and the Worst

For the most magnanimous take possible on the election, see Bill Whittle:

Remember one thing before you go. The most important election we are ever likely to see in our lives was not this evening's election. Bush's re-election in 2004 was the one we HAD to have, and we got it. Be grateful for that, acknowledge that this loss is no one's fault but our own, congratulate the Democrats on their impressive wins and start figuring out how we can make sure this never EVER happens again. =)

I wish to tell my friends to be cheerful and especially to be of good will. Disappointments come and go, but moments of courage and integrity in dark hours will be there when the stars grow cold. We have lost the election, so let us maintain our determination, our dignity and our sense of humor, and let us take this moment to reflect upon how our actions have fallen short of our ideals. And then, finally, let's act like the Americans we are, roll up our sleeves and start rebuilding. We who have survived Civil War, the Nazis and the Communists can probably manage to find a way to preserve the Republic in the face of Speaker Pelosi.

America is not only much, much stronger than you imagine; it is stronger than you CAN imagine.

To those who have written me in anger over the years, I say sincere congratulations to you on a big win, and I genuinely hope it will remove some of the bitterness in your hearts and restore some belief in a system that was never broken.

As for me, I pledge to re-enter the fight with more energy, not less, and to continue to try to make the case I think needs to be made. I'll start on that tomorrow.


"Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing...after they have exhausted all other possibilities." -- Winston Churchill

Welcome to the process of exhausting all other possibilities. This is where we separate the men from the boys. Pick a line and stand in it.

For the most pessimistic, see this, from a reader of the Corner, which I quote in full:
Those people who were serious about criticizing Rumsfeld (as opposed to those who were just vindictive or crazy) did so because they wanted our military to be doing more, not less, but does anyone seriously think that a Democratic Congress is going approve expenditures for the extra 50-70,000 troops that his serious critics say would be required to actually win in Iraq?
As a practical matter, I'm not sure how Iraq is possibly salvageable at this point given our current political situation. Zal is apparently on his way out, not wanting to be scapegoated as the man who lost Iraq and the real travesty is that he will be unlikely to receive half the official honors that Bremer and Tenet got despite his far more capable service to our country in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once the Baker Commission comes out, the administration is going to be under overwhelming pressure to implement the suggestions of the "bipartisan" commission and their failure to do so is just going to give the Democrats one more issue to run on to a pliable media and (near as I can determine) general public. Sooner or later, Baker's recommendations will likely be implemented, at which point al-Qaeda will be left in control of Anbar, Salahaddin, and possibly Babil and Diyala as well. They won't have any oil, but they'll have their failed state and that will give them a base from which to strike throughout the rest of the Middle East. Whether or not they are able to work out a manageable detente with Muqtada al-Sadr (who I expect will likely seize the southern part of the country), they won't be able to conquer his territory nor vice versa, meaning that we will still have a failed terrorist state made up of what was central Iraq to deal with. Oh, and a lot of innocent Iraqis are going to die, probably in the tens of thousands. But no one here will care about them, just like no one ever cares about the hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese and Cambodians who died when we abandoned Vietnam, but the important thing is that we'll all feel that much better. The truly ironic thing is that Iraq is likely to be held up as an example of why "Arabs/Muslims can't handle democracy," because to believe otherwise would be to admit that we should have done more, fought harder, and worked better to save them. And we can't have that. It goes without saying that if this is going to be the result that we never should have gone into Iraq in the first place.
The loss of Iraq is almost certain to coincide with a major push in Afghanistan-Pakistan and having defeated the United States, al-Qaeda is likely to regard the momentum as being with them. My own assessment is that Pakistan is likely to fall (probably in a palace coup) before al-Qaeda and the Taliban make any serious headway in Afghanistan. That may preserve the Karzai government, but it will also turn bin Laden into a nuclear power. The only good news that I can take away from this is that if, not when, this occurs the United States is unlikely to lapse into a "Blame America First" or "Iraq Syndrome." We won't lift a finger to save Somalia (now almost certainly lost) or Iraq, but the fall of Pakistan is likely to awaken the general population from their slumber. If not now, then certainly once the nukes start flying, whether at India or at the United States in Europe. It also now goes without saying that the US will not prevent the emergence of a nuclear Iran or take anything more than token gestures regarding North Korea. One thing I want to be clear on is that this isn't the apocalypse and al-Qaeda is not going to take over the Middle East in 2 years but that they will make a great deal of headway there if the US is emasculated in the interim as a result of domestic politics, particularly if the legislative branch now treats the executive as though it is part of an enemy state.
A word on Europe. As you are no doubt seeing in the media coverage, much of the European punditocracy is now giddy that the US has rejected the evils of Bushitleretardespotheocrat and all his works. While this is likely to make American tourist trips and cocktail parties more enjoyable, it is also nothing short of meaningless because, as we have seen over the last several years, Europe wants to be treated as a great power but does not wish to exert the necessary effort to actually be one. Our cooperation with them on intelligence and law enforcement matters would continue regardless of the event because they must [cooperate] for their own self-preservation, but they will not support sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism or increased troop commitments to Iraq or Afghanistan. In the case of the latter, they simply do not have the troops to send or the logistics to sustain them. . . .
The next 2 years are likely to suck, but I could always be wrong and the Democrats could always develop an uncharacteristic amount of sanity.

Commentary

"You win some and you lose some." "It's not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game." And so forth.

Well, actually, no. When you and your countrymen might die, it is whether you win or lose.

There no doubt are many furtive conversations taking place in both Iraqi kitchens and government councils right now.

"Should we go to Jordan?"

"Should we let the Americans attack Sadr?"

"If I try to tamp down the death squads, but the Americans leave, will the squads come for me?"

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November 3, 2006

The Adventures of Chester Radio: Interview with Army Military Police in Baghdad

Today's guests on The Adventures of Chester Radio are Staff Sergeant Jason Oliver and Specialist Kimberly McGinness, two Army military police who are training the Iraqi police forces in Baghdad.

Staff Sergeant Oliver and Specialist McGinness discuss the competence of the police, what the biggest crimes are ("auto theft"), how they get around the language barrier, Specialist McGinness' view of why the Iraqis might be a little frightened of her ("I carry a bigger weapon than they do"), and the bravery of the Iraqis.

This episode is about 18 minutes long.

You can listen immediately by clicking right here. Or you can subscribe to the show here. You can even subscribe via iTunes here.

Special thanks to US Central Command Public Affairs for making this possible.

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November 2, 2006

The Final Surprise: El-Baradei Strikes Again

The New York has launched its final, pre-weekend October Surprise of the silly season. An article entitled U.S. Web Archive Is Said to Reveal a Nuclear Guide has just been posted on its site, and is getting the all caps, red text treatment from the Drudge Report. The article alleges that the US archive of seized Iraqi documents, released on the internet in March of 2006, contained some documents with detailed plans for the construction of nuclear weapons.

The documents, roughly a dozen in number, contain charts, diagrams, equations and lengthy narratives about bomb building that nuclear experts who have viewed them say go beyond what is available on the Internet and in other public forums. For instance, the papers give detailed information on how to build nuclear firing circuits and triggering explosives, as well as the radioactive cores of atom bombs.
The Times is careful to note that these plans were from before the first Gulf War.
But in recent weeks, the site has posted some documents that weapons experts say are a danger themselves: detailed accounts of Iraq’s secret nuclear research before the 1991 Persian Gulf war. The documents, the experts say, constitute a basic guide to building an atom bomb.
The alarm was raised by the IAEA, according to the Times.
In September, the Web site began posting the nuclear documents, and some soon raised concerns. On Sept. 12, it posted a document it called “Progress of Iraqi nuclear program circa 1995.” That description is potentially misleading since the research occurred years earlier.

The Iraqi document is marked “Draft FFCD Version 3 (20.12.95),” meaning it was preparatory for the “Full, Final, Complete Disclosure” that Iraq made to United Nations inspectors in March 1996. The document carries three diagrams showing cross sections of bomb cores, and their diameters.

On Sept. 20, the site posted a much larger document, “Summary of technical achievements of Iraq’s former nuclear program.” It runs to 51 pages, 18 focusing on the development of Iraq’s bomb design. Topics included physical theory, the atomic core and high-explosive experiments. By early October, diplomats and officials said, United Nations arms inspectors in New York and their counterparts in Vienna were alarmed and discussing what to do.

Commentary

The diplomats "were alarmed and discussing what to do." It seems obvious, does it not, to pick up the phone and call your nearest American colleague and tell him he's got an anarchist's cookbook up on his internet? Certainly no government official who expects to keep his job would sit on such information? If, as the Times notes, the documents in question were only a dozen or so in number, then would it not take the retasking of a couple of translators and perhaps 6 hours of time from a nuclear physicist to determine if the documents in question are what the diplomats suspected them to be?

Or does one sit on this information for a few weeks, instead picking up the phone to the New York Times, and craft yet another October Surprise?

It's not impossible. In fact, it happened before -- two years ago, with the same agency! The IAEA, that is. The IAEA played a big part in the last October Surprise by the New York Times -- the aptly named Al Qaqaa story, now safely ensconced behind the TimesSelect firewall. The abstract notes, "International Atomic Energy Agency warned of danger of these explosives before war . . ."

There is one other aspect of the Times story that seems strange. The documents in question are described by -- surprise! -- an anonymous intelligence official, like this:

A senior American intelligence official who deals routinely with atomic issues said the documents showed “where the Iraqis failed and how to get around the failures.” The documents, he added, could perhaps help Iran or other nations making a serious effort to develop nuclear arms, but probably not terrorists or poorly equipped states. The official, who requested anonymity because of his agency’s rules against public comment, called the papers “a road map that helps you get from point A to point B, but only if you already have a car.”
Doesn't this buttress the argument that Saddam could easily have restarted his nuclear weapons program if the sanctions regime collapsed? If the Arabic documents can show Iran's scientists how to get around failures, then surely they could show Iraq's?

Another question: why were the nuke documents only begun to be released in September and earlier October? Where were they until then?

Tomorrow will be yet another interesting day in the silly season.

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The Man With One Red Shoe

Has Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army played a role in the presumed capture of a US Army translator? Is Sadr culpable for this, or has some other faction of his force performed this act? Confederate Yankee offers one explanation:

The fact that al-Taei (or as this article spells it "al-Taayie") did not turn up dead within the first 72 hours of his abduction, and the fact that he is believed to have been captured by the Mahdi Army instead of al Qaeda, leads me to believe that he was abducted not to become a victim of torture and murder, but to become a political pawn for one of the factions of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia.

What remains to be seen, and what we may never know, is whether al-Taei's capture is something that al-Sadr had a hand in, or if a faction within his loosely-organized Mahdi Army Militia conducted the kidnapping independently. If al-Taei's abduction was not conducted with al-Sadr's knowledge or blessing, there is the possibility that the kidnapping is evidence of a rift between factions of the Mahdi Army.

If so (and this is purely speculation), it could be that factions within the Mahdi Army are using the kidnapping to make a run on al-Sadr's control of the militia. The kidnapping places a microscope on al-Sadr (note the renewed calls to have him killed, which stem at least in part from the kidnapping), and depending on internal Iraqi politics, could rattle his standing with both other Mahdi Army factions and with the Iraqi government, which for now, seems to be doing the bidding of al-Sadr (on that, at least, Sullivan was correct).

If al-Sadr starts to lose (more) control of the Madhi Army, his importance to and influence within the Iraqi government may wane, and the possibility that Ralph Peters may eventually get his wish, perhaps courtesy of the apparently fragmenting Mahdi Army itself.

The idea that al-Sadr needs killing, and that this might be accomplished by his own forces working against him, was floated recently by Bill Roggio as well:
Sadr can no longer claim these are the acts of mere 'rogue elements' of his Mahdi Army. The clashes between Mahdi Army units and Iraqi and U.S. forces are occurring on a near-daily basis, and the sectarian violence is largely driven by Mahdi fighters. Ralph Peters argues it is time for the U.S. to kill Sadr. However, this would give Sadr the status of martyr to the 'occupiers' and could create unnecessary violence. We argue this is a task best left to the Iraqis. Ideally, a 'rogue element' of the Mahdi Army would kill him (or so it would appear). This would be just desserts for Sadr's shallow attempts at obfuscating his militia's role in the fighting. And it would spawn a round of internecine fighting that would do much of the needed dirty work of dismantling the Mahdi Army.

Commentary

The question of whether Sadr is behind the kidnapping, and whether his control of his forces seems to be slipping, is impossible to know. Since the invasion, Sadr has proven to be an adroit player of the Iraqi game. His continued presence after four years of other Iraqi politicians -- or leaders -- who have largely come and gone seems to testify against the idea that he has lost control over his own forces.

So then, taking that as case A, allow case B: Sadr's influence has grown to the point that he is now making use of it. The kidnapping of an American and the subsequent negotiations to maintain his release create a certain legitimacy for Sadr. Perhaps a year ago such an action would have warranted open battle with his forces; perhaps now he has struck because he knows such an outcome is unlikely, and that the Americans, coming to him with hat in hand, asking if he knows anything about a missing translator, will only buttress his own prestige within the Iraqi community.

It may be possible in the coming days to read between the lines of stories on this issue and deduce whether case A or case B is correct.

Regardless, Sadr should have been killed long ago. Many would argue that this is not necessary: only a significant defanging of his forces would have marginalized him. But this is to discount the nature of Shia Islam, which if nothing else, tends toward messianism. In other words, the big boss himself is frequently the source of strength, and not merely the forces with which he surrounds himself. See Ayatollah Khomeini.

The 1980s comedy The Man with One Red Shoe stars Dabney Coleman as a CIA officer who has been duped into thinking that Tom Hanks, a hapless violinist, is a spy. Coleman pursues Hanks left and right throughout the film, always being asked by one of his henchmen, "Sir, why don't we just kill him?" Coleman always has a better answer about how to manipulate him instead. Finally, at his wits' end, Coleman finally says, "Ok." But by then it's too late. Hanks has run off with a female spy.

Perhaps the Iraqi electorate is the female in this twisted analogy, and al-Sadr is the man with one red shoe. Sadly, I think we'll be seeing much more of him, not less.

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October 31, 2006

Second Lieutenant Booth and Senator Kerry

Yesterday Senator Kerry insulted those in uniform. But the day before yesterday he called the parents of Marine Second Lieutenant Joshua Booth, killed in action in Iraq earlier this month, to offer his condolences. His mother explains:

Second Lt. Joshua Booth died on Oct. 17. His mother said that what makes Kerry's words so offensive is that they come one day after Kerry called the family to offer condolences.

"We did appreciate the call. I am appreciative of anyone who reaches out to me and to then turn around and say something that is so totally incorrect," Booth said.

As to whether Kerry should apologize, Booth said that Kerry needs to do more to make amends.

"In addition to apologizing, he needs to learn a little bit about what our men and women in the military are actually made up of," Booth said. "We don't want to send that kind of signal, that you only go into the military if you are not good at anything."

So was Lieutenant Booth good at anything?

You decide. Last week National Public Radio did a segment about him and it can be heard in its entirety here.

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October 26, 2006

"Welcome to the party, pal!"

A quick cycle through the headlines of the past two days provides an update on our NATO allies:

Continue reading ""Welcome to the party, pal!""

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October 25, 2006

The Autumn of the Patriarch

Frederick Turner has written a brilliant piece in TCSDaily that offers a reinterpretation of the "death squads" so frequently mentioned in the press coverage of Iraq:

When there is a significant fraction of the population that will not join in political compromise, whether because of ideological idealism, addiction to supernatural power, or the passion for revenge, civil society is faced with a diabolical paradox.

It wishes to form legal and political institutions that are transparent, correctable by debate, and under the control of the people (with protections for minorities), where people can make good money in the marketplace and raise families in peace. But the reality is that even after all possible compromises have been offered to the refuseniks, civil society is faced with a small but absolutely hostile minority that will be content with nothing but total victory.

How to deal with this minority?

Continue reading "The Autumn of the Patriarch"

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September 27, 2006

Michael Yon Names Names

Michael Yon, the retired Green Beret who embedded for months with US forces in Iraq, pulls no punches in this email dispatch he just sent to his mailing list:

Pajamas Media recently reported that there are only 9 embedded reporters in Iraq . Many are blaming this on the media, and while I can never be called an apologist for mainstream media, I can say with certainty that the United States military is censoring.

It remains unclear if this is a general policy, though there are recent inquiries to the office of the Secretary of Defense. I await response. Or, perhaps, the censorship is merely the policy of ******* who is responsible for operations involving embeds. ******** is said to be the most quoted man in Iraq . I've learned to trust nothing he says. I do know for a fact that ******* has been untruthful with the media. If ******* calls me on this, I'll take the time to prove it.

While sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, sisters, brothers and friends, fight and die in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military apparently is preventing journalists from telling the story. They attempt to deflect accusations of censorship by allowing in just enough reporters to appear transparent.

Them's fighting words! Yon has huge credibility on issues like this. It seems he would not easily risk it.

UPDATE: After noting Belmont Club's post on Yon's email, which notes that it has not been verified as actually coming from Yon, I've removed the name that Yon mentions in the email. It should not have been included in the first place.

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September 26, 2006

The Irrational Tenth

Belmont Club notes a sort of ongoing conversation taking place in many circles about the war and the size of the force necessary to best prosecute it.

At that time [2003] there was very little appreciation of what was really required to defeat the enemy. The Democrats were arguing for police action through multilateral alliances. Or for large half-million man troop deployments in Iraq. And the Conservatives thought that major combat operations were over in Iraq. But in truth, no one was asking the right questions. As one Marine Colonel (the reference to which I can't find at the moment) argued, more men of the wrong kind would have converted Iraq into a mud-trodden disaster. John Kerry understands this, and calls for more Special Forces to be used. But where to get them?
Where to get them indeed. This is the type of conversation in which someone quickly chimes in, "Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics." And they'd be right in a sense, because figuring out what kinds of forces are necessary when and where is a sort of strategic issue. Figuring out where to find them and then supplying them is more of a logistical problem, since it deals with the whole panoply of issues that entail the forming and manning of a certain kind of force. A commenter on the Small Wars Journal noted:
In the short run you have to raid tactical units for more recruiters, for drill sergeants, for instructors, etc. This means less capable deploying units. We've divested ourselves of a lot of training facilities. It will take lots of time and money to get back to the capacity we had in 1990 with a much smaller number of installations because an expanded Army has to be quartered somewhere and it has to train when not deployed.

So without some degree of political guarantee that we won't find another "Peace Dividend" there is really little to no constituency within the institutional Army to expand in anything but the most gradual way.

In short, institutional fear of a lack of national will hampers the ability to make a full-throated cry for increases in size.

And this is truly the problem. New forces might be raised, new kinds of fighters might be created, but in the end without the will to use them, they come to naught. Critics can carp to no end about the lack of postwar planning in Iraq, and certainly have a point in many cases. But our national will seems too endeared with the search for a perfect plan for warfare, without acknowledging that such quests are as fruitless as perpetual motion machines. This sentiment is one of the bases of Tony Corn's wide-ranging critique of an over-reliance on Clausewitz in Policy Review:

Last but not least, the third major flaw is “strategism.” At its “best,” strategism is synonymous with “strategy for strategy’s sake,” i.e., a self-referential discourse more interested in theory-building (or is it hair-splitting?) than policy-making. Strategism would be innocuous enough were it not for the fact that, in the media and academia, “realism” today is fast becoming synonymous with “absence of memory, will, and imagination”: in that context, the self-referentiality of the strategic discourse does not exactly improve the quality of the public debate.

In making the case that there is a distinct Western military tradition dating back to the Greeks, Victor Hanson argued in The Wars of the Ancient Greeks that one such instance is "the ubiquity of literary, religious, political and artistic groups who freely demanded justification and explication of war, and thus often questioned and occasionally arrested the unwise application of military force."

Fair enough. But Corn seems to think that we have gone too far, that our conversations are "strategy for strategy's sake." Indeed, I know a different aphorism, often mentioned by field-grade logisticians with whom I served: "amateurs talk logistics, professionals talk pornography."

What this is meant to express, however earthily, is the idea that it is a sort of raw, fighting spirit which is the essence of war, and given that, all else will fall into place with merely mediocre planning. Leadership, persistence, manipulation, sheer force of will -- these are the missing elements.

T.E. Lawrence knew this. "Nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex."

Belmont Club finishes,

In the end, the single best . . . response to the attack on September 11 was simply to do something, a policy which seems to me infinitely better than doing nothing, if only because action led to learning and that was superior to sitting back and imagining that we had the answers.
Yes, the irrational tenth is probably only to be discovered in combat.

Written by Chester at 11:36 AM | Link | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

September 12, 2006

From Every Mountainside

Tom Ricks’ book FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq has been climbing the charts of late. Ricks lists the work Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula as being very important to understanding the fight in Iraq today. Galula was a French officer who served in Greece, Algeria, and China, and observed various different insurgencies firsthand. His work is peppered with colorful anecdotes such as the things he learned after being captured by the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, it very much attempts to develop a theory of counterinsurgency warfare that is extremely relevant today, despite the differences between Communist fighters and those of the Islamic ilk.

Galula believed that the population must be divided into three groups, the favorable minority, who will always favor the side of the counterinsurgent, the insurgent minority, those who are the actual fighters and organizers for the insurgency, and the rest of the population, which lives between the two sides, and can be swayed in either direction. He further made the point that insurgencies are always motivated by a cause, and that counterinsurgencies must have a cause as well if they are to succeed:

The strategic problem of the counterinsurgent may be defined now as follows: “To find the favorable minority, to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority.” Every operation, whether in the military field of in the political, social, economic, and psychological fields, must be geared to that end.

To be sure, the better the cause and the situation, the larger will be the active minority favorable to the counterinsurgent and the easier its task. This truism dictates the main goal of the propaganda – to show that the cause the situation of the counterinsurgent are better than the insurgent’s. More important [sic], it underlines the necessity for the counterinsurgent to come out with an acceptable countercause.

All of this struck me very forcefully last week while attending the 5th Annual Defense Forum in Washington, DC, and hearing Tom Ricks give the keynote address. Ricks told the story of Army Colonel H.R. McMaster’s method of addressing the sheiks and imams in his area of operations upon arrival in Iraq in 2005. “McMaster told the Iraqis that when the American military first invaded Iraq, they were like men stumbling around furniture in a dark room. Now, the Iraqi government has turned on the lights for us, and the time for honorable resistance has ended.”

Ricks stated that this level of courtesy, used by McMaster even while implicitly threatening those who opposed him, is both necessary and extremely effective in the Arab world because the core value of that society is honor, or dignity, or respect. Ricks believes that when “Americans speak to the Iraqis about freedom, something is lost in translation.”

To use Galula’s terminology and theory, an independent observer must conclude that democracy is the “countercause” that the US seeks to advocate in the Middle East. But to use Ricks’ anecdote of Colonel McMaster, perhaps this is not the strongest or most effective countercause we might be using. Instead, perhaps we could link the honor that is so important to Arabs to what we define as freedom. Or perhaps we might attempt to dissociate jihad – especially the suicidal variant – from those actions which are perceived to be honorable.

These are tall orders but certainly possible for what has already been called a “long war.” Surely we are up to the task.


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September 7, 2006

Dispatches from the Defense Forum

The Defense Forum of 2006 was an outstanding event and I'd like to thank the US Naval Institute and Marine Corps Association for making it possible for me to attend.

If any Loyal Readers are interested, here are the pieces I wrote from the conference for Pajamas Media:

First Dispatch: about the remarks of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Giambastiani.

Second Dispatch: about a panel on the progress of the Long War.

The Third Dispatch discusses both the remarks of Tom Ricks, and a panel on the Quadrennial Defense Review.

The final dispatch recounts the final panel, about lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There's lots of good stuff in there!

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September 4, 2006

Defense Forum Washington 2006

Tomorrow (Tuesday the 5th), I'll be attending the Defense Forum in Washington, DC, sponsored by the Marine Corps Association and the US Naval Institute, two outstanding professional organizations for the Naval services.

While there, I'll be sending email dispatches throughout the day to Pajamas Media, so look for updates on their homepage.

The schedule of events looks really interesting and I'm especially looking forward to the panels entitled "The Long War: Where Are We Now?" and "Fighting on the Terrorists’ Turf: Lessons Learned in Iraq & Afghanistan and the Gap Between Expectations and Realities".

If there's a chance during the panel discussions, I'll be sure to ask a question or two from the back of the room. If any readers have questions you'd like me to try to address, please send them on to my email account, listed in the sidebar to the right.

I'll be attempting to file my dispatches while using my Motorola RAZR phone in a modem capacity for my laptop. There's a backup if it doesn't work, but it will be pretty cool if it does!

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August 31, 2006

Energy Followup Post

So there was quite a bit of great discussion in the two threads on Energy Independence in the last couple of weeks. (See here and here.) Two more thoughts. First, frequent commenter "Papa Ray" sent me this link: China nomads on energy's cutting edge, which is quite an interesting story. Frequent readers may know that I have a burning desire to go to Mongolia one day (at least I think I've mentioned that before). I've often wondered if the nomads there would do well with some sort of rugged electrical production system. Maybe something like this: SkyBuilt Power.

And also, a Loyal Reader sent this comment:

Let's get a little creative in our quest to reduce our consumption of
imported petroleum. Use tactics that cost little or nothing.

If every job that could be accomplished by telecommuting were to be
made so,
for 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 days a week, we'd reduce our consumption
dramatically,
overnight. A distributed workforce is a good thing, in wartime and
peacetime.

For those who can't telecommute, how about changing the workweek? Four
10-hour days instead of five 8-hour days would reduce consumption by up
to
15%.

Road tolls can be increased without taxing gas, increasing car-pooling.

Right turn-on-red, smart traffic signals, enforcement of pedestrian
scofflaws and a myriad other options, in combination could reduce
consumption immediately, by more than 25%, with very small impact on
the
population.

No Manhattan Project (i.e., huge waste of taxpayers' funds) necessary.
Change the rules of the game.

Any thoughts, readers?

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August 30, 2006

America's Schizophrenic View of Warfare

I've written an article for TCSDaily entitled Bipolar Disorder: America's Schizophrenic View of Warfare. It argues that Americans tend to view total war as positive, and counterinsurgencies as negative, rather than merely seeing them as different kinds of conflict. Go see for yourself!

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August 15, 2006

TCSDaily Article: Unfrozen Caveman Voter

I've written another piece for TCSDaily entitled, "Unfrozen Caveman Voter." Go check it out and ask yourself: are you part of the caveman demographic?

Written by Chester at 10:56 PM | Link | Comments (16) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Discussion Topic: Energy Independence

One of the frequent strategies espoused for the war is that of pursuing independence from the importation of vast sums of foreign oil.

It seems there are many competing agendas among those who favor this move. Many want to end the dependence on fossil fuels in general. That may be well and good, but it doth not make an immediate foreign policy or strategy for war.

Also, many who advocate increasing the use of alternative energy see no way for this to happen but for the government to invest massive sums in such technologies. It seems to me that any sector of the economy in which the government is heavily invested, whether monetarily, from an attention-standpoint, or via regulations, is likely to be inefficient and screwy. Consider public education, health care, pensions, and defense (hey the military is filled with motivated individuals, but it is after all a bureaucracy and as such, filled with nonsense). In other words, it's hard to see how a massive government program to rid our dependence on oil would really serve any immediate strategic aims. I rather think that the government should abolish the energy department altogether and then if there are market alternatives to imported oil, those will begin to shine.

The other agenda for many who insist on an end to imported foreign oil is an old-school isolationism. Rid the US economy of the necessity to have anything to do with oil exporters, and then we can just fence the Middle East in and let them kill each other off. But it seems to me that those who are angry with us now will be no less angry with us if we are more isolated from the world.

Any thoughts? Please discuss.

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July 31, 2006

Not a great way to identify an anonymous source

An AP article, Marines Prop Up Ailing Local Gov't in Iraq (via the Washington Post), contains this snippet:

"There's been a concerted campaign against government officials that's had some great success ... the government center is nearly devoid of governance," said the top Marine intelligence officer for the 3rd Battalion, 8th Regiment, who asked not to be identified because of security policies for intelligence officers.
It's things like this that make me really wonder about some reporters. Unless 3/8 is in an unusual situation, there's probably only one intel officer in the battalion, and definitely not more than a few if more than one. What a way to screw up a source. On the same token, if I was an intel officer in Iraq, I'd avoid the press like the plague itself.

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July 28, 2006

Discussion Topic: The Future of Iraq

The US is shifting forces around Iraq and the region in order to bolster security in Baghdad. Around 6,000 Iraqis have killed each other in June and July.

Can the US slow the pace of sectarian violence long enough for professional native security organizations to grow?

If the answer is no, then what should US policy be?

If the central government dissolves and the country splits, what should US policy be?

Let me argue first, that the US will be able to staunch the violence to bring the sectarian killings to a lower-level and prevent an open civil war. That the answer to number 2 is to go after the Mahdi Army and al Sadr. And the answer to number three, I'm not sure about, but absolutely certain that complete withdrawal would be the poorest of options because we would have less influence on the outcome of the dissolution.

Please discuss.

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July 27, 2006

The Hamdan Decision and the Privatization of War

I've written a short piece about the Hamdan decision and the privatization of warfare for PajamasMedia's new POLITICS CENTRAL portal. You can find it here.

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June 23, 2006

The Iraqi Peace Deal

Very late night thoughts of the just-reported Iraqi peace deal (see here):

1. The source: The Times nailed another recent event way in advance: the large-scale security operation in Baghdad. They called that several months ago and were correct that it would occur in the summer. They seem to have good sources inside the parties that would be involved in the negotiations.

2. The negotiations: There's a deal and then there's a deal. How close is this to getting done? Have confidence-building measures already been performed? Could the appointments of the Interior and Defense ministers be a part of that process? Could Zarqawi's death have been part of the process? The two happened on the same day! That has bothered me ever since . . .

3. The terms: The Times article states,

The Government will promise a finite, UN-approved timeline for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iraq; a halt to US operations against insurgent strongholds; an end to human rights violations, including those by coalition troops; and compensation for victims of attacks by terrorists or Iraqi and coalition forces.
It's never good to believe the first report. This one implies that the US will admit ongoing human rights violations. It also implies that the UN has somehow given sanction already to an existing withdrawal plan. Neither of these seem like concessions the US would be willing to make. FInally, the article states in a later point "A halt to “anti-terrorist operations” by coalition forces in insurgent areas" as being another term. What exactly does that mean? It seems way too broad.

My guess is that the agreement is much more detailed and some of these details are incorrect as reported.

4. Enforcement: The deal involves "seven Sunni insurgent groups". Is that a significant enough portion of the insurgency to really offer a meaningful end to violence? Do we have good documentation of their capabilities (see confidence-building measures above)? And, will they act against the remaining elements of the insurgency, whether Ba'athists, criminals, or Al Qaeda? This would be a must, no?

5. Effects: Wow. I think the degree to which this will be good for Bush will depend on whether Iraqis who've killed Americans are given amnesty and how that works out.

This would be bad for Iran, not only because they'll lose a little more on their bid for influence, but because the US will soon be in a position to right-face the whole force and head east (figuratively).

The Left will still be the Left, but it won't win in November. And if the whole thing goes through more or less as declared by the Times -- which says it has seen the documents -- then Zalmay Khalilzad should get the Nobel Peace Prize.

If the deal goes through as predicted, someone is going to have to sit back and tally the results: what did the insurgents get out of the insurgency? This is a deal after all, not a surrender. Did they get a place at the political table? A share in oil revenue? Something more? Implied security guarantees?

One can ask what the US has gotten for its blood and treasure . . . but I think it is far too early for that.

If Iraqis who've killed Americans are given amnesty, a curious possibility enters the mind: future Sunni politicians who declare their status as veterans of the war against the Americans in their campaigns . . . This is a horrendous historical comparison, but Confederate officers weren't allowed to run for office . . .

But let's hold for more developments . . .

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June 22, 2006

Prairie Pundit Review of Cobra II


Prairie Pundit has posted a review of Cobra II in which he takes the authors to task for several different reasons, namely, its description of the Fedayeen, troop strength debates, and descriptions of intelligence work at the operational level. As they say, read the whole thing, especially if you are considering buying it.

I can personally vouch for one of Prairie Pundit's criticisms:

In fact the Centcom staff and Franks came up with pretty good way of eliminating a large part of the Fedayeen on the way to Baghdad that Trainor and Gordon, again, do not even discuss. The intelligence analyst noticed that the Fedayeen would come back from their attacks and "puddle" around Baath Party headquaters or Iraqi intelligence offices in the towns along the route. Franks told the staff to bomb those buildings when the "puddles" were at their maximum. Reports on these attacks were usually limited to just saying that the building had been destroyed, because we did not want to tip the Fedayeen and let them know why we happened to bomb those building when we did. The authors never discuss this tactic of dealing with the enemy and write as if the Fedayeen survived to start the insurgency.
Prairie Pundit is exactly right. Sitting in our ops tents one day in Nasiriyah right after the invasion, I was checking the MEF's Significant Events page, chronologically listing important things that were happening throughout the MEF's battlespace, along with a standard date-time group. At one point, something like this came up on an update:
SOF TM REPORTS 500 FEDAYEEN FIGHTERS CONVERGING ON SOCCER STADIUM IN AD-DIWANIYAH, GC XXXXXXXX
About half an hour later, this was followed up with this:
SOF CONFIRMS DIWANIYAH SOCCER STADIUM DESTROYED WITH CLUSTER MUNITIONS @ DTG XXXXXXX
Later, when my unit moved to Diwaniyah, I had an opportunity to visit the soccer stadium as part of a team sent to find humanitarian projects in the city which my engineer battalion might have been able to perform. Needless to say, the stadium was pretty screwed up (I may even have a picture of that somewhere . . .).

Anyhow, see Prairie Pundit's review for further discussion.

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June 21, 2006

The Reasons We're Only Learning About the 500 Shells Now . . .

The announcement by Senator Santorum that the US has uncovered over 500 sarin and mustard gas chemical artillery rounds comes as quite an interesting development and deserves a bit of thought. The obvious question is: why are we only learning of this now?

The details of the revelation itself are telling: Sen. Santorum revealed in his interview with Hugh Hewitt that he first learned of this information some 10 weeks ago, and has been working on getting a sanitized, declassified version of the existence of these shells released since then. He learned via a tip, and after his own efforts came to naught, he implored upon Rep. Hoekstra to do what he could as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Soon enough, a sanitized version of the document in question, describing the shells, was produced. To hear Santorum tell the story, he nearly immediately held a press conference.

Someone has been sitting on this information for awhile. Why? Here are four scenarios:

1. Sources and Methods: The discovery of the shells was kept under wraps because of the sources and methods used to find them. This could mean both technical means or human information. Moreover, the fact of the shells' very existence might have necessitated security. If there are 500, there may be more, and there are many who would like to get their hands on them. I'll be the first to testify that Iraq has more ammunition depots than Texas has barbecue. They may still be in the process of discovery today.

2. CIA = CYA Perhaps the CIA was underplaying the existence of the shells to cover its own poor estimates of Iraq's capabilities? This explanation is less plausible to me. According to Santorum, the report comes from the National Ground Intelligence Center, or NGIC to the military. This is not part of the CIA. Unless I'm mistaken, and I hope a military reader will correct me if so, NGIC is a DoD facility, run and mainly staffed by the Army, but serving all services. If memory serves, Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel regularly train and take classes at NGIC, and much of what they learn there (how to defuse nukes, for a made-for-tv example) is understandably classified. It makes sense that any chemical munitions discovered would be tallied, and probably even examined in the field, by NGIC; NGIC, after all, would be in charge of promulgating procedures for the handling of shells if more were discovered in the future.

On the other hand, the stonewalling of Santorum came from the DNI, John Negroponte. He's the man who runs everything, CIA, NGIC and other DoD intelligence agencies, supposedly. So he is the one to ask about this scenario . . .

3. Covert Action It's always impossible to tell with such things, and absolutely futile to speculate, but there is the chance that some recovered shells have been used in covert action operations by the US. Many people in the world would like to have chemical artillery shells; why not put them up for sale and see who comes a-knockin? Or perhaps there's an underground railroad leading out of Iraq for these things; who's on the other end of it, and was it set up by the former regime, or just entrepreneurs?

I mention these possibilities only because they are worth mentioning. To think though that the US might have conceived of such covert action, and then succeeded in executing it, is to assume a level of competence within our clandestine services that seems unlikely. There's no way to prove or disprove this scenario. And that's all I'll say about that.

They Don't Know What They Know If this scenario is true, someone will be reading the paper in the morning and saying, "Oh yeah . . . I guess chemical artillery rounds kind of are WMD, huh?" The government is large. It is unwieldy. It doesn't always talk to itself. RIght hand, meet the left hand.

Whatever the explanation, it'll get interesting. The key is: did the White House know about them? The answer to that question will go a long way toward figuring out which of the above scenarios might be correct.

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May 15, 2006

Hey! What's all this moping around?

Well Loyal Readers, I've been on vacation with Mrs. Chester for a week or so. Didn't pay too much attention to the news while gone.

You can imagine my surprise upon returning and plugging back in to see there's all this talk of Conservative Fatigue Syndrome.

If some of you out there need a little inspiration, I offer you Corporal Jeremiah Workman, USMC:

The President of the United States takes great pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

CORPORAL JEREMIAH W. WORKMAN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For extraordinary heroism while serving as Squad Leader, Mortar Platoon, Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 1, 1st Marine Division, US Marine Corps Forces, Central Command in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 23 December 2004. During clearing operations in Al Fallujah, Iraq, Corporal Workman displayed exceptional situational awareness while organizing his squad to enter a building to retrieve isolated Marines inside. Despite heavy resistance from enemy automatic weapon fire, and a barrage of grenades, Corporal Workman fearlessly exposed himself and laid down a base of fire that allowed the isolated Marines to escape. Outside the house, he rallied the rescued Marines and directed fire onto insurgent positions as he aided wounded Marines in a neighboring yard. After seeing these Marines to safety, he led another assault force into the building to eliminate insurgents and extract more Marines. Corporal Workman again exposed himself to enemy fire while providing cover fire for the team when an enemy grenade exploded directly in front of him causing shrapnel wounds to his arms and legs. Corporal Workman continued to provide intense fire long enough to recover additional wounded Marines and extract them from the besieged building. Although injured, he led a third assault into the building, rallying his team one last time to extract isolated Marines before M1A1 tanks arrived to support the battle. Throughout this fight, Corporal Workman's heroic actions contributed to the elimination of 24 insurgents. By his bold leadership, wise judgment and complete dedication to duty, Corporal Workman reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President,
/s/
Secretary of the Navy

Semper Fi, now-Sergeant Workman! I'm glad you're on our side.

[Thanks to Sgt. Workman's mother-in-law for forwarding the citation to me!]

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May 3, 2006

This Is Our War

Devin Friedman of GQ magazine was kind enough to mail a copy of his new book, This Is Our War, which is a compilation of photographs taken by US troops in Iraq. Friedman was on one of many visits to Iraq, sponsored by GQ, when he had a revelation: the war in Iraq is the first where every particpant can take digital photographs of his own experience. He describes his realization in the introduction:

Sitting in this mess hall eating shitty cardboard cinnamon buns with lonely, geeky, barely postpubescent, kind of frighteningly smart army grunts, I had two thoughts. One: the familiar panic at realizing that the rabbit hole goes way deeper than you thought, that the lives of the people you're trying to write about are more vast, rich, mysterious, and moving than suspected, that you've barely scratched the surface. Thought two: Just imagine the untapped resources, the files and files of beautiful, honest, intimate, hilarious, harrowing pictures that exist on the hard drives and Memory Sticks of a nation of soliders, a collective memory of the war in Iraq probably far superior to whatever's on the photo servers at The new York Times or Newsweek. Superior not in terms of technical skill and artistic composition (though often that, too) but in terms of capturing that brittle, fleeting sense of what it's like, that shy animal that tends to make itself scarce around journalists except in brief interludes.
Friedman and the GQ staff have done a bang-up job in assembling the photos in this work. Moreover, they've refrained from any excessive commentary. Aside from Friedman's brief intro, and a forward by Gen Wesley Clark, the rest of the book is photos, their attributions, and the occasional quote from troops.

If that "fleeting sense of what it's like" is ephemeral to journalists, I suspect it is just as much so to veterans like myself. Flipping through This Is Our War is an excellent exercise in dredging up memories -- both good and bad -- for me and a work that can do that, which can really make one remember vividly for an instant what it was like is truly to be cherished.

For those who have followed the war in detail, as I imagine many of you loyal readers have, I'd recommend taking a look at this work to get a better mental picture of the landscape of Iraq, in all of its details: the lifestyles of the troops, the terrain, the weather, the Iraqis themselves.

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April 18, 2006

FLASH: Marine Sgt to receive Navy Cross

A Loyal Reader emails:

You were one of the first blogs I read as the invasion of Fallujah unfolded. You really made it feel like I was there.

I am writing to inform you that my son-in-law [name withheld] will be receiving the Navy Cross in a ceremony at Parris Island . . .

He earned the award for action on 12/23/04 while clearing houses of weapons and people. His 20 man squad suffered 11 wounded and 3 KIA that day.

I'll hold on releasing the name until I hear more details.

To my knowledge, this will be the second award of the Navy Cross during the War on Terror. The first went to my Basic School classmate, Captain Brian Chontosh.

You heard it here first . . . developing . . .

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April 15, 2006

Corporal Brett Lundstrom, USMC

Wow. This slideshow of the wake for Corporal Brett Lundstrom, killed by small arms fire in Fallujah on January 7th, is incredible.

Cpl Lundstrom was Oglala Sioux.

Fair winds and following seas, Devildog.

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April 8, 2006

The US-Iraqi Security Treaty of 2007

Belmont Club points to an article I noticed in Opinionjournal last week, in which Amir Taheri fleshes out his belief that the strategy in many Muslim capitals is to wait out the end of Mr. Bush's presidency, the assumption being that whoever follows will not be so prone to an aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East:

According to this theory, President George W. Bush is an "aberration," a leader out of sync with his nation's character and no more than a brief nightmare for those who oppose the creation of an "American Middle East." Messrs. Abbasi and Ahmadinejad have concluded that there will be no helicopter as long as George W. Bush is in the White House. But they believe that whoever succeeds him, Democrat or Republican, will revive the helicopter image to extricate the U.S. from a complex situation that few Americans appear to understand.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric is based on a strategy known in Middle Eastern capitals as "waiting Bush out." "We are sure the U.S. will return to saner policies," says Manuchehr Motakki, Iran's new Foreign Minister.

Allow a bit of speculation . . .

The Bush administration is probably equally as concerned as Mr. Ahmadinejad that its successor will pursue a, for lack of a better term, more "traditional" foreign policy in the Muslim world. Moreover, the Bush team has proven fairly adept at forcing military actions to conform to domestic political timeframes. I think an oft-overlooked facet of the timing of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was its relationship to the election cycle. Bush et al. knew that they wanted to get rid of Saddam, and knew that they had to do it in his first term, because there was no way to guarantee that he'd have a second. Letting the inspections drag on then, as an alternative strategy for example, would have been more than just backing down; it would have lessened the chance that the regime would be changed before November of 2004.

Likewise, the Second Battle of Fallujah coincided with the end of the US election in 2004, as Bush could not risk the media's coverage of a dirty, urban battle while he was shoring up his own electoral position at home.

Some might think this is a poor way to plan: manipulative of policy for the purposes of political gain . . . but to think such is to ignore the intricate ties between warfare and politics . . . Clausewitz would understand what the President is up to, as would Lincoln, I think . . .

In any case, assuming Mr. Taheri is correct in his assessment of the "waiting Bush out" strategy he describes, we now encounter a new foreign-policy conundrum for Bush's team. First an inescapable fact: after January 20th, 2009, we'll have a new President, who might have altogether different ideas of how the US should be involved in the Middle East.

So assume that Bush wants his strategy to continue beyond his own tenure. How might he ensure that? One way might be through a security treaty with the new Iraqi government. Such a treaty might detail the nature of continued US intervention for the next decade or so: where bases might be located; how aid should be distributed; how intelligence might be shared between the two; how the two countries' forces could cooperate in a variety of endeavors . . .

It is unlikely that such a step could be taken in 2006 because of political conditions in both countries: the Iraqi government is in no shape to begin deliberating it, as it does not yet exist. And in Washington, things have entered the twilight zone that occurs in the runup to elections: little other than the election itself is on anyone's mind, and passing a major piece of foreign-policy legislation is unlikely (the immigration debate is certainly foreign-policyish, but is also certainly more driven by reelection concerns than anything else). Moreover, after 2007, Bush will probably have missed his chance to attempt such an initiative . . . by 2008, he'll have entered full-scale lame duck status, and most everything will be on autopilot as the politerati totally focus on the presidential election.

Back to Iraqis: one thing's for sure: whoever does end up running the government over there will not run it for long if security is not his highest priority . . .

So there's an interesting confluence of interests: US desires to extend its forward presence in the Mideast for the intermediate term, perhaps 10 years or more; and an Iraqi political need to appear to shore up domestic security, while at the same time addressing the status of the large US presence within the country.

And then there's the timing: the formation of the Iraqi government, and what could be called the continual reformation of the US government, both won't be complete until early 2007 . . .

My guess is that if the Bush team wants to enshrine some sort of aggressive US transformational policy in the Middle East, 2007 will be the year to make it happen, and a treaty, or other similar agreement, might be the means . . .

One interesting side note is that treaties must be approved by the Senate . . . and the number of Senators who are preening for 2008 is as large as ever . . . and the Bush team also has a habit of skillfully employing the tactic of forcing a vote on an issue so that legislators are thereby defined by that vote in an upcoming election (think the DHS bill of 2002 for example) . . . interesting . . .

A principle of grand strategy is to ensure that one's policies live longer than one's own administration -- for if they are the correct course, then they should not be limited in the timeframe of their execution . . .

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March 24, 2006

Why didn't Turkey let us open a northern front in 2003?

That's the question Wretchard poses in Belmont Club today. Here is my response:

As to your question, how this debacle occurred . . . My guess, and that is all it is, is that the issue of staging/basing rights in Turkey for the 4th ID is one of those things that falls in between departmental seams in the makeup of our foreign policy apparatus.

Was it a State function or a Defense function to convice the Turks to let us have our way? If memory serves, both Powell and Wolfowitz made trips to Turkey in the Jan/Feb/Mar timeframe. Who was ultimately responsible? Was everyone on the same page, making the same kinds of overtures to the Turks? or was it a case of an issue -- everyone who's worked in a large organization has observed this phenomenon -- where both were in charge and therefore neither took the initiative, knowing that they had the other to blame if it went south . . .

I think this is an enduring seam in the execution of our policies: the separate chains of command and institutions between the warmakers and the dealmakers quashes the ability to align the execution of policy except at the highest level -- the President. This seam definitely persisted for the entire lifespan of the CPA as well after the fall of Baghdad . . .

I agree, W, that only in retrospect can we say that 4th ID may have made a difference in the Sunni triangle, but I'm not so sure it would have. When we did the big op-pause about 7 days into the invasion, in order to "clean up the Fedayeen in our rear" (as ordered by LtGen McKiernan of CFLCC), the 1st MarDiv's intelligence section's opinion was that such resistance would collapse upon our seizure of Baghdad, and therefore the best way to clean it up was to press on. But somebody higher up wanted to stop, so we did.

This flies in the face of the assertions in Cobra II that Saddam's regime had two centers of gravity: the regime apparatus in Baghdad, AND the spirited insurgency fighters with a spiritual heart in the Sunni triangle (or some such).

I don't think that's an accurate observation. I think it was true that Baghdad was the center of gravity, and therefore the key node of the entire regime's system of power.

I think the real problem was that we dithered too long after Baghdad fell. That dithering was the result of the same seams between diplomats and generals mentioned above wrt to Turkey. Warfare is about creating opportunities and then exploiting them. For the creating part, I give us an A+. For exploitation, a B-.

One wonders if this performance might not be inherent to democracies. We worry so much about whether to go to war, and why, and why shouldn't we, and how else could we, and is there a precedent like this, and what will the French think, and how will people feel, that in the end, this makes the initial action the source of our mental focus, and not the second and third-order effects which is where exploitation -- and victory -- lies.


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March 23, 2006

The President's Sergeant Major

A few days ago, the case was made here that the President, if not the Secretary of Defense, needs a "directed telescope" to help him understand ground events in Iraq, and to refute, counter and clarify whatever hash is out in the evening news in the US:

While in Napoleon's time the directed telescope was one of two parts that were reinforcing -- regular reporting being the other -- in our day, there would be three parts: regular reporting, the directed telescope, and the press. The telescopes would be a powerful tool to have in the arsenal of a Defense Secretary or President in need of further independent information on the status of forces or situations. And, in my conception, the telescopes might provide valuable information about the conduct of a given battle or campaign. Such information could be priceless in engaging in the debate with the press described above. They might be composed of a couple of colonels, some independent civilians (West himself, or Robert Kaplan might be good examples, since this is similar to the roles they've fashioned for themselves already, albeit independently), and even a physically fit diplomat or two. Combined with robust archiving, search, image retrieval, and public-speaking capabilities inherent in the combat pundit office (perhaps "office" is the wrong term, as it should be informal, small, and not legislatively created), the National Command Authorities might be much better able to determine the status of all kinds of events, and use that information to refute inaccurate media memes (and be more informed in general as well).

Several new stories serve to clarify this idea a bit. First, Peggy Noonan has an excellent piece in today's Opinionjournal about the distance of elites from the masses, and the resulting cause for error in judgment:

The leaders of the day did not know that terrible violence was coming because of what I think is a classic and structural problem of leadership: It distances. Each of these men was to varying degrees detached from facts on the ground. They were by virtue of their position and accomplishments an elite. They no longer knew what was beating within the hearts of those who lived quite literally on the ground. Nehru, Mountbatten, Jinnah--they well knew that Muslims feared living under the rule of the Hindus, that Hindus feared living under Muslims, that Sikhs feared both. But the leaders did not know the fear that was felt was so deep, so constitutional, so passionate. They did not know it would find its expression in a savagery so wild and widespread.

Each of these leaders had been removed by his own history from facts on the ground. "Elitism" doesn't always speak of where you went to school or what caste, as it were, you came from. You can wind up one of the elites simply by rising. Simply by being separated for a certain amount of time from those you seek to lead.

People who know most intimately, and through most recent experience, what is happening on the ground, and in the hearts of men, are usually not in the inner councils. They have not fought their way or earned their way in yet. Sometimes they're called in and listened to, at least for a moment, but in the end they tend to be ignored. They're nobodies, after all.

This is a problem with government and governing bodies--with the White House, Downing Street, with State Department specialists, and the Council on Foreign Relations, and West Point, too. It is not so much a matter of fault as it is structural. The minute you rise to govern you become another step removed from the lives of those you govern. Which means you become removed from reality.

So how to correct for this as much as possible? Keeping the idea of a "directed telescope" in mind, now see this exchange between Hugh Hewitt and Michael Yon, warblogger extraordinaire:
Hugh Hewitt: . . . Michael Yon, when you do go back, which part of the country are you headed to? Are you going to embed with another unit like the Infantry division you were with a year ago?

Michael Yon: Well, I've already contacted Sergeant Major Mellinger, who's the top enlisted man in the theater, meaning he is the top enlisted man in Iraq. And he goes everywhere. I've been out with him twice before, and I call him the University of Iraq, because he seems to know everything that's going on. So I'd like to spend a couple of weeks with him, getting in-briefed again about the new state of the country, because he speaks very bluntly. And then after that, I'll go to probably where the action is. I tend to go to where our troops are seeing the most combat, but then I pop out sometimes, and go to the peaceful areas. But I want to know how our troops are doing.

Now tie it all together. You can see it, yes? What the President needs is his own Sergeant Major - a directed telescope on the battlefield reporting directly to him. Not his staff, not the White House Spokesman or the Press Pool. The chain goes straight to The Man himself.

This is not hard to envision. Grab any of a number of Sergeants Major out there who are now retired. They have made careers of making gut calls in all manner of odd situations. Grab a guy who used to be in Delta Force, or the 1st Marine Division SgtMaj. You could grab an officer if you preferred (ahem: my email address is in the sidebar), but if it was me, I'd have a senior enlisted man, the type who's harder than woodpecker lips. Whoever he is, he must be able to communicate very very very well. Then give him an armored four door humvee, a translator, and a couple of shooters to be a mini-brute squad. That's all he'll want if he's the kind I have in mind. He can always hop on a bird if needs to. Get him some nice equipment too -- a camera, a sat phone, etc.

Then set him loose. Tell him to go to whatever is interesting and report whatever he thinks necessary. Give him no format whatsoever. No timeframes whatsoever. Or, if you know of a particular operation that needs checking up on, send him there.

One more thing he needs: a little letter signed by POTUS that says, "This man may go wherever he wishes. Do not impede him." He can laminate that and put it in his vest and that's all he'll need for access.

The cost of all this is miniscule compared to the added channel of insight that the President would have to the events on the ground. He can then make better decisions, question his subordinates a little more pointedly, but most importantly, be very prepared to refute, clarify, and offer counternarratives to the press.

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March 21, 2006

Good News From Iraq

Regimental Combat Team 7 has sent me the following story:

Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division - one of two Iraqi Army brigades in western Al Anbar Province - have spent months now learning the administrative and decision-making processes they’ll need to function as a military headquarters element to the three Iraqi infantry battalions which will eventually be under their charge.

Partnered with a Military Transition Team - groups of Marines assigned to track and guide each Iraqi military unit’s transition to full control - the Iraqi soldiers here are learning the skills required to operate as a command staff, such as administration, logistical procurement, command and staff relations and tactical decision making.

The article states that the Iraqis have made tremendous progress and lists several operations in which they've participated with Americans.

My understanding is that the Iraqi system of unit sizes is on the British system: a battalion is similar to two of our companies, a regiment is like one of our battalions, and a division is the size of one of our regiments. I think that's right, and perhaps they'll correct me if I'm wrong.

Comments are still closed, but feel free to email.

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March 17, 2006

Fallujah, media memes, and public debate

Today, Belmont Club has a post mentioning the problems Bing West describes in No True Glory, his story of the Battle for Fallujah.

I knew Wretchard was reading this book, so I decided to read it too and finished it earlier in the week.

The thing that struck me, but which West does not explicitly state, is that media perceptions were the driving factor in two key decisions made by the Bush Administration: first, to order the assault on the city in April of 2004, and second to halt it a few days later.

First, US popular revulsion to the images of the four dead military contractors in Fallujah caused the Administration to seek vengeance solely for its own sake.

For a gleeful mob to hang Americans like pieces of charred meat mocked the rationale that the war had liberated grateful Iraqis. The mutilation was both a stinging rebuke and a challenge. National pride and honor were involved. The president's envoy to Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, went on television in Baghdad to denounce the atrocity, vowing that the "deaths will not go unpunished." The spokesman for the JTF, Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, followed up by saying the attack on Fallujah would be "overwhelming." Write an order for the Marines to attack, General Sanchez told his staff, and I don't mean any fucking knock-before-search, touchy-feely stuff.
The Marines, namely the 1st Marine Division, then still under General Mattis, and his immediate field commander, LtGen Conway of the First MEF, had intended to slowly take over various portions of the city over months, not invade it in one decisive action. But they had their orders (apparently very poorly written ones, according to West) and they carried them out.

But then media coverage and perceptions of the attack were once again integral in operational decisionmaking. The CPA

had prepared a public affairs plan in support of the offensive, although it didn't address the Arab press.
That left Arab media to shape perceptions of the battle with no American influence at all.
On April 4, Fallujah was dominating international headlines because all major news outlets had rushed reporters and video crews there after the administration's vow of an overwhelming response.
West's chapter entitled "Faint Echoes of Tet" is priceless. Here's an extended excerpt:
The CPA and all Iraqis were relying on the press to inform them about the military situation. Reports about the fighting came from two major sources -- Western journalists, principally American, and the Arab press. The two dominant Arab satellite networks were Al Arabiya, based in Dubai, and Al Jazeera, based in Qatar. In addition to reaching hundreds of millions of Arabs, their reportage was more trused by Iraqis than was the US-funded channel called Al Iraqiya, based in Baghdad. About 25% of Iraqis -- the more wealthy and influential -- had access to satellite reception, and by a five-to-one margin they preferred Jazeera to Iraqiya . . .

Both networks had learned how not to bite the hands that fed them. Criticism of the autocracies in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere had resulted in the closure of offices and the withdrawal of advertising revenues. Diatribes about the Israeli occupation of Iraq were the two staples of their coverage that received wide approval among Arab governments . . .

In April the insurgents invited a reporter from Al Jazeera, Ahmed Mansour, and his crew into Fallujah, where they filmed scenes from the hospital. Hour after hour, day after day after day in the first week in April, the airwaves were filled with pictures of the dead, the bleeding, and the maimed. The Arab media were calling the resistance an Initifada, linking the insurgent fighting against the Americans to the Palestinian uprising against the Israelis. The sound bites featured the wails of the mourners, the sobs and screams of mothers, and the frenzied shouts and harried faces of blood bespotted doctors and nurses. No one with a breath of compassion could watch Arab TV and not feel anguish. Most poignant were the pictures Jazeera ran of babies, one after another after another, all calm, frail, and pitiful in the repose of death. Where how or when they died was not attributed. The viewer assumed all the infants wwere killed by the Marines in Fallujah. The baby pictures would bring tears from a rock . . .

A Jazeera and Al Arabiya were unrelenting in broadcasting the plight of the civilians in Fallujah, while the internet amplified the message of Marine callousness and sped protests around the world on a minute-by-minute basis. On the Google search engine, during the month of April, the word Fallujah leaped from 700 to 175,000 stories, many highly critical of the Marines. Quantity had a spurious quality of its own, resulting in an erroneous certitude based on the sheer volume of repetition.

The reports filed by Western journalists embedded with the Marines did not support the allegations of widespread, indiscriminate carnage. Senior US government officials, though, didn't have the time to peruse tactical reporting. Instead, in their offices they turned on cable news, where video clips from Fallujah were shown over and over again. The images, obtained from a pool that included the Jazeera cameramen inside the city affected viewers in Iraq, in Washington, and in Crawford, Texas.

West offers what might have been a palliative for this spin.
In the face of this press onslaught, the White House, the Pentagon, the CPA, and CentCom were passive. Partially this was a military reflex to avoid any comparison to the 'body count' debacle of Vietnam. none of those at the top of the chains of command, though, requested from the Marine units in daily contact any systematic estimates that distinguished between civilian and enemy casualties. Given the video recorded the the unmanned aerial vehicles and the imagery required of every air strike and AC-130 gun run, records of the damage would have been easy enough to collect and verify had anyone thought of doing so.

In the absence of countervailing visual evidence presented by authoritative sources, Al Jazeera shaped the world's understanding of Fallujah without having to counter the scrutiny of informed skeptics. The resulting political pressures constrained military actions both against Fallujah and against Sadr.


The Cluetrain Manifesto, which in the 1990s was so influential at describing the nature of the emerging connected world, made two observations that are relevant here:

1. Hyperlinks subvert hierarchy. In the case of Fallujah, the CNN and other western outlets frequently used footage from Jazeera, subverting to some extent the hierarchy of national boundaries as being determinative of press coverage. The same is true with the Google News aspect that West mentions. And finally, the hierarchy of the chain of command was subverted as well. Presumably the President himself had Fallujah brought into his living room, and its coverage shaped his perceptions of the battle. West implies that he did not seek out other opinions, notably that of the ground commanders, Mattis and Conway.

2. Markets are conversations. Cluetrain asserted that the information technology revolution allowed mass markets to revert to their conversational origins: the haggling, debate, and spirited nature of the traditional market or bazaar, rather than the stilted interaction between monolithic institutions and underdog individual customers that came to characterize relationships in the age of the industrial society.

West's solution to the whole conundrum, as mentioned in the last two paragraphs above, is very interesting. Traditional public relations methodology has attempted to generate enough contrary content such that the good might offer an alternative to the negative for the public to choose what to believe themselves. But what West advocates is something more like a public debate, in which some viewpoints, spin, or memes, are publicly refuted in some meaningful way. The only member of the Bush Administration who does anything like this on any kind of regular basis is the Defense Secretary. Occasionally when asked a leading or insinuating question for example, he responds with another question that attempts to refashion the dialogue. But even he doesn't do this that often. Keeping track of what memes are proliferating, where they come from, how they contradict each other, and finding concrete and believable evidence to refute them is a big job. Few military or policy organizations do this well. Not even corporations excel at this: usually they stumble along with PR as a sort of arm of the Marketing department. How many times has a corporation been accused of something and responded with deft explanations and a robust defense? Only about a tenth of the time or so would be my guess . . .

In fact, the only kind of organization I can think of that has an inherent stake in immediately and strongly responding to charges made by the press -- or by an opponent, with the press as its proxy -- is the political campaign. Attack ad is met by attack ad, and spin meets spin. But even those organizations are in search of the ever-memorable sound bite, not some public consensus on "truth."

Perhaps then, one thing that the Defense Department needs is a rapid response combat punditry team. Since this would essentially be a political function, it should be staffed with appointed civilians, but preferably those who are not too closely tied to the reigning administration, if that's possible. The office would work to refute, debate, clarify and offer counter-narratives in any case deemed necessary. This would be something different from "propaganda" creation, at least as I envision it. Propaganda nowadays is smelled as such by the public immediately and if there ever was value to it, it would certainly be counterproductive today. But to publicly enter into a debate with the memes, or individuals in the press -- to begin a conversation, rather than the traditionally conceived shouting match or corporate institutional-speak-- might be very effective. It would be a difficult job, but it seems to be a necessary one these days. The key would be to be forceful, but not necessarily adversarial. Public debate is about winning people over to one's side after all, and the ultimate coup would be to win the press themselves.

Notably though, one key to good conversation is when each side is willing to admit previous mistakes, or misjudgments. A candid combat pundit would do so. And if the press failed to do so, it would lessen it morally in the eyes of the independent observer. Or, miracle of miracles, perhaps some would admit mischaracterizations from time to time. In that case, would not public debate be more enlightened than it is now?

The blogosphere already performs the function I've described to some degree, but with much more limited effectiveness. Someone based within the DoD would have the authority of office to go with that of the megaphone.

A second technique for offering evidence to counter inaccuracies that enter public discourse would be the use of a small number of "directed telescopes", perhaps working out of the same combat pundit office mentioned above. The directed telescope was an innovation of Napoleon. Each was a pretty senior colonel or general officer, held by Napoleon in exceptionally high esteem, and trusted implicitly. He would use them to survey terrain, deliver important communications, gather intelligence, make judgments of enemy dispositions, and occasionally they would jump in to correct units that were not following Napoleon's intent. Martin Van Creveld describes this technique in Command in War:

Climbing through the chain of command, however, such reports tend to become less and less specific; the more numerous the stages through which they pass and the more standardized the form in which they are presented, the greater the danger that they will become so heavily profiled (and possibly sugar-coated or merely distorted by the many summaries) as to become almost meaningless. To guard against this danger, and keep subordinates on their toes, a commander needs to have in addition a kind of directed telescope -- the metaphor is an apt one -- which he can direct, at will, at any part of the enemy's forces, the terrain, or his own army in order to bring in information that is not only less structured than that passed on by the normal channels but also tailored to meet his momentary (and specific) needs. Ideally, the regular reporting system should tell the commander which questions to ask, and the directed telescope should enable him to answer those questions. It was the two systems together, cutting across each other and wielded by Napoleon's masterful hand, which made the evolution in command possible.

As organized from 1805 on, Napoleon's system for cutting through established channels and for directly gathering the information he needed consisted of two separate parts. The first was a group of between eight and twelve adjutant generals; these were men selected unsystematically from among colonels and generals who caught the emperor's eye, usually carried the rank of brigadier or major general, and were between ages thirty and forty and thus in the full flower of their mental and physical powers. Their duties varied enormously, from reconnoitering entire countries (Savary in 1805) to negotiating a surrender (Rapp in the same year) to spying out enemy headquarters under the cover of a truce (Rapp again, on the eve of Austerlitz) to commanding the cavalry of the artillery reserve in battle (Druot, Lauriston) to governing a province and commanding a garrison far from the main theater of operations. Such responsibilities called for practical savoir faire as well as diplomatic ability, the knowledge and talents of a military commander, and, last, but not least, sheer physical stamina.

While in Napoleon's time the directed telescope was one of two parts that were reinforcing -- regular reporting being the other -- in our day, there would be three parts: regular reporting, the directed telescope, and the press. The telescopes would be a powerful tool to have in the arsenal of a Defense Secretary or President in need of further independent information on the status of forces or situations. And, in my conception, the telescopes might provide valuable information about the conduct of a given battle or campaign. Such information could be priceless in engaging in the debate with the press described above. They might be composed of a couple of colonels, some independent civilians (West himself, or Robert Kaplan might be good examples, since this is similar to the roles they've fashioned for themselves already, albeit independently), and even a physically fit diplomat or two. Combined with robust archiving, search, image retrieval, and public-speaking capabilities inherent in the combat pundit office (perhaps "office" is the wrong term, as it should be informal, small, and not legislatively created), the National Command Authorities might be much better able to determine the status of all kinds of events, and use that information to refute inaccurate media memes (and be more informed in general as well).


PS: Comments are currently closed. Feel free to email me any thoughts or responses you have. I may include them here, but no promises.

UPDATE: I forgot to mention: in case there's any doubt to the role the press played in the Fallujah Battle, remember that when the city was finally assaulted in November of 04, the first objective was seizure of the hospital so that he images mentioned above would not be used so spuriously.

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March 16, 2006

I fully intend to rub the AP's faces in this one day

Allow me a small rant:

Iran Offers to Enter Iraq Talks With U.S. - Yahoo! News:

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran offered Thursday to enter into talks with the United States aimed at stabilizing Iraq, the first time the Islamic republic has agreed to negotiate with the superpower it calls the "Great Satan."

The offer appears to reflect the desire of at least some top Iranian officials to relieve Western pressure over Tehran's nuclear program in return for help on Iraq, which is sliding ominously toward civil war.

I'm so sick of this crap. Civil war is in no faction's interest whatsoever. Not the Kurds, not the Sunnis, who will be annihilated, not the Shi'ites. If it happens it will be largely provoked and prosecuted by the militias -- the Sopranos of the country.

We shall see, my friends in the press, we shall see.

This story was written by, "ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writers". Three years from now Iraq will be a peaceful, prosperous democracy, Ali. We'll see what shinola you're peddling then, and for whom . . .

Why must we all put up with this? This stuff really pisses me off.

You know, I'd really love to form a small private organization dedicated to tracing the links between al Qaeda's media committees and reporting like this . . . how many bombing photos are the result of pre-strike tips, for example? how many stories are ghost-written by local stringers? The insurgency pays on average $200 for detonating an IED. I bet the press probably pays much better for pictures of the aftermath.

We are witnessing the death of the Fourth Estate my friends, let there be no doubt about it. Spin like this might have worked back in the day, but we're all meme-wise now.

I'd love to hear Hugh Hewitt interview one of these yahoos.

Thus endeth my rant. Sorry for the interruption.

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March 5, 2006

Discussion Topic: Media Memes and the War on Terror

Of all the memes disseminated by our media with regard to the war on terror in general, and Iraq in particular, how can they be categorized or classified? My thought is:

-the US is disrespectful of Islam (the Newsweek story)

-the US routinely violates human rights (Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib)

-the Iraq war is analogous to the Vietnam war

-Iraq is perpetually on the brink of civil war

-extreme Islam should be tolerated (the refusal to publish cartoons)

-Iraq grows more violent by the day

Are there more? If all of these might be categorized in some way, what would they be? Aside from mere opposition to US efforts, can more distinct categories be discerned?

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March 2, 2006

"Strike?"

Jim Geraghty wonders how else the fallout from the port deal will affect our politics: [hat-tip: Instapundit]

Welcome to Post-Tipping Point politics. There is no upside to doing the right thing – which is to emphasize, as one blogger put it, that there is a difference between Dubai and Damascus. There is tremendous political upside to doing the wrong thing, boldly declaring, “I don’t care what the Muslim world thinks, I’m not allowing any Arab country running ports here in America! I don’t care how much President Bush claims these guys are our allies, I don’t trust them, and I’m not going to hand them the keys to the vital entries to our country!”

Courting these voters will mean supporting proposals that are supported by wide swaths of the American people, but are largely considered nonstarters in Washington circles: much tougher immigration restrictions, including patrolling the Mexican border; racial profiling of airline passengers instead of confiscating grandma’s tweezers; drastically reducing or eliminating entry visas to residents of Muslim or Arab countries; and taking a much tougher line with Saudi Arabia and coping with the consequences of that stance. Since 9/11, the Bush administration, and most leaders on Capitol Hill in both parties have dismissed those ideas as unrealistic, counterproductive, or not in accordance to American values.

Geraghty points to this New Republic piece, in which Peter Beinart asks,
If you listen to Democratic criticism of the port deal, the Jacksonian themes are clear. In the words of California Senator Barbara Boxer, "We have to have American companies running our own ports." But nationalism tinged with xenophobia makes Democrats uncomfortable.

For Democrats, stealing the Bush administration's populist, unilateralist thunder would be a remarkable coup. And it would be a remarkable historical irony, since Jacksonianism in Jeffersonian clothes--civil libertarian, anti-globalization, uninterested in transforming the world--inverts the foreign policy of the last Democratic president, Bill Clinton.

Politically, the opportunity is clear. There's just one catch: Is this really what Democrats believe?

*********

I'm convinced this is all a remake of Naked Gun. You remember the scene: in his zealous pursuit of the Queen's would-be assassin, Lt. Frank Drebin finds himself at an Angels game, suddenly taking the place of the umpire behind home plate. A pitch is thrown. The crowd goes silent. Drebin is quiet. The pitcher stares at him. The batter turns and looks at him. Drebin looks back at him. Then he mumbles, "Strike?"

The crowd goes wild. Drebin smiles. He's got em now! He's forgotten all about the assassin for the moment. The next pitch is thrown. It's obviously way outside. Drebin calls another strike. The crowd goes nuts! Drebin does a little dance behind the plate, with two fingers up in the air, repeating, "Two! Two! Two! Strike Two!" On the next pitch, Drebin calls a strike before the ball even hits the catcher's mitt. Then he polishes it off with a moonwalk and a bit of breakdancing.

This is where the Democratic party finds itself. With their friends in the press, they've thrown out all manner of arguments in their zealous quest to wrest power from George W. Bush. Then, all of a sudden, they find themselves in a position to umpire a large commercial transaction. Everyone waits to see what they're going to say.

"Arabs?"

The country goes wild! They reinforce their success and continue on this meme. But as Beinart notes above, are they really ready to deal with the underlying reasoning that leads the nation to cheer at their calls?

We all know how that segment of the movie ends. Drebin is having so much fun that he forgets about the sleeper in his midst. Then, when he's reminded, he starts a riot on the field. Of course, it's Hollywood and in the end he's a hero. But is this the kind of national security that we want? Ask a Democrat what kinds of actions he's prepared to take in the war, and he'll say he'll withdraw troops from Iraq. Then he'll list a litany of things he would have done differently. But does he really have a plan of any substance? In the midst of discrediting the Bush Administration, he sees an opening on Bush's right. Finally! But is he really ready to go there and do the things that those constituencies want done? All of a sudden, the pre-9/11 Democrats have gone on a blind date with 2006 voters. I have a feeling that before it is all over, the Democrats will be as terrified of the voters as they are of Arabs.

This all goes back to my post of yesterday: How will our society answer the question: Is Islam compatible with a free society? The Democrats may be about to side with those who say, No. SInce this violates some of their most fundamental principles, and those of multiculturalism, can they even make this journey? Or are we witnessing a transformation of the Democratic party?

Interestingly enough, Naked Gun opens with Drebin "on vacation" in Beirut, if memory serves, where he takes out Ayatollah Khomeini, Gorbachev, Idi Amin, and Qaddafi all at one time.

[Frank has beaten a horde of America's most-feared world leaders in a conference room and heads for a door]
Muammar al-Qaddafi: Hey, who are you?
Frank: I'm Lt. Frank Drebin! Police Squad! And don't ever let me catch you guys in America!
[the door hits Frank in the face and he loses his balance]
This was supposed to be funny back in 1988: a witless American taking the fight to the enemy: basically what the American people would have loved to see done to any of those world leaders. But it's meant to be a farce!

Who knew it was prophetic of the possible electoral machinations of the Democratic party in 2006?

Written by Chester at 10:10 PM | Link | Comments (8) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

The Key Strategic Question

Is Islam compatible with a free society?

This is the key strategic question of our day.

In October, William Buckley wrote:

The moment has not come, but it is around the corner, when non-Muslims will reasonably demand to have evidence that the Muslim faith can operate within boundaries in which Christians and Jews (and many non-believers) live and work without unconstitutional distraction.
[h-t to a Belmont Club commenter]

Buckley is correct that this is a question demanding an answer, but he misjudges the timing of its asking and answering. The truth is that assumed answers to this question have been fundamental in developing our strategies in the war on terror, and that we have yet to answer it definitively.

Is Islam compatible with a free society? A 'yes' answer offers a far different set of strategic imperatives than a 'no' answer.

In his book The Universal Hunger for Liberty, Michael Novak notes the tone of discourse in the beginning of our war:

"Surely," the proposition was put forward, by many Islamic voices as well as by the president, "a modern and faithful Islam is consistent with nonrepressive, open, economically vital societies."
To say yes to our question, one assumes that there are aspects of being Muslim and faithful to Islam, that can coexist peacefully with liberty, tolerance, and equality. The strategy that follows is one of identifying the groups and sects within Islam that adhere to these notions of their religion, and then encouraging them, favoring them, propagating them, and splitting them off from the elements of Islamic practice that are all too incompatible with the portions of modernity that invigorate men's souls: free inquiry, free association, free commerce, free worship, or even the freedom to be left alone.

To answer no, one states that Islam itself is fundamentally irreconcilable with freedom. This leads to a wholly different set of tactical moves to isolate free societies from Islam. They might include:

-detention of Muslims, or an abrogation of certain of their rights;

-forced deportation of Muslims from free societies;

-rather than transformative invasions, punitive expeditions and punitive strikes;

-extreme racial profiling;

-limits on the practice and study of Islam in its entirety

And even some extreme measures if free societies find the above moves to be failing:

-forced conversion from Islam, or renunciation;

-colonization;

-extermination of Muslims wherever they are found.

These last are especially ghastly measures. But a society that thought Islam incompatible with freedom might in the long term slip towards them.

Since 9/11, the assumption of our government has been that Islam can be compatible with freedom. The Bush administration has been exploiting all manner of divides within the Muslim world, not to conquer it, but to transform it such that a type of Islam compatible with freedom -- and therefore the West and the US, the wellspring and birthplace of modern individual liberty -- will come to the front at the expense of a type of Islam that is irreconcilable. Every institution of government answers our key question with a resounding yes. The Pentagon, in its Quadrennial Defense Review, makes a distinction between "bin Ladenism" and moderate Muslims, our would-be allies. Bush makes speeches in praise of freedom in general and especially in the Muslim world. The defense establishment is addressing what it calls a 'war of ideas':

The U.S. government is also focusing more attention on the intangible but vital dimension of the "war of ideas" between radical Islam and moderate Western and Islamic thought. The Pentagon's September 2004 National Defense Strategy stressed the need to counter ideological support for terrorism to secure permanent gains in the war against terrorism.

It stated the importance of negating the image of a U.S. war against Islam, and instead, developing the image of a civil war within Islam, fought between moderate states and radical terrorists. This kind of imagery will feed into the broader debate beginning in the U.S. on how to win such a war of ideas and how to cultivate moderate democratic Islamic states.

A yes answer to the question requires Red State Christians in the US to tolerate an Islam that tolerates them. A no answer to the question requires an abandonment of belief in the universality of ideas originating in the west, because it becomes clear that a large portion of humanity -- a fifth perhaps -- follows an incompatible religion. A yes answer forces one to attack totalitarian elements within Islam. A no answer forces a clash of civilizations, a Great Islamic War, as it assumes that all Islam is totalitarian.

A yes answer might lead to the establishment of something like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, as discussed in a recent piece in the Chronicle of Higher Education:

The idea of the congress, however, grew out of a feeling among independent intellectuals on the non-Communist left, as well as American officials, that the West after World War II faced a huge Soviet commitment to propagandizing and imposing Communism, and might lose the battle for European minds to Stalinism.

So the congress — established at a 1950 Berlin meeting at which the writer Arthur Koestler declared to a crowd of 15,000, "Friends, freedom has seized the offensive!" — launched magazines, held conferences, mounted exhibitions, and generally sought to expose Stalinist falsehoods from its liberal position. At its height, according to Coleman, the CCF "had offices or representatives in 35 countries, employing a total of 280 staff members."

One principle of the CCF's founding document was, "Freedom is based on the toleration of divergent opinions. The principle of toleration does not logically permit the practice of intolerance."

A no answer might disparage the notion that Westerners can say anything of import to those practicing Islam. I'm not sure if Bruce Thornton would answer no to the key question, but he doesn't seem to like the idea of Westerners trying to convince Muslims of anything new about their religion:

If, then, you are in possession of this truth that you are absolutely certain holds the key to universal happiness in this world and the next, why would you be tolerant of alternatives? Why should you tolerate a dangerous lie? Why should you “live and let live,” the credo of the spiritually moribund who stand for everything because they stand for nothing? And why wouldn’t you kill in the name of this vision, when the infidel nations work against God’s will and his beneficent intentions for the human race?

This is precisely what the jihadists tell us, what fourteen centuries of Islamic theology and jurisprudence tell us, what the Koran and Hadith tell us. Yet we smug Westerners, so certain of our own superior knowledge that human life is really about genes or neuroses or politics or nutrition, condescendingly look down on the true believer. Patronizing him like a child, we tell him that he doesn’t know that his own faith has been “hijacked” by “fundamentalists” who manipulate his ignorance, that what he thinks he knows about his faith is a delusion, and that the true explanation is one that we advanced, sophisticated Westerners understand while the believer remains mired in superstition and neurotic fantasy.

A yes answer to our question might force us to reexamine the religious roots of our own conceptions of freedom, in order to figure best a way to help Muslims look for such roots in their faith. This might resemble the efforts of David Gelernter in his recent Bradley Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, "A Religious Idea Called 'America'"
The most important story in and for American history is the biblical Exodus; the verse “let my people go” became the subtext of the Puritan emigration to America in the seventeenth century, the American revolution in the eighteenth, and--in significant part by Lincoln’s own efforts--of the Civil War in the nineteenth. It became important, also, to the twentieth century Americanism of Wilson and Truman and Reagan and W. Bush--Americanism as an outward-looking religion with global responsibilities.

In the end we do need to know the real character of Americanism. The secular version is a flat, gray rendition--no color and no fizz--of this extraordinary work of religious imagination: the idea that liberty, equality, and democracy belong to all mankind because God wants them to.

A yes answer might say that if God gave Biblical antecedents for the freedom of all mankind, He might have put some in the Koran as well . . . A yes answer would try to figure how to play our own religion-based beliefs into a conversation with Islam, as Henry Jaffa seems to argue in the Claremont Review:
We [are], in short, engaged in telling others to accept the forms of our own political institutions, without reference to the principles or convictions that give rise to those institutions.

Unless we as a political community can by reasoned discourse re-establish in our own minds the authority of the constitutionalism of the Founding Fathers and of Lincoln, of government devoted to securing the God-given equal rights of every individual human being, we will remain ill equipped to bring the fruits of freedom to others.

A no answer, on the other hand, might first start with Islam as anathema to free society, then move to other religious creeds, seeing them through a lens of general suspicion.

Is Islam compatible with a free society? Like a Zen koan, this is the question that vexes us.

Our answer of course, might change. The Bush administration has been answering yes for five years. But, inhabiting a democracy, it is of course reflective of and responsive to public sentiment. Several commentators believe that sentiment may be shifting. A piece by Jim Geraghty on his National Review blog wonders if Americans' answer to the key question is changing:

This strikes me as the fallout of the Tipping Point™ - my sense that in recent weeks, a large chunk of Americans just decided that they no longer have any faith in the good sense or non-hostile nature of the Muslim world. If subsequent polls find similar results, the port deal is dead.
Perhaps the people's answer to the question is changing.

And what to make of the Manifesto from a dozen European intellectuals, Muslims or former Muslims many of them? How are they answering the key strategic question?

It is not a clash of civilisations nor an antagonism of West and East that we are witnessing, but a global struggle that confronts democrats and theocrats . . .

Islamism is a reactionary ideology which kills equality, freedom and secularism wherever it is present. Its success can only lead to a world of domination: man’s domination of woman, the Islamists’ domination of all the others.

In Glenn Reynolds' podcast interview with Claire Berlinkski, author of Menace in Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis is America's Too, she relates this story:
Reynolds: You have this wonderful scene in your book where you talk about this, this Englishman of Bengali descent, and he said that when he traveled to the United States, he saw all these immigrants who were US citizens being welcomed by the INS and told, "Welcome home!" And he said, you know, if I ever got that kind of treatment you know when I returned to England, I'd happily lay down my life for England right there . . .

Berlinski: I would have died for England on the spot, that's what he told me. If ever once, someone had said "welcome home" when I showed them my passport at customs and immigration, I would have died for England on the spot.

In a dissenting statement to the above-mentioned manifesto, Paul Belien in Brussels Journal quotes Dr. Jos Verhulst:
And now he stands at the dawn of the 21st century: the maligned individual, unsteady on his own feet after executing the inner breach with every form of imposed authority, uncertain, blinking in the brightness of the only god he is willing to recognise – Truth itself, stretching out before him unfathomably deep – full of doubt but aware that he, called to non-submission, must seek the road to the transcendent, carrying as his only property, his most valuable heirloom from his turbulent past, that one gold piece that means the utmost to him, his precious ideal of complete freedom of thought, of speech and of scientific inquiry. That is the unique advance that he received to help him in his long and difficult quest.

Meanwhile he is being beleaguered and threatened on all sides; from out of the darkness voices call him to submit and retreat; they shout that the gold in his hands is worthless, while the brightness ahead of him still makes it almost impossible for him to see what lies in store. In short: what this contemporary individual needs most of all is courage, great courage. And the will to be free and to see, which is tantamount to the will to live.

When I was in Iraq, one Iraqi told me he wished Iraq could be the 51st state in the union. Our experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan seems to indicate that there are many Muslims who would prefer that we answer the key question with a yes, saying to those Muslims who can find Islam compatible with freedom, "Have courage!" and once they've achieved their freedom, "Welcome home!"

To what fate are we assigning them if we answer no?


UPDATE: Welcome Instapundit readers! Even though I had no direct quote above, this piece, like most that I do, had a lot of influence from Belmont Club, especially Blowback.

UPDATE2: There seems to be some problem posting comments. The server must be a little slow. It took me several tries to post last night. Thanks for your patience.

Written by Chester at 12:26 AM | Link | Comments (43) | TrackBack (5) | Print Article

February 18, 2006

The Saddam Tapes and the Intelligence Summit

The Intelligence Summit, a "non-partisan, non-profit, educational forum", is taking place this weekend in the Washington, D.C. environs. Another blogger, Kobayashi Maru
, is there and I just spoke with him on the phone. He had some highlights from this morning's speaker, John Tierney, who discussed the tapes of Saddam Hussein recently released to ABC, and subject of a story on Nightline.

Here are some points Tierney made this morning. Take from them what you will:

-Only 4% of the tapes have been analyzed

-The tapes contain the voices of senior Iraqi scientists, meeting with Saddam. Many of these scientists' identities were completely unknown to UNSCOM. Tierney implied that they were being hidden and were never interviewed in the search for WMD in Iraq.

-References are made on the tapes to "plasma programs" of some kind, which Tierney took to mean that Iraq was attempting to manufacture hydrogen bombs first, rather than more simple nukes.

-It is clear from Saddam's tone of voice, and his laughter on the tapes, that he was supremely confident that he had UNSCOM completely running around in circles and utterly confused insitutionally as to what he was actually doing.
Other speakers in the tapes share the same view.

-Tariq Aziz is not just a diplomat at arm's length on the tapes, but is very highly valued by Saddam. At one point, Saddam tells him that when they win the fight against the Americans, Aziz will write the book about it. (Readers with a sense of irony may enjoy knowing that US troops occupied Aziz's home in the spring of 2003. A detailed account of this may be found in The March Up by Bing West and Ray Smith.)

-Many speakers on the tape punctuate their remarks with references to Allah, God's will, etc etc. Tierney points out that Saddam never stops them, corrects them, or discourages them from using such pious language. This may be meaningless, as such expressions are common in the Arab world. But they seem to speak to the notion that Saddam would never cooperate with Islamists.

-Tierney implies that in one portion of the tape, Tariq Aziz makes the case that a biological weapons attack would be more difficult to blame on Iraq than a nuclear attack. Tierney then mentions that the anthrax attacks in 2001 were in some part blamed on personnel at Fort Detrick.

-Another speaker, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Jack Shaw, has restated his case that the Russians helped move Iraqi WMD materials to Syria, and have even helped move some of them back to Iraq, and that many places in Iraq where they might be have still not been thoroughly investigated. He makes the case that the US wants to keep a lid on this in exchange for Russian cooperation with Iran in the future. Shaw also implies that some of these allegations have been corroborated by Ukrainian intelligence agencies.

So that's some highlights from today at the Intelligence Summit. Take what you will from them. Are they true? Who knows? But they're certainly interesting.

Based on my interpretation of the list of speakers at the conference, I think it probably succeeds as a non-partisan forum. Looks like quite a number of different backgrounds and viewpoints are present.

Written by Chester at 11:16 AM | Link | Comments (17) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

December 2, 2005

Murtha Revisited

Travel, work and illness have kept posting lighter than I'd prefer. More soon if health holds.

I heard an interview with Congressman Murtha today on NPR. It was absolutely horrendous. Borderline nonsensical. Many of his responses to the interviewer's questions were incoherent.

More on the nature of victory this weekend. Belmont Club has had an open post and it has been very interesting to read . . .

Written by Chester at 12:13 AM | Link | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

October 30, 2005

All Al-Tikriti's Men

Social network analysis can be a powerful tool for discovering and mapping the web of relationships between a group of people. Journalists regularly perform such analysis, as do lawyers -- though they might not call it such -- noting the length of acquaintance between two people, their financial ties, how much time they spend together and so forth. Their targets are usually criminal defendants or public figures. An excerpt from this FoxNews article, of last week, U.N. Procurement Scandal: Ties to Saddam and Al Qaeda provides an example:

Who were the people who owned IHC?

. . . Corporate board minutes of IHC, obtained by FOX News, had mentioned a “sole shareholder” of IHC. The sole shareholder, according to the June sales documents on IHC, turns out to have been an even more mysterious company called Torno S.A.H. (search), based in the financial haven of Luxembourg. And Torno, in turn, had two major shareholders who approved the sale of Torno’s 100% interest in IHC. One of these shareholders was a Milan-based businessman, Dario Fischer (search), a director of IHC since at least 1996, who at the time of the sale was chairman of the board.

The other shareholder in Torno S.A.H., who gave his proxy to Fischer to approve the sale, was a man named Engelbert Schreiber, Jr. (search) He has been linked, either directly or through father-son family business, to a number of Liechtenstein enterprises affiliated at various times from the 1970s through at least the year 2000 with Ahmed Idris Nasreddin (search), a man designated as a terrorist financier by the U.S. and U.N. shortly after Sept. 11, 2001.

A naturalized Italian citizen, Nasreddin operated for decades out of Milan and Lugano, Switzerland, both as a businessman and a member of the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood, some elements of which morphed into Al Qaeda. In 2002, Nasreddin, along with a number of his enterprises, landed on the U.N.’s list of individuals or entities “belonging to or affiliated with Al Qaeda.” He is now believed to be in Morocco.

The Schreiber father-son connections with Nasreddin are labyrinthine, but they are a subject familiar to trackers of terrorist money . . .

and so on and so forth.

It is rare for an entire network to be exposed at once, for its power relationships to become visible to the naked eye in such detail as to find its members scurrying for cover from enemy networks, the lidless eye of the press, or in the case of dictatorships, the furor of the formerly subjugated. Yet this is what is afoot in the circumstances surrounding the overthrow and trial of Saddam Hussein.

No matter how megalomaniacal the dictator, no regime survives through the action of one man. Within are vassals, chamberlains, and yes-men of the highest proficiency. Outside are those who can be persuaded to look the other way for any number of reasons – or better yet, to defend the regime’s odious acts with all the straight-faced solemnity they can muster.

First, with the invasion of Baghdad came the plunder of Iraqi records, and from that came the investigation into the Oil-for-Food scandal. As investigators continue to pull at those strings, unraveling the legitimacy of the United Nations as they go, Saddam’s trial will become the second revealing of his galaxy of appeasers: in his desire to save himself at all costs, Saddam will deny everything, blame the United States, and finally, implicate as many of his former friends as he can. It will not sit well with the President-for-Life to see his old partners in the international community go untried for their own abetting of his crimes. Right out of the gate, he will put the United States on trial along with him. But when that fails, as it will, he will drag his entire edifice of power down with him.

One wonders what manner of connections may ultimately be found among Saddam’s trading partners in the Oil-for-Food mess, his legal defense team, and the slew of international agencies and organizations that decry his trial as unfair. An overclass of globalati, they will cough quite loudly as the pungent odor of corruption exposed ruins their rarefied air. If they aren’t careful, their ideas, programs, and issues might all be discredited. Following the money is proving thus far to be quite a show: named as facilitors in the Oil-for-Food kickback scheme are a British MP; a French Interior Minister; a French Ambassador to the UN,; a former assistant to the Secretary of State for the Vatican,; Marc Rich, beneficiary of President Clinton’s merciful last-minute pardons; DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, and 2400 other firms and individuals.

But more importantly, than any single two-bit player in his sad human tragedy, when Saddam’s trial reconvenes, the conduct of the state of Iraq and the government of Hussein, founded upon principles of Arab solidarity and nationalism, will be seen by those in the region as never before. For every lofty ideal of pan-Arabism that the Ba’athists espoused, there will be a crime against humanity in the name of serving the twisted id of one man. Such will be the spectacle on display: the edifice of secular Arab civilization itself will be shaken. The press in Europe and the US may blow quickly past the corruption exposed by Volcker, but the memories of those ultimately maligned by the sanctions regime are likely to be much longer . . .

Meanwhile, the other bastion of Ba’athism endures scrutiny of different sorts. For all the wailing about the trial of Saddam not being held under international auspices, the trial of the House of Assad is gaining steam, and is being conducted by the UN itself. With each press conference, each report issued, each arrest of high-ranking members of the regime, Bashar’s legitimacy wavers. Unlike the US invasion of his neighbor, the pressure on Syria seems to build with few abstentions: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even France have all condemned the regime for its alleged assassination of Rafik Hariri, and are sided with the US against Syria.

The outcomes of these collapses are not foregone conclusions. Much ill can come from either. In Syria in particular, no one is sure if Assad is actually in power, and there are few opposition groups available to throw one’s weight behind, whether rhetorically or otherwise.

But regardless of the ultimate outcome, as both of these trials progress, the core of Ba’athism, and pan-Arabism by association, will be challenged as never before in the Arab world. The US is creating a moment wherein democracy might take hold of the imagination of the region, especially when so utterly contrasted to the intellectual vacuity of the uninspiring status quo. The next year, or perhaps even months, might prove to be one of the defining fulcrums of history in the Middle East.

Written by Chester at 10:43 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (1) | Print Article

October 18, 2005

The Amazing Anbar Campaign

Live it yourself: The Fourth Rail: The Anbar Campaign - A Flash Presentation. Bill and the guys have done it again. Go see it immediately!

Is that the theme music to Patton in the background?

Written by Chester at 1:45 PM | Link | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

October 14, 2005

Live-blogging the Iraqi Constitutional Referendum

10:47am: Well, thus endeth the live-blogging. I'll be checking news throughout the rest of the day, especially looking for regional reaction or analytical follow-up. But for now, I'm ungluing myself from this screen. Thanks to all who stopped by! Here's two final links, via RealClearPolitics: Toward a new Iraq from the Washington Times, and Consensus and Iraq's constitution from the LA Times.


10:42am: Iraq vote holds interest for Iran


10:30am: What's Next for Iraq After Referendum: this is a pretty good piece:

IF CONSTITUTION IS APPROVED: Iraqis will choose new parliament in national elections to be held by Dec. 15. Parliament will then select new government, which must take office by Dec. 31. New administration will be first permanent, fully constitutional government in Iraq since collapse of Saddam Hussein's rule in 2003. Sunni Arabs have been promised they can propose constitutional amendments in first four months of new parliament. Amendments would need two-thirds approval in parliament and gain voter support in referendum.

---

IF THE CONSTITUTION IS DEFEATED: Parliament dissolves, but the mid-December elections go ahead as planned. New parliament must draft another constitution within a year and present it to voters in second referendum. Interim constitution approved in March 2004 would continue as legal foundation for governing Iraq.


10:17am: One thing I'm looking for now: regional reaction.


10:08am: US captures Al Qaeda disguise expert in Iraq. Looks like we not only killed Abu Azzam a few weeks back, but we also got enough intel from the op to find his chief disguise-maker. This is the whole article:

United States forces say they have captured two senior Al Qaeda members in Iraq, including a man known as "The Barber", who helped top extremists evade detention by transforming their appearances.

Walid Muhammad Farhan Juwar al Zubaydi, also known as Firas, Abu Ziyad, and "The Barber" was seized in a Baghdad raid on September 24 by US-led multinational forces acting on a tip, the statement said.

Also captured was Ibrahim Muhammad Subhi Khayri al-Rihawi, commonly known as "Abu Khalil".

The former performed duties including "altering senior Al Qaeda in Iraq members' appearances by dying hair colour, altering hairstyles and changing facial hair in their efforts to evade capture".

Abu Khalil was described as "a close associate of Abu Azzam, [who] served as an executive assistant for the terrorist emir.

"He also acted as a banker for Azzam and stored the terrorist organisations funds so they would not be confiscated should Abu Azzam be killed or captured."

Azzam, considered second in command to Al Qaeda's frontman in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed in a raid in September.

Interesting that this would be released today, after the polls close, according to Google News. I wonder if the captured bad guys are foreigners? Two senior foreign terrorists captured, right while the Iraqis are digesting their experiences of the day. I don't know that they are foreigners, so hard to tell. But here's something I wrote back in September,when I thought the vote-counting would take longer than is expected:
In the meantime, while the votes are counted, coalition offensives will continue in Anbar and along the Syrian border. The Sunni electorate will ponder the outcome of their enfranchisement while the sounds of battle are echoing outside their doors. The chiaroscuro-like choice of blood or compromise will cleave their very souls.
Perhaps a similar effect is meant to be induced by the release of this news about the terrorists today.

9:56am: More photos: Terrorism Unveiled. Intrade still have a value of 90 on their constitution contract, but I'm not sure the exchange has been open since I did my first post yesterday afternoon [scroll to the bottom]. I know they're in Ireland, but I don't know their hours.

9:53am: Both IRAQ THE MODEL and Sooni have photos of the polling. If anyone sees more on other blogs, let me know. Photos are fun.


9:43am: Iraq Elections newswire is a blog that aggregates news about the vote in one place. Worth a visit. Looks like some follow-up/what-does-it-all-mean stories are starting to roll in around the world. Here's the take form a Bangkhok newspaper.


9:41am:, US Central: So there I was, sleeping like a baby, when with a start, I awoke, for some inexplicable reason. I couldn't put my finger on it, but knew something was up. Now I discover what it is . . .

Welcome Instapundit readers!


3:59am: I'm going to end my coverage for now and catch some z's. I'll do a follow-up in the morning. Here's a really cool presentation from the January vote, for a good flashback:

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election_HiRes.wmv


3:50am: USAToday has a decent article up now: Historic vote on referendum begins in Iraq:

Militants attacked three of the capital's 1,200 polling stations, wounding two policemen and a civilian, but Iraq was mostly peaceful . . .

In the south, the heartland of Iraq's Shiite majority, lines formed at polling stations in Basra, Hillah and other major cities as people poured in to vote on a constitution Shiite leaders have strongly supported . . .

But turnout appeared low in the early hours in Sunni Arab towns in the center and west.

Ramadi, the capital of overwhelmingly Sunni Arab Anbar province, looked like a ghost town. At the hour polls opened, insurgents clashed with U.S. troops in the downtown streets.

Only about 20 people had voted in the Sunni town of Haditha, northwest of Baghdad, after three hours . . .

The situation at polling stations across Iraq varied widely.

In the central Baghdad area of Khulani, where Sunnis and Shiites both live, a steady stream of voters entered a large polling station. All voters were searched three times before entering the building, including old men and women who could barely walk with canes, and young mothers wearing chadors and carrying infants.

"I am an Iraqi citizen. Of course, I voted 'yes,'" said Abid Ali Hussein, an elderly man with a white beard, as he left the area. "God willing, there will be no terrorism."

In the mostly Shiite city of Hillah, about 60 miles south of Baghdad, lines quickly formed. Some voters carried Iraqi flags and banners saying, "Yes to the constitution." Iraqi police guarding the streets and imams at local mosques both used loudspeakers to urge Hillah residents to cast ballots.

But Haditha — a mostly Sunni Arab city 140 miles northwest of Baghdad, where a large U.S. offensive was just fought against insurgents — showed much less enthusiasm.

Other than soldiers and polling station workers, no one showed up to vote in the first 90 minutes of voting. One reason was that residents had only be told of the polling site locations minutes beforehand.

Just after dawn U.S. Humvees roamed the streets, blaring the location of two polling sites in the city. The locations were kept hidden until the last minute to prevent insurgent attacks.

"I voted 'no' because the new government says if there is trouble in the future, Iraq could be split. I say there should be one nation," said voter Obeidi Amir Nasser, 30 . . .

In Fallujah, the mostly Sunni city west of Baghdad that was heavily damaged by a U.S. offensive against insurgents in 2004, hundreds of Iraqis gathered in front of many polling centers chanting: "No, no for the constitution. Yes, yes for Iraq."

3:07am: Here's a great article on General Petraeus and the Iraqi Security Forces: A Soldier's Story: "The Iraqis are in the fight," says Gen. David Patraeus.


3:00am: BBC is about to have something . . . constitution is "crucial" to the future of Iraq . . . three attacks in Baghdad injuring three people . . . polling stations protected with blast shields and rolls of barbed wire . . . electricity has now been restored to many areas after yesterday's power cut. The anchor mentioned three attacks in Baghdad, but the guy on the ground there only mentioned one in the city.

2:57am: The BBC is not doing anything on the voting. Right now there's an in-depth interview with a Nigerian folk singer. I kid you not. Perhaps the top of the hour will bring something. Polls have been open for four hours now. Certainly a blurb or two.


2:52am: An Alert Reader points to this article: Constitution Is Put Before a Divided Iraq.

"I expect good things for the people for this constitution," said Zahra Khnif after voting in a Shiite district of the capital. "It will bring peace and stability."

In the northern city of Kirkuk, Hamid Abdul Jabbar, a 35-year-old Sunni, said he voted against the charter. "It does not represent the Iraqi Sunnis," he said. "It will lead to the division of Iraq."

President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari were among the first to vote in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone, headquarters of a government elected in January and led by a coalition of Shiites and Kurds. Both had urged a "yes" vote.

Many of those casting early ballots voiced enthusiasm over Iraq's second nationwide vote since the ouster of President Saddam Hussein 2 1/2 years ago. Amar Sadhel Kifajy, a Shiite voter in Baghdad, called it a festive occasion, "like a wedding celebration."

"I made sure my whole family came with me, even though they are fasting for Ramadan," Nassera Abaas, a 60-year-old housewife, said amid a heavy turnout in Baghdad's heavily Shiite district of Sadr City. "It's important to taste the freedom we were deprived of for so long."

Sunnis were divided on the charter but turned out in significant numbers in Samarra, Fallouja and other cities that heavily boycotted the January election.

Ahmed Mohammad Mahmoud, a 30-year-old electronics engineer in Samarra, said Shiite leaders who helped shape the document were intent on creating an autonomous pro-Iranian Shiite mini-state in southern Iraq that would "hand Iraq to the Iranians on a gold platter."

"This constitution is for the people who wrote it, not for us," Mohammed Kadhim, a 50-year-old high school teacher, said after voting in Fallouja.

But Mohammed Aboudi, a 38-year-old Sunni in Baghdad, voted for the charter, saying it would lead the country to a more stable democracy, undermine the insurgency and "build a clear future, free of occupation" by U.S. troops.

Sounds like the reporter did a fair job there of getting some differing views. We'll see what happens!


2:48am: I just muted the TV, which has had zip about the voting, and turned on the local NPR affiliate, which carries BBC news at this hour of the night. So perhaps something will come over the transom there.


2:46am: I just used the new Google Blog Search feature to search for some other blogs covering the constitution and this is what I got: Google Blog Search: Iraqi Constitution. Check 'em out!


2:39am: Strategypage also has a blurb on the material aspects of the negotiations among the various factions in Iraq. They aren't exactly the sprited debates about the natural rights of man, or the nature of sovereignty, that one might expect:

Many Iraqi Sunni Arabs are willing to accept democracy, as long as they have a fair shot at government jobs, and a share of the oil. The current negotiations with various Sunni Arab groups (some of them actively supporting violence against the government) have come down to how many Sunni Arabs get prosecuted for their Saddam era crimes (murder and torture, for the most part, but all massive theft of private and public assets), how many former Baath Party members are banned from government jobs for life, and how the oil revenue is shared.
When many of the parties to the negotiation are the criminal henchman of a ruthless dictator, I suppose this is what it all comes down to.

2:34am: Little more than a headline, but worth mentioning anyway: Iraqi Sunni Cabinet minister says he expects constitution to be defeated:

4 October 2005 (AP Worldstream) -- Iraq's industry minister, one of his country's top Sunni Arabs, predicted Friday that voters at this weekend's historic referendum will reject the draft constitution despite amendments designed to win Sunni Arab support.
That's the whole article. Note that it's from yesterday.

2:31am: Strategypage reports on Arresting Dirty Politicians in Iraq.

While nailing bureaucrats for stealing money may be common in the United States, it is very, very rare in the Middle East. And that’s one of the main reasons al Qaeda came to be. This Islamic terrorist organization first tried to clean up it’s own back yard. Failing at that, they decided to blame it on the West and go after this new enemy. But now, al Qaeda fans (the few that are left after so many Arab civilians have been killed by suicide bombers) are faced with the fact that the Americans have also brought with them the concept of honest government, and accountability for those who run the government. A really radical development this is, at least for the Middle East.


2:26am: Here's an opinion piece in the Egyptian newsmagazine Al-Ahram. No significant new insights there that I can see.


1:52am: An Alert Reader pointed out these stories in the comments, but here's the first link I've found: Insurgents launch several attacks in Iraq:

A roadside bomb exploded near a polling station in western Baghdad on Saturday morning as it opened for voting in Iraq's constitutional referendum, and one policeman was wounded, police said. No citizens were injured.

The explosion occurred just as the heavily guarded center was opening at 7 a.m., and no voters were there yet, said police Lt. Mohammed Kheyon.

Violence also was reported in Ramadi, 70 miles west of Baghdad, and near the southern city of Basra city, police said.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted at about 7 a.m. between a small group of insurgents and U.S. troops patrolling the mostly empty streets of the city, said police 1st. Lt. Mohammed Al-Obaidi. It was not immediately clear if anyone was wounded in the fighting.

South of Basra, three armed men attacked an empty polling station at 3 a.m. and were caught and arrested, said police Capt. Mushtaq Kadim.

Sunni-led insurgents had vowed to wreck the referendum taking place Saturday at about 6,000 polling stations across Iraq. In the 19 days before the voting began, nearly 450 people were killed by insurgents using suicide car bombs, roadside bombs and drive-by shootings.

Doesn't seem very impressive from a terrorism standpoint. One bomb in Baghdad, a firefight in Ramadi, three guys storm an empty polling station in Basra. The last one has a comical aspect, no? Are the terrorists so dense that they thought voters might be there at 3am? As always, the devil is in the details, and we just don't have any, so it's hard to say, but man, that has Animal House written all over it.


1:42am: Opinionjournal has a new piece up: The New Politics of Iraq: Progress in Baghdad belies pessimism in Washington. Here's a takeaway:

Millions of Iraqis will risk their lives today to endorse their new constitution, but it's a measure of American defeatism that the vote is already being dismissed in many quarters as a mirage on the road to inevitable civil war. On the contrary, we'd say the vote is further evidence that the Iraq mission still has every chance of succeeding.


1:09am: Curious to know what the Left is writing about the referendum, I just moseyed over to Daily Kos: The Divide on the Iraq Constitution. Sigh. As always, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Here's some National Review articles:
Founding Freedoms: The promise and perils of Iraq’s constitution:

Still, those of us who work to defend religious freedom internationally are deeply troubled by the soon-to-be adopted constitution. We are concerned that it may be the first step in creating what is called an “illiberal democracy,” or even in undermining democracy altogether. We fear the powerful role given to Islam in the constitution — a role that is likely to negate the positive language on religious freedom and other individual human rights.

The new constitution fails to guarantee the fundamental human rights and freedoms contained in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that are consistent with America’s core values and President Bush’s articulated foreign-policy goals.

Political Progress
Constitutional flexibility is a good sign for democracy in Iraq.
This one is written by Roman Martinez, who recently served as a political adviser to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, and as director for Iraq at the National Security Council.
With only a majority vote needed to revise the charter, the Sunnis have a real vehicle for making changes to the document.

In this sense, the agreement gives the Sunni community a chance at redemption for its boycott mistake last January. Having long argued that federalism is unpopular among ordinary Iraqis, they can now take their case directly to the people.

This raises the significance of the upcoming December parliamentary elections. In order to take advantage of the constitution's flexibility, the Sunnis will need to garner as many seats as possible. Political organization, campaigning, and a high voter turnout on election day are now at the core of the Sunni community's political self-interest. This is a sea change from last January — and a breakthrough with great potential to undermine the insurgency, which rightly sees widespread Sunni political participation as a vital threat to its own existence.

To help their chances in December, Sunnis will need to organize parties and build strong coalitions that cut across sectarian divisions. Ideally, these alliances will reach out to Shia leaders who share Sunni concerns on key issues such as federalism. Over time, such cross-sectarian partnerships will foster the emergence of an Iraqi political system based more on issues and ideas, and less on identity.

Not everyone agrees that constitutional flexibility is a good thing. Ever since the initial draft was made public, critics have argued that by deferring difficult questions to the future, the charter fails to fully meet Iraq's political needs. No doubt these complaints will intensify with this week's deal, which leaves the constitution even more open to amendment than before.

In fact, Iraq's status as a fragile, emerging democracy makes a flexible approach especially worthwhile. The new charter can promote stability and order, yet without setting every decision permanently into stone. Constitutional flexibility will actually strengthen democracy, by allowing internal debate to ripen and reflect the broadest diversity of views. Most importantly, of course, it will speed along the Sunni community's gradual integration into Iraq's new democratic order.

For all its historic significance, then, Saturday's referendum will not mark the last word in Iraq's political evolution. Once the new constitution passes, the Iraqi political debate will only just be starting to heat up.

Democracy Spreads
Is the world on the cusp of a fourth wave of democratization?
While the number of electoral democracies worldwide has been stalled at about 120, there are reasons to think that a fourth wave of democratization is coming.

The third wave was characterized by the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the breakdown of totalitarian states in Europe, and the insistence on democratic reforms in many parts of the world. There are now more democracies on earth than ever before. Freedom is an everyday reality for 2.8 billion people (44 percent of the world's population). An additional 1.2 billion people are considered only partly free because their rights are undermined by conflict, authoritarianism, and/or corruption. Since the publication of Huntington's classic work in 1991, not fewer than 40 governments have undertaken the transition to democracy.

When the third wave began 30 years ago, it was not immediately clear that the Portuguese revolution would mark democracy's rise. However, in 1974, it was not possible to consider Portugal transitioning to democracy, because the outcome was uncertain. Civil protests were critical to the transition. Are we seeing the beginnings of this in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Kuwait, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan?

This begs the question of whether or not we can ever know if a country is in transition until the smoke has cleared. Will the Kuwaiti women that earned voting rights this year result in a cultural and political revolution in the Gulf countries? Will the contested election in Egypt last month give rise to multiparty democracies in North Africa? While it isn't possible to answer yes to these questions yet, there are reasons to be optimistic. Afghans just went to the polls to affirm their human rights by selecting a parliament. Iraqis are determining their constitutional principles today. Afghans and Iraqis are riding this fourth wave of democratization.


12:55am: What will happen? Will the Sunni's be upset that they voted and didn't get their way? Will there be more violence? Will the Iraqis ever straighten things out? Can't the US just come home? I think now is a good time to read again some words of Tony Blair, speaking to the US Congress in July of 2003:

We are fighting for the inalienable right of humankind--black or white, Christian or not, left, right or a million different--to be free, free to raise a family in love and hope, free to earn a living and be rewarded by your efforts, free not to bend your knee to any man in fear, free to be you so long as being you does not impair the freedom of others.

That's what we're fighting for. And it's a battle worth fighting.

And I know it's hard on America, and in some small corner of this vast country, out in Nevada or Idaho or these places I've never been to, but always wanted to go...

I know out there there's a guy getting on with his life, perfectly happily, minding his own business, saying to you, the political leaders of this country, "Why me? And why us? And why America?"

And the only answer is, "Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do."

And our job, my nation that watched you grow, that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you.

You are not going to be alone. We will be with you in this fight for liberty.

We will be with you in this fight for liberty. And if our spirit is right and our courage firm, the world will be with us.


12:48am: Another interesting point in the Gerecht article below (this one) is that all of the proceedings of the Iraqi National Assembly should be broadcast in a CSPAN-like forum in the region. I think that's a great idea. No idea if anything like it is already happening.


12:40am: Took a short break. Back now. Here are some others who are live-blogging:
Bareknucklepolitics.com
The Indepundit

11:40pm: The Iraq Index of the Brookings Institution [pdf] shows that US combat deaths in the month of October as of the 10th stood at 21. Last year it was at 56 for the whole month, if I read the chart right (on page 4). So it looks like not a significant drop, compared to July, August, and September, which did see drops.


11:25pm: The blood is the life, Mr Rumsfeld! is an article in the Asia Times which I've just skimmed. It discusses the death-cult like aspects of Shia Islam and comes to this conclusion:

Iraq's proposed federal constitution will be defeated in the October 15 referendum, not only because the Sunni minority rejects an arrangement that encourages rule by the Shi'ite majority, but because Shi'ite radicals led by Muqtada al-Sadr repudiate the pro-constitution Shi'ite establishment headed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Intra-confessional strife among Shi'ites represents a nastier obstacle to constitutional democracy than the Sunni insurgency.
I like to check the Asia Times every now and then because it seems to have sort of one-off opinions like this that really can't be pinned down to the normal left-right divide in the US. Not sure what to make of this, but it is certainly interesting. On a similar note, Steven Vincent, the late American writer who traveled to Iraq on his own dime, has a chapter in his book, "In the Red Zone" [see the link in the sidebar] discussing his own impressions of Shi'ism during the Ashura festival, and he also comes to the death-cult conclusion.


11:17pm: An Alert Reader points out Iraqis practice art of deception, an article which is pretty interesting.


11:06pm: Here's an article in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer discussing some of the details of the vote. Excerpt:

RESULTS: Full returns are not expected by Saturday night, although some partial and unofficial figures may be released. Final results are expected within two to four days, depending on appeals or security problems preventing paperwork from reaching Baghdad.
Well that's certainly an improvement from January, if memory serves . . .

UPDATE: An Alert Reader asks in a comment if exiles are allowed to vote this time around. The article above says no, but doesn't say why.

11:03pm: Tallyho! The polls are open!

Fox just had a blurb from an Army colonel it noted as a "Coalition Operations Chief" who said that attacks were down 1/3 from the January election. Not sure if he meant in general, or just related to polling.


10:57pm: Aaron is talking to Christiane again on CNN. She says it is a simple ballot with a yes or no on it. As she shoots the bull with Aaron, the cameras show what I think is Jalal Talabani voting in Baghdad. Now they are talking again and saying little that is new to blog readers. Amanpour is discounting the vote per se, and playing up the necessity of "legitimacy" being the outcome of this poll.

Fox now has a headline piece, which is just that, no big insight.

If the ballot is as simple as Christiane says, then it seems that it shouldn't take too long to count them. Actually, thinking a bit more, the real thing that took so long for the results of the last election wasn't counting the ballots, though that took some time, but forming the government, which seemed to take forever. Perhaps we'll have the results much faster this time around.


10:52pm: I just returned to the article Birth of a Democracy by Reuel Marc Gerecht in the Weekly Standard in February. He always has an interesting perspective and this caught me this time:

* First, contrary to the rising chorus of Democratic commentary on the Iraqi elections, Iran was the biggest loser last Sunday. The United Iraqi Alliance, which seems certain to capture the lion's share of the vote, is not at all "pro-Iranian." Neither is it any less "pro-American" than Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's al-Iraqiyya list . . . A better way to describe the United Iraqi Alliance, if it lasts, is as Iran's worst nightmare. It surely will cause the clerical regime enormous pain as the Iraqis within it, especially those who were once dependent on Iranian aid, continue to distance themselves ever further from Tehran. Primary point to remember: Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who is now certainly the most senior Shiite cleric in both Iraq and Iran, who is of Iranian birth and early education, has embraced a democratic political creed that is anathema to the ruling mullahs of Tehran. Ali Khamenei, Iran's senior political cleric, is in a real pickle since he cannot openly challenge Sistani and his embrace of democracy. Iran's relations with the new Iraq would cease to exist. Also, the repercussions inside the Iranian clerical system would not be healthy. Sistani is the last of the truly great transnational Shiite clerics, and his following inside Iran, particularly since he has so publicly backed a democratic franchise, which if it were applied in Iran would shatter clerical power, should not be underestimated. Sistani and his men know very well that the political game they play in Iraq will have repercussions throughout the Arab world and Iran. He and his men are not rash, but there will be no tears shed on their side if Iraq's political advancement convulses those clerics in Iran who believe in theocracy.


10:40pm: An Alert Reader notes this article: Bomb-scarred people of Hilla wary before Iraq vote. Excerpt:

HILLA, Iraq (Reuters) - Residents of Hilla, where a suicide car bomber demolished a mosque last week killing 25 people, are afraid but determined to vote in Iraq's constitutional referendum, their mayor said on Friday.

"Everybody knows that freedom has a very expensive cost and sometimes that cost is blood," Imad Lefta told Reuters on the eve of a ballot that that has exposed deep divisions between Iraq's Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish communities.

"It was just the same in the United States when they had a civil war and they had their own problems and conflicts until they were able to set up a democratic country."

I've been to Hilla and it is quite a bustling little city. Adjacent to the Euphrates, it has rather more vegetation than lots of the other cities around, but this green is overshadowed by the ruins of ancient Babylon nearby, where Alexander died, and one of Saddam's palaces, which protrudes from a very high point of ground outside the city. Hilla has seen a lot of history and today is no exception. Polls open in 15 minutes.


10:23pm: Finally, CNN has a story. Aaron Brown is intoning right now. Christiane Amanpour (hooray! just kidding) is in Baghdad. UPDATE: Brown said he'd return to her later in the hour and asked her to think about how the country has changed since she covered the January election.


10:18pm: Perhaps this explains why we aren't hearing as much voting news as in January.


10:11pm: I received a report from StratFor earlier this week about Iraq. Here's an excerpt:

Some Sunni leaders have opposed any agreement or participation in the constitutional referendum; others have supported participation with a "no" vote. What appears to have been crafted between the Shia and negotiating Sunni groups is this:

If the constitution is approved, it will be a temporary, not permanent, constitution.

After a general election on Dec. 15 that would be based on this constitution, a committee of the National Assembly would review the document once again.

The new parliament would have four months to complete changes to the document.

A new vote would be held to ratify that final constitution.

In other words, the agreement that has been reached here between the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds is simply that all sides will focus on the constitutional negotiations.


9:43pm: I've learned that polls open at approximately 11pm US Central time.


8:57pm: An Alert Reader sends a link to Multi-National Force-Iraq: Democracy in Action, noting that it may have some news. I'll keep an eye on it.

The same reader asks if I'll be up all night. I'll be up as long as there's new news coming in. Right now, things look a bit thin on that front.

Well, off to plumb the depths of the Early Bird for some new stuff.


8:36pm: Here's another description of the Iraqi Army that you should check out.

8:32pm: Retired Major General Robert Scales, has a piece in the Washington Times describing the emerging Iraqi Army:

soldiers know that the effectiveness of a fighting force is better measured by intangibles such as courage, will to win, skill at arms, leadership, cohesion and allegiance to a higher cause. These are factors that media amateurs and Washington insiders have difficulty comprehending.
We visited the Iraqi 9th Mechanized Division located in Taji a few miles north of Baghdad in one of the hottest and most contested regions of Iraq. The unit was activated last October and has yet to form completely. It is commanded by Gen. Bashar, a thirty-year veteran and, like many patriotic, innovative and self-reliant officers, a victim of Saddam Hussein's brutality. The general created the division by calling up many of his old regular-army comrades. Three quarters are veterans who have been recruited from every province and ethnicity in Iraq. The division's motto is, appropriately, "Iraq first." Gen. Bashar built his division from a junkyard. In less than a year his soldiers picked through acres of destroyed Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers to patch together a fleet of over 200 operational fighting vehicles.

8:13pm: As always, Iraq the Model has interesting stuff:

People on the street, TV and radio are all talking about the coming historic event while papers went on hiatus since yesterday but many of them published the document on Wednesday to ensure that more people get to read it. Although the distribution didn’t go perfectly, I doubt there are many who didn’t get the chance to take a look as the document was published many times on different outlets including websites and there were many discussions on TV where articles were discusses thoroughly. Add to this the thousands of workshops and lectures organized by NGOs. So I think it’s fair to say that only those who weren’t interested in the subject would say that they didn’t have the chance to read the document . . .

I am so excited but a flashback from Saddam’s referendum three years ago still hurts; he wanted a 100% as the 99.96% of the previous one shocked the dictator. I was depressed that way and I decided not to go to the voting office and so did the rest of the family but my father was afraid that not going could be dangerous.
He said that maybe one member of the family could go alone and cast votes for the rest of us. We looked at each other thinking who’s going to volunteer to do this ugly job to protect the family. At that moment my father said “it was my generation that caused the misery we’re living in so I’m the one who should do this”.

I couldn’t stop him and I couldn’t utter a word but I felt sad for him; his sacrifice was big and I had teary eyes when I watched him taking our papers and heading out.

It is different this time father, no more 100% and a ‘no’ would make me happy just like a ’yes’ would do and no one ever will force us to do something against our will anymore.

8:07pm: The cable news coverage of the referendum seems underwhelming. in fact, it seems non-existent. If my math is right, then the polls should be opening in 4 or 5 hours, but Hannity and Colmes are screaming about Scott McClellan right now. O'Reilly just did a piece with Geraldo about Aruba. I guess I'll switch to some other channels and check them out. I was afraid of this. Not enough bodies in January's vote means fewer reporters around for this one.

7:55pm: Here's another Jazeera piece, Iraq's charter: A divisive framework? which says the opposite: that the constitution will actually split the country, and predictably, that this has been the agenda of the US the entire time. Seems like there'd be easier ways to do it, if that's what we wanted, but hey, that's just me.


7:49pm: Iraq's federalism ensures justice is an opinion piece on Al Jazeera advocating federalism, but not explicitly endorsing the constitution. It also carries the disclaimer that the author doesn't necessarily speak for Al Jazeera, which seems strange for an opinion piece. Here's an excerpt:

Federalism represents a guarantee against the return of authoritarian regimes and suppression by centralised government. This could be achieved through establishing a stable democratic government.

Federalism should not be the victim of the fear that it is somehow breaking up the country. That would be legitimate if there was the will for division but that would not be imposed under a democratic system which believes in multi-party rule and peaceful rotation of power.

We could turn the tables and say that centralised rule is what will eventually break Iraq up?

The call for federalism in southern Iraq is not sectarian. We believe in seeking the opportunity to achieve justice in wealth distribution and fairness in all aspects of life.

The constitution must stipulate that federalism is an adopted system in Iraq. We are against the view that says only Kurds should enjoy a federal province just because they are a special case.

Federalism must be secured for all Iraq. Even if it is not applied on the ground right now, the constitution must say clearly that federalism is to be adopted for the sake of Iraq’s future.

7:44pm: Fred Kaplan at Slate, who recommended that the Iraqis not approve the constitution not long ago, now says, Perhaps the Iraqi Constitution has a chance of success, after all, because of the last-minute deal announced this week.

7:30 pm: Here's an AP-translation of the constitution: TEXT OF THE DRAFT IRAQI CONSTITUTION.


7:08 pm: Well that was a slightly longer station break than I would have preferred. Back now.


1:26pm, US Central: Folks, I'll be kicking the coverage tonight as the Iraqis go to the polls.

All week, I've kept an eye on the futures market:

Intrade [Go to the homepage and click "Markets" then do a search for Iraq] has this contract:

The ratification of the Iraq Constitution by October 31st 2005.
The price has fluctuated a bit this week to say the least. These contracts are priced between 0 and 100. A lower price means people think the event will have a negative outcome (the constitution doesn't pass). A higher price means people think the event will have a positive outcome (it passes). Earlier this week, the price was around 70, but then it surged up to the low nineties after the deal with the Sunnis on amendments was announced. Now it's settled a bit, and the last trade was at 90 even as I type. So there is extremely high sentiment from a prediction market standpoint, that the constitution will pass.

I'll be writing more throughout the afternoon and evening!

Written by Chester at 1:21 PM | Link | Comments (21) | TrackBack (9) | Print Article

September 29, 2005

The Fickle Mob: Iraqi Constitution Ratification Report #1

The Pundits

Fouad Ajami wrote in yesterday's OpinionJournal:

Sunni Arabs are registering in droves, keen not to repeat the error they committed when they boycotted the national elections earlier this year. In their pride, and out of fear of the insurgents and their terror, the Sunni Arabs say that they are registering to vote in order to thwart this "illegitimate constitution." This kind of saving ambiguity ought to be welcomed, for there are indications that the Sunni Arabs may have begun to understand terror's blindness and terror's ruin.
Read the whole thing, as he covers the effects of the Iraqi campaign on the Arab world.

Fred Kaplan suggested in Slate yesterday that Iraqis should reject the constitution:

The very process that created the constitution is seen by many Sunnis as so arbitrarily rushed and so systematically dismissive of their interests that, if the document is approved, many Sunnis will reject the vote's legitimacy.

A report released yesterday by the independent, nonpartisan International Crisis Group goes further. The constitution, it concludes, "is likely to fuel rather than dampen the insurgency, encourage ethnic and sectarian violence, and hasten the country's violent break-up."

Is it possible that the Iraqis will vote the constitution down? There are two ways this can happen. It can be opposed by either 1) a majority of all Iraqis (very unlikely) or 2) two-thirds of the Iraqis in three of the country's 18 provinces. Sunnis hold a majority in four provinces (al-Anbar, Nineveh, Salah al-Din, and Diyala), but few analysts believe they'll muster a two-thirds majority in more than two of them. At least one Shiite faction in Basra has come out against the constitution—they see it as giving too much power to rival Shiite parties—but its province contains too few Sunnis to allow for a coalition. So, according to the conventional wisdom (though nobody knows how accurate that is), rejection is unlikely.

Kaplan thinks it will happen even though that might not be best.

The Prediction Markets

StrategyPage phrases their prediction like this:

The Iraqi constitution, when put to a vote in October, will be rejected by the voters of 3 or more provinces and not go into effect.
Currently, there is an aggregate vote against this sentiment, with 595 pros and 1670 cons. StrategyPage's prediction market is correct while an event is open 85% of the time. Of note, those participating in that market are not using money.

Intrade Trading Exchange [go to the home page and enter "Iraq" in the search bar] is showing a last price of 71 for the contract that reads thus:

The ratification of the Iraq Constitution by October 31st 2005.
This exchange works such that if an event closes negatively, the value of the contract is 0. If positive at close, the value is 100. Traders buy or sell in the middle. A "price" of 71 indicates very high sentiment predicting ratification. Notably, traders in this market are using actual money.

The Document

TEXT OF THE DRAFT IRAQI CONSTITUTION translated by the AP.

Analysis

Sentiment is high for both turnout and a 'yes' result. Many Sunni voters may be upset that their high turnout fails to stop the constitution. This could lead to more violence.

The psychological aspects of the outcome are not to be overlooked. An Iraqi voting for the first time may be skeptical of the entire process, or may feel empowered by his moments at the ballot box. Those feelings may come crashing down if the outcome does not go his way. This is simple stuff, but bears remembering because the effects would be magnified in a political culture new to democracy.

One of the simplest aspects of our political culture is the idea that if one party does not win, it always has a chance the next time around. The prevalence of that sentiment among the Iraqi electorate is key . . .

I take issue with those who foresee a civil war if the constitution is rejected. In that instance, the process calls for the December parliamentary elections to proceed as scheduled and for the resulting MPs to then convene a new assembly to create a new constitution. Instead of war, an alternate scenario if there's an upset:

The Sunnis may be late converts to the political process if the constitution fails. Having missed their chance at the ballot box in January, they may feel vindicated that they've defeated the constitution and be completely sold to the idea of elections as determinants of political outcomes. This seems like a positive development, if it plays out that way. The entire country will then return to the polls in December knowing that whomever is elected will be rewriting the constitution. So the next round has the potential to be much more inclusive.

Given how long vote-counting took in the winter and spring, having the next round of elections scheduled for December could be the master stroke by those that planned this process. In the meantime, while the votes are counted, coalition offensives will continue in Anbar and along the Syrian border. The Sunni electorate will ponder the outcome of their enfranchisement while the sounds of battle are echoing outside their doors. The chiaroscuro-like choice of blood or compromise will cleave their very souls.

Written by Chester at 11:57 PM | Link | Comments (17) | TrackBack (2) | Print Article

September 26, 2005

The Pursuit and Finishing

What will the endgame be, whether tomorrow or years hence?

The Marine Corps Operations Manual says thus:

Pursuit

A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. Pursuits often develop from successful exploitation operations when the enemy defenses begin to disintegrate. A pursuit may also be initiated when the enemy has lost his ability to fight effectively and attempts to withdraw.

The manual goes on to describe the mechanics of a pursuit in the terms of classic set-piece military battles -- "a pursuit is normally made up of a direct pressure force and an encircling force" -- which causes the reader to scratch his head and wonder how to translate this to a transnational terror insurgency . . . Such definitions are geared to immediate tactical and operational needs, not to the strategic aims of our entire effort in Iraq. Put precisely, if the insurgency is defeated, what have we won? From a political standpoint, certainly a democratic and democratizing Iraq. But from a military standpoint, from the aim of using our victory as leverage to further prosecute the war on Islamic fascism -- a pursuit if you will -- how to conduct such pursuit?

Imagine Iraq's borders are controlled by its government at some point in the near future. Developments on the political front have been largely positive. Sunni support for Al Qaeda has diminished dramatically. The foreign jihadists desire to leave the country, and many of them begin an egress. How to both physically pursue and destroy them, and how also to follow-up the psychological impact of our own victory?

First, as to the ins and outs of physical pursuit: it seems unlikely that the US will attempt another invasion, or even something like cross-border raids, anytime soon. But if ratlines, supply networks, and recruitment centers can be divulged from prisoners, this information may be used over a period of time to target those nodes. The military will not be the preferred method of doing so, at least not the US military. More than likely this aspect of the Iraqi campaign will go unreported, as other government agencies do what they do in the shadows.

But the psychological pursuit is more important. Mark Helprin has written:

The instant the Arab world realized that the promised shock and awe had not materialized, the insurgency was born.
While the denouement of the campaign will probably not create any events that are notable from a media standpoint, our success, and that of the Iraqis, must be driven home to the Arab world nonetheless: while "shock and awe" may not have captured the imaginations of the Middle East, the destruction of Muslim terror in Iraq, coupled with the simultaneous creation of a representative government, must not be lost on the region. Every possibility to reinforce this fact must be exploited to the utmost: whilst the mujaheddin may have been able to defeat all-comers before, they were unsuccessful against the US. Moreover, a sovereign state, remade in the image of the US, exists on the border of every major Arab country, save Egypt.

This is the conundrum: how to drive these points home? There are many ways: media campaigns, troop withdrawals, letting the Iraqis do what they do unfettered, and letting the world watch. But none of these boils down to a decisive event. Will any of these actually leave the Arab world agog at our powers?


UPDATE: David Ignatius intimates our endgame, a slow withdrawal that will allow us to focus on training local militaries elsewhere to defeat terrorism:

The commanders' thinking is conveyed by a set of "Principles for a Long War" for combating the main enemy, al Qaeda and affiliated movements. Among the precepts they discussed here: "use the indirect approach" by working with Iraqi and other partner forces; "avoid the dependency syndrome" by making the Iraqis take responsibility for their own security and governance; and "remove the perception of occupation" by reducing the size and visibility of American forces. The goal over the next decade is a smaller, leaner, more flexible U.S. force in the Middle East -- one that can help regional allies rather than trying to fight an open-ended American war that would be a recruiting banner for al Qaeda.
Notably, this is reflected in the comments of several Marine generals at the conference on the future of the Marine Corps.
GENERAL HAGEE: Now what about on the low end? Let's talk about cooperative security which I think is unbelievable important, so-called Phase Zero. If we do Phase Zero right, then I don't think we'll have to do Phase I, Phase II and Phase III, major combat operations, and if we don't do that, we don't have to do Phase IV. And Phase Zero is cooperative security . . .

We have stood up, or it's going to have its initial operational capability on the first of October, a foreign military training unit. Phase Zero. We want to go out, we want to provide a capability to each combatant commander, to help countries in the combatant commander's AOR, help them train their armed forces and to understand how a armed force works under a democratic, civilian-led government.

We haven't had that capability before, not focused, the way that we intend to focus. We have stood up at Quantico a center for advanced operational cultural learning. It will have its initial operational capability on the first of October. It is going to inject cultural learning into all of our schools, starting at boom camp and at the basic school.

We have decided that every Marine, whether he or she is enlisted or officer, is going to be assigned a region in the world, and they're going to be tasked with learning about that region in the world and even learning one of the languages in that particular region, and we hope to be able to give them the opportunity to serve in that particular area.

Now is everyone going to be able to do that? No. But at least we are identifying how important that is. Two, three years ago, we probably sent 20 some individuals to Arabic language course. Last two years we've sent four thousand Marines. Now are they fluent? No. But at least they're able to start to communicate, they're able to start to understand the culture, at least in the area that we are fighting in right now. Some examples of what we are doing.

Global influence that does not aggravate sovereignty? Perhaps that's the next stage of the war.

Written by Chester at 11:15 PM | Link | Comments (26) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

September 25, 2005

Planning ahead: Live-blogging the Iraqi Constitution's Ratification

I've decided to live-blog the Iraqi Constitutional ratification, on October 15th. I did the same for the elections in January and it was quite an experience. Just a heads up.

Written by Chester at 2:20 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

September 21, 2005

Reflections on the Flash Presentation on The Anbar Campaign

Bill Roggio, Marvin Hutchens, and Steve Schippert from The Word Unheard (who is revealing his name for the first time) have created a Flash presentation of recent operations in Iraq, specifically in the West, along the Syrian border. I know they've been working on it for a while and the product is outstanding. It covers the period Aug 27-Sep 17th. Please go check it out immediately.

UPDATE: The thing that makes this presentation so powerful is its complete independence from the normally practiced way of reporting the war. Most war reports make sweeping generalizations from a few small bits of first-hand observation, for better or worse. They rarely tie military actions together in an operational whole (note: Wretchard has just pointed this out as well at The Belmont Club).

To give a concrete example of what I mean, I'd like to do a comparison of three texts. First, Chasing the Ghosts an article in the September 18th edition of Time magazine, and secondly, an interview with DoD News: Press Briefing on Overview of Operation Restoring Rights in Tall Afar, Iraq, and finally, DoD News: Special Defense Department Operational Update Briefing on Operations in Northwest Iraq [h-t to Belmont Club over the past week or so for all three sources].

We can start with the titles of the articles themselves. "Chasing the Ghosts" of course implies trying to catch something that is forever out of one's grasp. It of course reeks of drama, but not of a good kind, but of a tragic sort of failure. The other DOD headlines relfect the mundane manner in which the DOD assigns and tracks its news. These two documents should be pushed out to every media outlet possible, not just released on the Pentagon website. The headlines reflect that mentality.

First, let's examine the overall tone of both sets of documents just through some of the descriptive phrases in each. In the TIME article, here are representative words, reflecting, and shaping, the overall tenor of the piece:

"elusive and inexhaustible enemy"
"success" is "elusive"
"inexhaustible enemy emboldened by the US presence"
"gradual . . . erosion" in public support
"millions of Iraqis will vote on a constitution that threatens to further split the country"
"beleaguered US mission in Iraq"
"unwinnable military fight"
"series of failures"
"hardened local fighters"
"politically compromised outcome"
"dangers, dilemmas, and frustrations that still haunt the US in Iraq"
"temporary tactical gains"
"doubts about whether anything resembling victory can still be achieved"
"powerless to do anything" about atrocities
"intelligence suggests insurgents are displaying their mettle"
"This enemy is not a rabble."
"fierce resistance"
"shaken US officer"
"troops . . . embittered"
"momentum lost"
"insurgents proving so resiliant"

Do you really even have to read the article to know what it says? When I was a child, my father told me that Life magazine was for people who don't like to read, and TIME for people who don't like to think. Seems an accurate characterization. Let's contrast those above phrases with the ones used by Col H.R. McMaster, Commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the subject of the first DOD link, who led the attack on Tall Afar, and those of Col Robert Brown, Commander of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry, who is the subject of the second interview, conducted as his unit is about to leave Iraq after a full year there.

Col McMaster's interview:

"The enemy . . . is the worst of the worst in terms of people in the world."
"no better enemy for our soldiers and Iraqi army soldiers to pursue and defeat"
"our troopers were very aggressive"
"we pursued them very effectively"
"gain access here by a very good relationship with the people"
"they can't hide in plain sight anymore"
"there's a permanent security presence here"
"the enemy is denied that area"
"very capable Iraqi security forces"
"tremendous amount of capability"
"we conducted very effective combat operations against the enemy"
"we relentlessly pursued the enemy"
"these Iraqi soldiers are brave"
"more effective every day"
"there is no really greater pleasure for us than to kill or capture these particular individuals"
"discipline of our soldiers . . . ability to overwhelm the enemy in every tactical engagement"
"apply firepower with discipline and discrimination has saved civilians' lives"

Col. Brown:

"desperate situation for al Qaeda and the insurgents in Mosul"
"sources we have inside the al Qaeda network . . . have . . . informed us of that"
"population clearly understands they want freedom . . . they are sick and tired of the terrorists"
"the government has really improved their legitimacy"
"the Iraqi forces are getting better"
"the situation improving on a daily basis in Mosul"
"normalcy has come back to the city"
"They're absolutely fantastic"
"huge improvement just over the last three months"
"we have a number of sources that provide information"
"foreign fighter that we're seeing now -- very poorly trained"
"80 percent say they're going to come and vote"
"they want the people in fear"
"many of these former regime elements are coming forward"
"mistake to align themselves with al Qaeda"
"the level of proficiency is down in the foreign fighter"
"the level of complexity of attacks is way down"
"the leadership is severely disrupted"

Now one might be tempted to think that Col McMaster and Col Brown are just shills for the administration. But interestingly enough, Col McMaster is the author of a bestselling book on Vietnam, Dereliction of Duty : Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. Why would he write such a scathing text, then go on to repeat those same errors? I'm willing to bet he's calling it like he sees it. Here's an excerpt from his book:

Johnson's preoccupation with his domestic legislative program led him to obscure from the public and the Congress the extent of the difficulties in Vietnam. Despite his efforts to suppress the stories, however, newspapers had carried front-page articles on the US ambassador's row with the South Vietnamese generals and on the military defeats suffered by the South Vietnamese Army at the hands of the Viet Cong. On January 21 Johnson arranged a meeting with key Democratic and Republilcan members of the House and Senate. The meeting convened as General Khanh was charging the administration with grossly understating the degree of Communist infiltration from North Vietnam. Coincidentally, the purpose of the meeting with the legislators was to propagate the administration's spuriously optimistic assessment. [emphasis added]
It doesn't jive that the same man who wrote that in 1997 would now willingly abandon such convictions to spuriously provide overly optimistic assessments of our current conflict. I think we can cut that criticism off at the pass.

Now let's compare some specific statements from TIME magazine vs. Col McMaster. They provide quite a contrast. The overall effect is that of Chicken Little sharing a podium with Clint Eastwood, who carefully and clearly dismantles the bird's every cluck. Pity these two weren't in the same room.

1. TIME:

Waiting for the Americans were hundreds of hardened local fighters, small bands of foreign zealots and in the notorious Sarai quarter of the city, a labyrinth of medieval alleyways laced with booby traps and roadside bombs.
Col McMaster:
These were very complex defenses in neighborhoods outside of the Sarai neighborhood, which was the center of the enemy's safe haven here. They had their command and control in a safe house in the center that was very heavily defended. Outside of that, they had defensive positions with RPG and machine gun positions. Surrounding those positions, they had homes that were rigged to be demolished by munitions as U.S. and Iraqi soldiers entered them, and then, outside of those, they had Improvised Explosive Devices, roadside bombs, implanted, buried into the roads.

But our forces aggressively pursued the enemy in these areas. They were able to defeat these IEDs based on the human intelligence we developed. We exploded many of them with attack helicopter fire or detonated them with our engineers. We penetrated that defense. Our tanks led with our Iraqi infantry in support. We absorbed any energy from their rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns, continued the assault into these safe havens and destroyed their leadership throughout the city. The word then went out that -- to the enemy that put other elements on notice: look, we're being slaughtered here; we need to avoid these very effective combined forces of Iraqi and U.S. forces. But we continued to relentlessly pursue them as we moved to isolate the Sarai district. In Sarai, the most dense urban terrain you can imagine, there was a very complex defense prepared there, with, again, these roadside bombs, buildings rigged for demolition, machine gun positions, sniper positions, and mortars integrated into this. But with our intelligence, our precision fires capability, we were able to severely disrupt that defense and really collapse it all around the enemy.

2. TIME:
But field commanders and top intelligence officers acknowledge that the U.S. is no closer to subduing the insurgents and the threat that they pose to Iraq's stability.
Col McMaster (who is of course a 'field commander'):
Nothing's rosy in Iraq, okay? So I don't want to give you an unrealistic perspective here. What I tried to describe with you was a continuous interaction with the enemy that we've had since our arrival, but an interaction that has been in our favor. We've maintained the initiative over this enemy . . .

The standard for success for us here is to ensure that the enemy can no longer wage an effective campaign of intimidation over the population of Tall Afar. And to get to your question, in terms of can we permanently secure it, the answer is, yes, and we're taking all measures to do that. In fact, it's the most complicated part of the mission, is how we provide permanent security. We're introducing Iraqi security forces into the center of the city. Iraqi army will have access to the population. They'll be in patrol bases in the interior of the city . . .

So building the capability of the security forces, introducing them into the city, controlling the return of civilians, developing sources within the communities to make sure that we have early warning of these terrorists if they come back -- these are all things that are very much on all of our leaders' minds as we continue to set conditions for permanent security for the people of Tall Afar.

So is it done, yet? No. Will it happen? Yes. It's going to happen. And this operation is setting the conditions for establishing that kind of security, so these people -- these good people in Tall Afar no longer have to suffer. I mean, there are the most beautiful children I've ever seen in my life in this city. I mean, there's Turkmen kids in these multicolored dresses. They've suffered for way too long, and all of us, the Iraqi soldiers, the Iraqi police, our forces are committed to make sure they don't have to suffer anymore. And these terrorists will not come back. They won't come back to Tall Afar.

3. TIME:
Across Iraq, the prize for the U.S. remains a clear-cut outcome, some indication that the U.S. is doing anything more than playing whack-a-mole with the insurgents.
Col McMaster:
. . . what gives us the ability to sort of clear-and-hold as a counterinsurgency strategy is the capability of Iraqi security forces. And I think we have to remember, you know, that the enemy attacked the Iraqi security forces in a very focused manner over the last couple years. Why was that? Because that's their greatest danger to them. So I think we tend to give the enemy, you know, too much credit, not ourselves credit sometimes. You know, we've got the right strategy here, which is to build Iraqi security forces, which can secure the population from these terrorists and these murderers. And the key thing is for us to be able to reconstitute in this area, and that's what we're really doing, is rebuilding, reconstituting police forces, which suffered from a focused attack by the enemy last fall, so that the police can be the primary level of security. And now what has fundamentally changed from operations conducted previously is that we have a capable Iraqi army formation to provide them with backup.
The TIME article has some truly bizarre statements in it:
Unlike the Fallujah battle, Tall Afar raged mostly unseen, with accounts of the fighting limited largely to the reports of U.S. and Iraqi officials in Baghdad, who declared that the onslaught had succeeded in driving out the bands of rebels . . . from their safe haven.
Now wait just a moment. Why might this operation have been less covered than Fallujah? Couldn't it have something to do with not enough reporters who give a damn?

The TIME article is also interesting because of its structure, which basically shifts between A) ground-level combat and B) large-scale strategic prognostications and generalizations. In fact, breaking the paragraphs down with these values yields this organization:
A
B
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A/B
B

The ability for one individual to impute the overall course of things and at the same time cover a given tactical action in detail flies in the face of my experience there. I had little knowledge of ground-level combat, but a quite well-developed view of the entire operational picture. My friends in the infantry were no doubt in the opposite position. The only way to develop a detailed view of both is through the expenditure of a significant amount of time -- Michael Yon might be a good example of this, but even he shies away from pronouncements on the course of the overall conflict, instead sticking to descriptions of the trials and successes of one battalion. One other way is to be that rarest of individual on the battlefield: the operational-level commander, of a battalion or a regiment, someone like Col McMaster, or Col Brown, who serves as the critical link between the strategic overview and yet can move freely among his men on the ground, going where he can best observe their progress.* TIME magazine is kind enough to tell us that

After a month in the Al Qaeda-dominated Syrian border region, TIME spent 10 days on the front lines of the war, having lived with U.S. and Iraqi troops as they prepared for the battle of Tall Afar . . .
There is a view in contemporary America that authentic experience trumps analytical rigor: I was there, you weren't, I know what I'm talking about, you don't. It is reminiscent of the conversation between Spock and Dr. McCoy in Star Trek III, when Spock tells McCoy that in order to have a conversation about Spock's recent death and resurrection, McCoy must first die and then be resurrected himself.

That seems like a silly way to win an argument, but playing by those rules, isn't it logical that if time in theater is the arbiter of tactical and strategic insight, then Col Brown's year-long tour and Col McMaster's 5 months thus far trump TIME magazine's 40 days? And that is completely setting aside their professional expertise.

In the end, is there an absolute correct answer as to the course of the war in Iraq, or are we doomed to forever repeat the questions of one of Robert Littell's spies, who perpetually asks, "Whose truth, which truth?"

I am admittedly biased, but it all seems like a no-brainer to me.

*This is likely to change over time as forces are more and more decentralized and given a common operational picture from which to operate. But that's how it is now.

Written by Chester at 9:12 PM | Link | Comments (16) | TrackBack (5) | Print Article

September 14, 2005

Speculation on the Baghdad Attacks

A briefing, using the understudy technique:


"I'm Zarqawi's lead henchman in Tal-Afar, that is, after all the other, much more qualified lead henchmen have been killed or captured. The Americans and the Iraqi government are coming to take over my city. I've stockpiled lots of materiel here, weapons, supplies, even some pre-staged car bombs, for quick use. Since the Iraqis and the Americans are clearing the entire city, I now have nowhere to keep my supplies . . . I can't use most of my weaponry in an open battle; the Americans will slaughter my forces. I can't transport most of my materiel; I don't have the operational lift to do it. The most I can do is roust all the guys I can (and let's be honest, I'm getting near to the bottom of the barrel here) and get them to drive the remaining car bombs out of the city. There's no way they can go west to our brothers in Syria. With luck they'll be able to reach Baghdad and launch some sort of attack there. Hopefully, it will kill many, but more importantly, it will cause the western press to completely forget about this operation in my haven of Tal Afar, and focus entirely on Baghdad's carnage. I mean, they practically work for us -- they even do multimedia presentations on our work that they never do for the efforts of the Americans. This seems to make sense because as we know, most of the press is holed up in Baghdad and never even visits other cities.
Finally, maybe I can get word to the Emir, Zarqawi, and he can spin it however he wants. Civil war against the Shi'ites or or a foretaste of a 'Great Ramadan Offensive' or whatever. That's just about the best I can do, praise be to Allah. Throw a Hail Mary -- as it were -- out there and see what happens . . . "

*****

If the press can make a meta-narrative, so can I. I mean -- come on! 10,000 US and Iraqi troops invade Tal Afar, with the Iraqis in the lead, and it's relegated to the back pages. But some car bombs in Baghdad, and the New York Times creates an entire multimedia presentation about it. Bull puckey, I say to that.

I have to credit The Fourth Rail as the source of all those links. Bill Roggio is apparently the only journalist in the world keeping track of things but . . . wait . . . he's not even a journalist. He'll probably get mad I even called him one . . . He's sitting in his living room in Jersey running circles around all the denizens of the Palestine Hotel. It's inspiring and disgraceful at the same time.

Written by Chester at 11:47 PM | Link | Comments (9) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

August 23, 2005

"...the whole thing was unintelligible to me."

-Lord Auckland, Governor-General, on the catastrophe he had engineered

The Return of Elphey Bey

The press has created a meme and put it in the mouths of our enemies. "Leave Iraq, and you will not be bothered." This has some significant parallels to the British Army's retreat from Kabul in 1842:

It was to be the most terrible retreat in the history of British arms. It began on January 6th, 1842 and would in end an 'awful completeness' as the historian John Kaye said, barely a week later. The nearest British garrison and therefore the only place where safety could be guaranteed was in the city of Jalalabad, and it lay over ninety miles away. It doesn't seem so far, but it was a ninety mile trek over snow-covered mountain paths and passes, through desolate country held by warlike tribesmen with a great hatred for the British. The British had little confidence in their leaders and even less in the trustworthiness of Mohammed Akbar's promises of safe conduct through the passes. It was therefore a very cold, dispirited throng, there was such confusion it could not be called an army, that left their home of the last three years and headed for the mountains. Almost 17,000 people left the cantonment that dark day . . .

There was no sign of Akbar's promised escort and the horror started immediately after the rearguard left the compound with the Afghans swarming over the walls into the cantonment eager for loot. The rearguard itself came under sniper fire and many men were hit in the first hour or so of the retreat. It was only to get worse. Afghan horsemen rushed the column again and again, driving off baggage animals and killing both soldiers and unarmed camp followers. By the end of the first day only five miles had been covered and much of the baggage had been lost. As the army tried to make camp, stragglers continued to stagger in asking where their units were. Nobody seemed to know. All was confusion and pointed to a lack of any effective leadership that had already led, and would again lead,to tragedy. Only one tent had survived the Afghan attacks and it was used by some women and children and senior officers that night. Everyone else had to lay down in the snow and the following morning many woke up with frostbitten limbs. Many didn't wake up at all. When the army moved off, those with frostbitten feet had to be left behind.

On the second day, the sniping and mounted attacks continued and in one the Afghans captured two mule guns, leaving only one other mule gun and two heavier pieces as the total ordnance available to the British. And then Mohammed Akbar appeared, scolding the British for leaving before his escort had been made ready. This was nonsense as the time and place for the escort to meet the British had been very precisely set; Akbar's men just hadn't shown up. Akbar suggested the British halt for the day while he negotiated safe passage through the upcoming Khoord-Cabool pass with the local chieftains who controlled it. How Elphinstone could believe such things was beyond the comprehension of the men under his command, but he did and the army dutifully halted. Akbar also asked for three British political officers, Pottinger among them, as hostages. Again Elphinstone supinely gave in to the demand. It must have seemed like a sentence of death to Pottinger and his two companions but they obeyed their commander's orders and went with the Afghans. It was to save their lives.

On January 8th, the third day, the weakened, cold , hungry army moved into the Khoord-Cabool pass. Its four-mile length was to become a charnel house. From the heights above the Afghan tribesmen poured down a withering fire on the Army of the Indus that had no hope of retaliation. Again Akbar's guarantees were shown to be false. Flight was the only option and everyone moved as quickly as possible to escape the fire of the long-barrelled Afghan jezails. The pass was narrow and there was a partly frozen stream wandering along its bottom. The stream had to be forded some thirteen times before the exit of the pass was reached. When the main body finally reached the end of the pass and a temporary safety , the Afghan tribesmen descended on the stragglers and slew them wickedly. Perhaps 3,000 men, women and chidren were lost in that bloody defile. Some said they saw Akbar himself riding through the killing zone shouting in Persian (which many of the British knew) to spare the British and in Pushto (the language of the tribesmen) urging them to kill everyone.

Major-General Elphinstone's ineptitude is legendary. Again and again and again, Akbar Khan gave his word to protect the British, or to at least spare them from the hordes of Afghans who descended upon them. Elphinstone always took him at his word -- despite the advice of many of his officers. Though the British eventually returned to Afghanistan, there were there only briefly, then left again, returning once more 35 years later as the great game continued . . .

To paraphrase what Daniel Henninger wrote in his Friday column for the Wall Street Journal last week, "the forces that conspired to remove all of the moral and political complexity from the case of Terri Schiavo are now about to turn their attention to Iraq." By this he means to implicate us all: Sheehan and her ilk, her media megaphone, politicians who count the days until November of 2006, and the presidential leadership as well.

If the US were to leave Iraq next year, in toto, we will not have lost the war. But neither will it be over. Radical Islam has not been defeated. Militarily, perhaps, the designs of Al Qaeda have been kept at bay from North America with success. But the ideas which animate their actions, and which are so attractive to so many in the world, have not been discredited. Creating a democratic Iraq, (one of the many goals of our involvement there) is an action meant to answer the jihadis claim for claim.

What would happen, were we to withdraw, and the Iraqis to fail in their constitutional odyssey? The West may lose the will to fight in Iraq, and the Iraqis may lose the will to govern themselves (in which case, one or many strongmen may come to power), but one thing is for certain: Radical Islam will most certainly not have lost its will to power. That desire will manifest itself in violence and Americans will die.

It is a confusing proposition to attempt to compare our current conflict to either World War II -- when the entire might of the American nation was mobilized -- or the Cold War, when forbearance from action was largely seen as the smart course due to the logic of mutually-assured destruction. We find ourselves in a strange situation, partially committed, unsure of what to do next, but knowing -- or do we? -- that restraint may mean death. Our indecisiveness will cause us to be avid spectators of our own slaughter:

As [the prisoners] trudged back along the track towards Kabul, they walked past the thousands of frozen, bloody and mangled corpses of their friends, fellow officers and comrades. "The sight was dreadful, " wrote Lady Sale in her diary, "the smell of the blood sickening; and the corpses lay so thick it was impossible to look away from them, and it took some care to guide my horse so as not to tred upon their bodies."
Will the United States perform now as Elphey Bey did in 1842? I submit that if so, peace will be short-lived, and the carnage to come will surpass anything hereunto experienced by man. As the slaughter of Elphinstone's charges was to Lord Auckland, the whole thing will be largely unintelligible to the West, agog at the death that surrounds us.


UPDATE: Please see these: David Frum's Diary on National Review Online and Tipping Point on Iraq [h-t: Mark Tapscott].

Written by Chester at 11:34 PM | Link | Print Article

August 19, 2005

"You bastards. This is Jihad? You call this Jihad? "

This MEMRI report, of an interrogation of a captured terrorist by an Iraqi security member, is a must read (ht: Austin Bay). Not only does the terrorist admit to assassinating Muhammed Al Bakr, but he details campaigns of targeted rape, the fact that the Fallujah assault scattered his coworkers, the fact that he was only paid $400, the fact that Ansar al Islam set up house quite comfortably in Halabja during the time of Saddam.

Interrogator: "Did you kidnap women?"

Abed: "Yes."

Interrogator: "There were operations of kidnapping and rape, carried out by the squad you belong to?"

Abed: "Yes."

Interrogator: "Tell me how many rape and kidnapping operations were carried out. My information says that the kidnapped women were university students or daughters of famous people. You raped them and got money for it, and if they were not slaughtered afterwards.... Did this really happen?"

Abed: "Yes, it did."

Interrogator: "Who would carry out these operations?"

Abed: "Abu Sajjad."

Interrogator: "Your superior?"

Abed: "Yes."

[...]

Interrogator: "Is this Jihad – raping women? Is this Jihad?"

Abed: "It is because they collaborated with the Americans."

Interrogator: "That's why they were raped?"

Abed: "Yes."

Interrogator: "A student who is simply going to her university is kidnapped, raped, and then slaughtered?! This was an American collaborator?!"

Abed: "Mullah Al-Raikan would give the names to the squad commander."

Interrogator: "My information says that they were kidnapped and brought to Mullah Al-Raikan's headquarters. True or false?"

Abed: "He would interrogate them."

Interrogator: "Were they raped after the interrogation?"

Abed: "Yes. He would give them to the squad, and they would kill them. Some would rape them."

Interrogator: "You bastards. This is Jihad? You call this Jihad? "

Interrogator 2: "What was your role in these operations?"

Abed: "I would stand at the entrance to the headquarters. It was a house, and they would bring them there."

Interrogator 2: "Did you participate in the rape and murder?"

Abed: "No. Just one who worked for the PUK. She was a Kurd."

Interrogator: "In the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan?"

Abed: "Yes. We brought her too."

Interrogator: "And you raped her?"

Abed: "Yes."

These videos should be aired in the United States.

UPDATE: Hello, Instapundit readers. My comments are currently disabled. Feel free to email me.

You may view a video of the interrogation as well, via MEMRI TV.

Written by Chester at 8:10 PM | Link | Print Article

August 8, 2005

'There's Something Happening Here . . .'

Operation Quick Strike: Neither Quick, Nor just a Strike

Things are about to change dramatically in Anbar province.

As both Wretchard (here, here, and here) and Bill Roggio have noted, Operation Quick Strike has begun.

The question is, why now? An LA Times story (8 U.S. Troops Killed in Battle for Border) on the death of 6 Marine snipers (aside: this is extremely unusual and bears close examination) contained a tantalizing detail of the nature of Quick Strike:

The deaths of the Americans, though, highlight the intensity of the fighting in the area after a recent order by Army Gen. George W. Casey, the top U.S. commander in the country, to control Iraq's western border by November.
This is a rather important detail that is buried deep within the story.

Wretchard points to another LA Times story which has a bit more detail (Base Set Up to Curb Rebels):

American troops have established the first long-term military base along a major smuggling route near the Syrian border in a new effort to block potential suicide bombers from reaching targets in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities.

A force of 1,800 U.S. troops, responding to continuing concerns that foreign fighters are crossing the Syrian border into Iraq, recently began an operation that includes setting up the base, three miles from the crossroads town of Rawah.

This is a major change in the force structure out on the border. Rawah is not quite on the border, but does occupy a rather important crossing point for the Euphrates. But more importantly, it will be the first US base in Anbar that is north of the Euphrates. In any case, 1800 new troops represents about a third more personnel than were in the Marine regiment responsible for this area. This is a significant increase. More:
U.S. military officials in Iraq say the operation near Rawah is their top priority. In the last two weeks, the military has been building structures at the new base and American troops have begun arriving at the facility. The base as been set up far enough from the town so that insurgents seeking to launch mortar and rocket attacks would have to do so from the open desert, where they are more likely to be seen.

A mission statement viewed by a Los Angeles Times reporter states the military's goal is to disrupt Zarqawi's organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and establish Iraqi government control of the border, driving a wedge between the militants and the Iraqi population and eliminating a "safe haven" for insurgents.

The battle plan calls for U.S. troops to launch a series of raids, secure the area and bring in Iraqi security forces. Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun Dulaimi referred briefly to the operation after meeting Thursday with President Jalal Talabani.

"Our forces will start from the Syrian border … till we reach Ramadi, then to Fallouja," he said. "We have taken precise measures on the ground and acquired the president's approval to start the operation."

As in Fallouja, in western Iraq, where U.S. forces fought in November to oust insurgents, U.S. military officials have asked the Iraqi government to issue emergency laws that could include a curfew and a travel ban.

The operation, the largest in western Iraq since May when 100 alleged foreign fighters were killed in Operation Matador, is key to fulfilling an order from Casey: that Iraq's borders be secured by November.

This operation is meant to sever the operational rear of the insurgency. The Iraqi government will gain control of the border area over the next 60 days and its influence will begin to slowly creep eastward. Terrorists will have to choose -- to die in battle, to flee to Syria, or to displace further and further east as the Coalition steamrolls behind them. This will not be a single decisive battle, like Fallujah, but will instead be a campaign of decreasingly lethal skirmishes. US Marines and some Army troops will form a shock force, but will leave the after-battle cleanup and establishment of law and order to Iraqi battalions and brigades -- a joint operation that will highlight the competencies of the US and the Iraqis both. In the process, the Iraqi units will gain valuable combat experience. There's even more good news:
The 2nd Infantry Division's Stryker Brigade Combat Team is leading the operation and is the first to take up a permanent presence in the area. Officials say it has been difficult, if not impossible, for U.S.-led forces to control the region without such a commitment.

"It's a huge, desolate place and if somebody wanted to hide out it would be a good place to hide out," Marine Maj. Gen. Stephen T. Johnson, commander of coalition forces in western Iraq, said in an interview in Fallouja.

As the operation unfolds, Marines would continue to hold the region south of the Euphrates, while the Stryker Brigade, which has been based in Mosul, pushes south, putting insurgents in a "vice," a senior U.S. military strategist said.

That's right, you read it correctly, somehow, we've managed to free up an entire Stryker brigade and send it south to Anbar. This is a regimental-sized unit, but nearly completely mobile (readers, correct my mistakes here, please). Given the terrain, the Stryker brigade will own the area north of the Euphrates. General Casey has certainly decided to make Quick Strike his main play for the autumn.

Why has this decision been taken?

The factors are three:

1. The Iraqi political timetable -- with more elections planned for December, pacifying now-lawless areas of the Sunni Triangle and Anbar province will allow even more Sunnis to participate in the elections. The Iraqi government will gain a great deal of legitimacy if it is able to dramatically increase Sunni participation and a key factor will be a security environment stable enough for voting to take place. The US is also probably looking to another successful election to provide further momentum toward democracy in the rest of the region. The momentum of the first election sort of petered out when it took the Iraqis so long to form a government . . .

2. The competence of Iraqi forces -- there is much to be made of the idea that the nature of the operational campaign in Anbar province up until this point (see Bill Roggio's excellent summary) can be characterized as a delaying action. The US intended to keep the insurgents off-balance, to destroy their sanctuaries when they coalesced (Fallujah) and to seek to impose order -- all the while knowing that victory would only come with large numbers of competent Iraqi forces. Another possibility is that competent Iraqi forces have been able to take responsibility for security in other parts of the country, freeing up the US to shuffle units into Anbar. A final possibility is that General Casey has judged Sunni participation in the election to be so important that he has chosen to be weak elsewhere. The truth may be a combination of all of these possibilities. In any case, everything up until Quick Strike constituted an entirely different campaign than the one that begins with Quick Strike.

3. US domestic politics: General Casey has recently been talking up the possibilities of beginning to withdraw US troops from Iraq, as have other generals, civilians in the Pentagon, and members of the Administration too. Is he being pressured from above to make quick results? How much is domestic politics concerning the President now, who certainly does not want to see the GOP lose seats in the 2006 elections -- the campaigns for which are just beginning to creep into the public's consciousness, and the news media as well, but which will really get going in early spring of next year.

From the three factors above, we have the new Campaign for Western Anbar. Let us hope that those in charge, and our fellow voters as well remember Shakespeare's evil genius Iago: "How poor are they that have not patience! What wound did ever heal but by degrees?"

Written by Chester at 12:11 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

August 4, 2005

Separation of Mosque and State

Before he was killed, Steven Vincent wrote extensively about the city of Basra, and these writings were destined to be the focus of a book.

There is no Sunni and foreign insurgency in Basra, yet his descriptions are troubling nonetheless:

Not surprisingly, given Basra's dilapidated condition, contracting is big business. Not only for the city's numerous contractors, but also for the crooked politicians, parasitical religious parties and criminal gangs who take their cut from every construction job, creating a business climate that combines the accountability of Tammany Hall with the law and order of 1920s Chicago . . .

Not that I didn't know anything about Basra-style corruption. In our travels across the city, Layla and I have fielded ceaseless complaints of extortion, protection rackets, employment featherbedding, nepotism, bid rigging, influence-peddling--it's impossible to talk to Basra businesspeople and not hear such woes.

The corruption is not limited to the business world. As Vincent explained in his last article in the New York Times, the security sector is undergoing a sort of criminalization as well, albeit of a different sort:
As has been widely reported of late, Basran politics (and everyday life) is increasingly coming under the control of Shiite religious groups, from the relatively mainstream Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to the bellicose followers of the rebel cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Recruited from the same population of undereducated, underemployed men who swell these organizations' ranks, many of Basra's rank-and-file police officers maintain dual loyalties to mosque and state.

In May, the city's police chief told a British newspaper that half of his 7,000-man force was affiliated with religious parties. This may have been an optimistic estimate: one young Iraqi officer told me that "75 percent of the policemen I know are with Moktada al-Sadr - he is a great man." And unfortunately, the British seem unable or unwilling to do anything about it.

Perhaps from these observations we can glean a bit about the necessity of keeping Iraq unified as a nation, and not letting too much of its national power devolve into federalism. Zalmay Khalildad, the newly appointed US Ambassador to Iraq, writes in an opinion piece in yesterday's Wall Street Journal [caught it in the print edition at work and have no subscriber link, sorry]:
Iraq needs a "national compact" enshrined in its constitution. One of the biggest challenges facing Iraqis is overcoming the loss of trust among its communitites. This underlies current political and sectarian tensions. In part, it underlies the insurgency. Fostering hatred was central to Saddam's rule. His was a personal tyranny, rooted in a narrow clique, not in a wider community. To overcome this dark legacy, Iraqis need to build bridges, not burn them . . .

This process of forging a national compact begins with an agreement on a new constitution; but it does not end there. If Iraq is to succeed, it needs to build truly national institutions . . . it is vital that Iraqis build institutions that all communities can have confidence in -- that are not instruments of revenge or fiefdoms of patronage of one group or another.

Taken together, what Vincent's microcosmic look, and Khalildad's macro-view suggest is that an Iraqi federalism will lead to more Basras dominated by Shi'ite religious police and Anbars ruled by Sunnis and foreign jihadis. Only national institutions will have the ability to draw in all members of Iraq's diverse community and forge a unified nation-state -- with all of the trappings of freedom that are the ardent goal of the Americans.

There seems to be some logic to this. All national institutions will be centered in Baghdad, the most diverse and largest city in the country. There, elements of all of Iraq's regions, ethnicities, sects, and religions already live together, yet their stabilizing security situation has not led to the introduction of religious police and such as is seen in Basra (though business corruption may very well be another story). Could it be that the diversity of Baghdad will lead to an incipient separation of mosque and state? That a civil society might develop there?

Could it further be that such a civil society is one of the goals of our intervention? Nowhere else in the Arab world do such diverse groups exist in such close quarters -- Lebanon is perhaps a close second, but Iraq has the distinct advantage of being at the geographic center of the region, not on its periphery. Basra may never be an Iraqi melting pot, but Baghdad might be, and its influence might be pressed throughout the country in the form of national power.

Written by Chester at 10:54 PM | Link | Comments (0) | Print Article

August 3, 2005

Rest in Peace, Steven

In December, I learned through National Review of a journalist named Steven Vincent who had traveled to Iraq on his own dime and written a compelling account of his journey.

In January I discovered his blog and emailed him to ask some detailed questions about something I had recently read about Iraqi domestic politics. He got back to me in 24 hours with an equally detailed response. I thought that was very charitable of him. Shortly thereafter I invited him to write some guest posts here on Adventures and was flattered when he agreed. I was just a little ole blogger after all, and he was a published writer. We agreed that he would do four guest pieces for the weekend of the Iraqi elections.

During all of this, I really enjoyed working with Steven. He was extremely polite, had a great sense of humor, and was generally extremely nice to write guest posts on an insignificant little spot of the internet like mine. And, as anyone can tell, he was an excellent writer. When I asked him to do one post a day for the election weekend, he responded that I was quite a demanding editor. But he did three, and each is lovely.

This morning, Bill Roggio emailed me with the news that Steven was murdered in Basra. I can't begin to express the range of emotions I feel. I'm angry that the bastards killed him. I'm sad to have lost a friend, albeit one I didn't know very long or very well. And I'm heartbroken for his wife, Lisa. As he writes in the acknowledgments of his book, "without her courage and resolute assistance, my travels, this book, and the self-knowledge I gained from both would not have been possible."

Steven surely knew that his profession was a dangerous one. "I won't pretend I wasn't afraid -- actually, there were moments when my nerve seemed to fail me and I wondered what the hell I was doing leaving my comfortable position as an art journalist to venture off into a war."

Yet he went anyway, inspired by a friend of his who had gone "mainly to duplicate Homer's achievement, to create a body of art based on life in a war zone." When his friend returned and he heard his tales, he "kept hearing an inner voice challenging my complacency: Do you want to participate in this world-historical event? Participate! Do you want to enlist in the war against Islamofascism? Enlist! Do you want to help give meaning to the victims of 9-11? Go to Iraq!"

And go to Iraq he did, three times, all the while remaining independent, unedited and cut off from the mass of milquetoast reportage that normally characterizes our link to the fight.

Steven was an inspiration to me. He inhabits a long tradition of extremely independent observers who have looked upon world-changing events from afar and known that they must, must see them closer and be a part of what is happening. It is a grand tradition indeed -- de Tocqueville, John Steinbeck, Winston Churchill, Marco Polo -- these are but a few of these epic travel writers, who wrote about war, or faraway lands and their transfomations -- all from firsthand experience. I know that I do not exaggerate when I say that Steven's place in their noble numbers is certain.

In one of our last correspondences, I wrote him that "Marines should probably get to know more art critics." If I could write that again, I would add, "thanks for being my friend."

Rest in peace, friend, and know that you will not be forgotten.

----------------
These are the guest posts Steven Vincent wrote here at The Adventures of Chester:
The Shadow of Karbala
A Prayer for Iraqis About to Vote
The Voting Rights Act, 2005
Going Forward
THE GOD COMPLEX I
THE GOD COMPLEX II

Written by Chester at 8:57 PM | Link | Comments (0) | Print Article

July 4, 2005

Discussion Topic: Buying Iraqi Currency

I meant to post this much earlier when the currency folks first purchased a blogad:

What do folks out there think about investing in Iraq by buying currency. From what I can tell, the Iraqi Central Bank currently has the exchange rate fixed (see here), but I suppose it could fluctuate wildly if it was floated. And down the road, after some stability sets in, perhaps it would increase in value.

Thoughts anyone? It would be interesting to know what kind of exchange rates are in use on the streets. Or, to compare purchasing power, to know how much certain staples go for in dinar -- things like bread, milk, etc.

Written by Chester at 10:27 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

June 26, 2005

Congressman Kucinich and insurgent leadership make same demands of Bush

Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich, speaking on the House floor:

"But this war can end another way. It can end if enough members of Congress consider and cosponsor H.J. Res 55, a bi-partisan bill introduced last week, to require the President to initiate troop withdrawal no later than October 1, 2006. Thank the troops, and bring them home."
US 'in talks with Iraq rebels' - Sunday Times - Times Online:
The Iraqis had agreed beforehand to focus on their main demand, “a guaranteed timetable of American withdrawal from Iraq”, the source said. “We told them it did not matter whether we are talking about one year or a five-year plan but that we insisted on having a timetable nonetheless.”
What esteemed company the authors of Res 55 find themselves in! The Americans were meeting with Ansar Al Sunnah, The Islamic Army of Iraq, the Iraqi Liberation Army, and Jaish Mohammed.

Written by Chester at 10:22 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

June 7, 2005

Strange Reports on Matador from Debka

Two separate Alert Readers have drawn attention to this article: DEBKAfile - Impatient for Assad to Go, Washington Made Much of Routine Syrian Scud Test. Among other claims, the article makes these assertions about the recent Operation Matador:

Last month, aware of the ground shaking under his feet, Assad performed an epic about-face – or at least gave the appearance of turning over a new leaf.

He ordered his army to pitch in with support for “Operation Matador”, the important U.S. assault against insurgents along the Iraqi-Syrian border, thereby tipping the scales in favor of the American forces. This was revealed by DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military sources in an exclusive report from Iraq on May 20. Thanks to Syrian cooperation, American troops were for the first time able to come up from behind Iraqi and Arab insurgents and al Qaeda gunmen, including followers of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi. From launching pads on Syrian soil, units of the 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary drove into Iraq and executed a west-to-east sweep of terrorist bases (as you will see on the special map accompanying this article) .

The US operation was two-pronged: one arm drew a 15 square-mile square around a patch of al Jazira Desert in the al Qaim region. It was delimited by the Syrian frontier town of al-Hary and the Euphrates River, the area around the Iraqi town of Ar Rabit, on the northern bank of the river, and the Iraqi cities of Khutaylah, Sadah and Karabilah on the southern bank.

Simultaneously, the second American arm drove southeast for a systematic purge of insurgent lairs along the centuries-old smuggling route from the Syrian border. They cut through a corridor more than 200-mile (320-km) long, winding from the Syrian border town of Abu Kemal, crossing through the Syrian Desert and ending near the Shiite shrine town of Karbala in central Iraq. Numerous Arab and al Qaeda sanctuaries and launching-pads were mopped up along the route.

According to DEBKA-Net-Weekly’s military sources, Syria deployed an armored brigade between Abu Kamal and the Syrian banks of the Euphrates to cover the US Marine operation around and inside Al Hary. The brigade was under orders to shield the Marines from insurgent attack on the Syrian side of the border and to cut the guerillas’ links via the Euphrates to their comrades on the Iraqi side of the border.

The dense reeds, bushes and vegetation provide cover on the river banks for armed ambushes and hideouts. Syrian forces undertook to cut off the guerrillas’ escape route back into Syria while the Marines hammered these riverside lairs.

The Syrian military umbrella left the Marine Force and the Army’s 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company free to construct a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates and cross safely into Iraq. US forces and Syrian troops then formed a defensive perimeter around the area.

Upon reaching the northern bank, the Marines began their offensive in Iraq, coming at the guerrillas from the rear and forcing them to flee toward western Syria – where they were stopped. Finding themselves running into the arms of Syrian troops, they turned south and took the smugglers’ corridor bound for Karbala. Here they were trapped by the second prong of the US clean-up operation. Those who could, fled east. Most reached Iraqi towns and villages along both banks of the Euphrates at points north of Ramadi and Fallujah in the Sunni Triangle.

The salt required to swallow this comes in a very large shaker. Consider:

1) An operation of this magnitude involving joint US and Syrian forces would be very difficult to keep a lid on. US reporters were embedded with US forces during Matador. Why would they keep quiet about being in Syria?

2) Why keep this cooperation secret? Publicizing it would work extremely well in our favor. and for the Syrians.

3) Some of the descriptions of tactical actions do not make sense. Like, "The Syrian military umbrella
left the Marine Force and the Army’s 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company free to construct a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates and cross safely into Iraq." The Euphrates runs perpendicular to the border; it does not divide the countries. One can cross it and one would still be in the country one started in. Moreover, many press accounts have stated that difficulty in spanning the river led to delays which drew enemy fire from the insurgents. How was this possible if a "Syrian military umbrella" was in place?

4) I'd be extremely surprised if any US commander would recommend joint operations with the Syrians. Though they were on our side in Desert Storm, an operation as described would require significant command and control cooperation -- and would therefore give any Syrian military personnel with ties to the insurgency a window into our operating methods in general and battle plans in particular. I doubt an American general would be ok with this. The doublecross factor is too high.

I think I used Debka as a source once, but I don't think I'm going to use them again.

Written by Chester at 10:08 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

June 5, 2005

Ho Chi Minh Trail vs the Euphrates Line of Communications

On Saturday, the New York Times published an article by John Burns entitled Iraq's Ho Chi Minh Trail, wherein he makes several errors of analogy:

From Husayba on the Syrian frontier through Qaim and the sand-blown towns of Rawa, Haditha, Asad and Hit, onward through Ramadi and Falluja to Baghdad, the corridor has become the Ho Chi Minh trail of this war.

Like the bane of American commanders in Vietnam, the 300-mile stretch of river is not so much a single route as a multi-stranded network of passages, some hewing close to the lush silted landscape of palms and reeds that run along the banks, others crossing vast reaches of stony desert on either side . . .

For their part, the insurgents have access to a resource network of their own - Sunni Arab mosques sympathetic to the insurgency in almost every village and town from Damascus to Baghdad. American officers say they have become stations on a relay run straight into the heart of Iraq.

In numbers, the foreign Arab recruits account for a fraction of the insurgents operating across Iraq, whose total is estimated by the American command to range from 12,000 to 20,000. How small a fraction can be guessed from the fact that, as of last week, only 370 of the 14,000 men held as suspected insurgents in American-run detention centers in Iraq were foreigners, according to figures provided by the American command . . .

Nor is there much doubt that the foreign Arabs' impact has been out of proportion to their numbers, primarily because of the willingness of the non-Iraqis to die in suicide bombings. According to a tally kept by the American command, more than 60 of these bombings took place across the country in May, responsible for about two-thirds of the civilians who died.

Iraqis commonly insist that suicide bombing is alien to the Iraqi character, and American commanders agree. "In every case we've seen, the driver has been a foreigner," an American officer who has studied the bombings said last week.

The officer said intelligence reports had established that many bombers passed through mosques in Damascus, Syria's capital, or Aleppo, another Syrian city, and from there through a network of mosques that filtered, in many cases, down the Euphrates, through Qaim, Haditha and Ramadi. At every stage, the officer said, the handlers were organized in cells, each separate from the next, so as to guard the network's secrecy.

As for the bombers, he said their sojourns in Iraq were generally short.

"They don't stay in Iraq very long," the officer said. "They get a lot of indoctrination along the way, but once they're here they are moved into operations very, very fast."

Consider the two maps below. First, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, running through Laos and Cambodia, adjacent to Vietnam:

Continue reading "Ho Chi Minh Trail vs the Euphrates Line of Communications"

Written by Chester at 11:07 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 31, 2005

Thunder/Lightning Update Tomorrow

News is sparse. I've got a good map picked out but little to put on it. I will wait eagerly for the Early Bird in the morning and then hope to post tomorrow.

Written by Chester at 12:20 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 30, 2005

Operation Thunderbolt/Lightning has started

Looks like it kicked off on Saturday . . . I will try to post in-depth about it sometime mid-day Monday.

UPDATE: I will hold on Lightning until late Monday night -- but I will post a map when I begin Lightning coverage.

Instead, I'll have a Memorial Day post up shortly.

Written by Chester at 12:11 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 29, 2005

"New Market" Still Kicking

Operation New Market continues:

UPDATE ON OPERATIONS IN HADITHA

CAMP BLUE DIAMOND, Iraq – Iraqi Security Forces, Marines and Sailors from Regimental Combat Team – 2 continue to operate in and around the city of Haditha today.

Marines from 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines and Iraqi Forces continue to rout out terrorists as part of Operation New Market (Souk Jadeed), successfully disrupting terrorists activity in the vicinity of Haditha. The purpose of this mission is to maintain pressure on terrorists that began with Operation Matador, conducted in western Iraq May 7-14.

Since launching the offensive operation on May 24, Marines and Iraqi soldiers have killed 14 terrorists and detained more than 30 men suspected of conducting terrorist activity in the area.

While conducting patrols through the city, Marines discovered four machine guns stowed in a neighborhood school. Marines and Iraqi Soldiers also discovered numerous weapons caches in and around the city consisting of 313 mortar rounds, two 155mm artillery rounds, five machine guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers and ammunition.

No essential civilian services are being disrupted as a result of the operation. Water and power have not been affected; however, hospital services for the region are still degraded due to a suicide car bomb attack by terrorists and foreign fighters on the Haditha Hospital on May 8.

Thursday night, Marines conducted a precision air strike against terrorists who were firing on coalition forces from a building they’d occupied. One laser-guided bomb was dropped on the building, leveling it to rubble and killing the terrorists inside.

Also in western Al Anbar, Marines and ISF returned the Iraqi man who was taken hostage and tortured by foreign fighters in a terrorist safe house in Ubaydi. The man, who asked not be identified for his own safety, was severely beaten by his abductors. Before being returned to his family, military doctors treated his wounds.

ISF and coalition forces are continually striving to end the campaign of intimidation waged by the terrorists against the citizens of Al Anbar.


Written by Chester at 11:19 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 28, 2005

Zarqawi surrounded?

Just an FYI, from an Alert Reader.

The Kuwaiti News Agency is reporting that

BAGHDAD, May 27 (KUNA) -- A force of Iraqi commandoes, supported by US forces, have sourrounded the village of Abu Shallal, north of here, after reports indicated that Abu Musab Zarqawi might have taken refuge there, Interior ministry sources told KUNA on Friday. -- The sources have indicated that Zarqawi has been spotted by eyewitnesses driven in a red Opel in the village of Abu Shallal, near an area called al-Tarmia. He was said to have taken refuge in the home of an individual named Sheikh Hatem al-Amir.

The Iraqi commandos and US forces are said to be ready to start an operation aimed at capturing him in that village, said the sources.

Interior ministry forces last week surrounded an area named al-Etaifiya, in the middle section of Baghdad, where the Karkh hospital there was inspected for a possible sighting of Zarqawi.

Interior minister Bayan Jabr Solagh had stated at a press conference yesterday, when announcing the launching of Operation Lightning, that he was able to confirm that Zarqawi had been injured.

The news about his injury had been received by the Interior ministry five days ago, said Solagh, although the extent of the injury was not quite clear.

Solagh's statements came hours after an Internet website denied what had been rumored yesterday that al-Qaeda had appointed a replacement for Zarqawi, pending his recovery from his injury. (end)

I've never used this source before, so I can't speak to its accuracy, but it's the official news organ of the Kuwaiti government from what I can gather, so there's something to be said for that.

Written by Chester at 12:16 PM | Link | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 27, 2005

Edge of my seat waiting for Operation Thunder to start

This is the best article I've found detailing the upcoming Operation Thunder -- a massive security operation in and around Baghdad by 40,000 Iraqi troops: Operation Thunder to root out rebels in terror crackdown - World - Times Online

Don't worry. When this kicks off, I'll be all over it.

Written by Chester at 12:32 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (2) | Print Article

Interesting Miscellany about the Corps

Marines focus on small units - (United Press International) is a pretty interesting article focusing on a variety of aspects of the initiatives the Corps has in progress. Good stuff.

Also, an Alert Reader emailed a while back to ask why more flame retardant materials like those used by firefighters aren't in use for clothing and other gear in Iraq. In an anti-IED manner.

I think it sounds like a good idea, but the heat would be quite a limiting factor. Moving around in 120 degree heat in MOPP suits for NBC defense is probably similar to what wearing fire-protective gear would be like. And let me tell you it is a pain in the butt. Necessary of course, but significantly slows down movement and range of motion. And you get tired and dehydrated even quicker than you did before. But if they can make it work, sounds like a winner to me!

Oliver North subbed for Hannity tonight and had some footage of the maintenance bays at Al-Taqqadum where Humvees are being retro-fitted with additional up-armor kits. Said they are getting 200-300 a month done there and will have all Marine humvees in Iraq done by October.

I don't really understand why this isn't being done by contractors so it can happen on a larger scale and faster. October is a while off . . .

Written by Chester at 12:05 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (1) | Print Article

May 26, 2005

Here's wishing you die slowly of a gut shot and burn in hell for eternity

Well, as we all know, Zarqawi is dying somewhere. [See Austin Bay: Zarqawi As Myth, Ghost, and Damaged Goods].

And he's being replaced: Rantburg: Web Site Announces Al-Zarqawi Replacement.

Chrenkoff notes thus:

Supporters of the al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, filled Islamist bulletin boards on the Internet with prayers for his recovery on Wednesday after his group said he had been wounded.

A statement posted on Tuesday on sites used by insurgents called on Muslims to "pray for the healing of our Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from an injury he suffered in the path of God"...

Within hours one posting had launched a "million prayers of recovery campaign," quickly garnering over 70 responses.

70 messages of support in a few hours? C'mon people - we can do better than that. Forget "Get well, al-Zarqawi", it's time for the launch of the official

Get caught, al-Zarqawi

campaign. Abu Musab - wishing you a speedy meeting with the Coalition security forces.

So, dear readers, the comments section is all yours - please feel free to write in your "get caught" or "get [anything else] wishes for Al Qaeda's Number 1 in Iraq.

And let's show jihadis we can run a successful "million prayers of capture campaign."

What a wonderful idea!

I've done one better: you can go to SYSTRAN Language Translation Technology's homepage and your hate mail for the Emir of Iraq can be automatically translated into Arabic.

Here's a sample:

I typed, "Zarqawi, I hope you rot in hell forever."

And I got this:

?????] ? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?????.

Now, my grammar and vocab aren't up to snuff, but I know the alphabet enough to see that they at least got Zarqawi spelled right phonetically.

So, all we need is to know the names of which websites are wishing him well and we can start the mother of all comment wars. Trading barbs with the yahoos at Kos will be nothing compared to this. Both fun and helpful to the cause . . . So if anyone has any idea which websites to go to, post away!

UPDATE: Darn! Movable type just turned my Arabic into question marks. You'll have to go to the site and see it for yourself.

UPDATE2: Al-Jazeera aired the only known video footage of Zarq in Iraq the other day and MEMRI TV has the download, with subtitles. Good background.

UPDATE3: Well, I suppose if you're worried about becoming a target of a fatwa, might be best not to post your wishes on a Jihadi message board. Perhaps more fun could be had by posting something like this:

Dear brothers in Allah, I am so disheartened that our leader the Emir is ailing. I am going to hang up my weapons and stop the jihad. If we cannot beat the infidels we must join them. Allah be praised."

Written by Chester at 9:36 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 25, 2005

Operation New Market

News is sparse on Operation New Market. Not even CentCom has any mention of the new op. Perhaps something new will be up in the morning.

It looks like most of the major news outlets are regurgitating the intial AP report on the battle, seen here in its ABC News incarnation. Ellen Knickmeyer of the Washington Post, who reported on Matador, was interviewed this morning via phone by NPR. She related details of the news about Zarqawi though, not about New Market.

We know this so far:

1. It involves about 1000 US and Iraqi military personnel. Same in size then as Matador, but with Iraqi involvement:

A small reconnaissance unit of Iraqi soldiers was participating in the attack on the northwestern city.

2. At least one of the battalions involved, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, was involved in Matador. So there is some overlap of forces. I believe that a portion of 3/25 was moved to the far west for Matador to reinforce 3/2 for that operation. Haditha is where the bulk of 3/25 is normally operating.

3. Ten or so terrorists have been killed. One was a local cleric who fired at the Marines.

The operation's description sounds much like a "cordon and search" mission.

Helicopters swept down near palm tree groves and armored vehicles roared into this Euphrates River city before dawn Wednesday . . . Marines brought by helicopters blocked one side of Haditha, while other troops on foot and in armored vehicles established checkpoints and moved toward the city's center.
Though I have no satellite imagery for you this week, a quick study of the map shows that Haditha is located due west of a north-south run of the Euphrates. This sheds some light on the tactical movements described: the terrain on the city's east, closest to the Euphrates, is likely much greener and much more vegetated -- this explains the reference to helicopters dropping Marines off in palm tree groves. This type of terrain is better for dismounted infantry. On the other side, the terrain becomes less and less vegetated as one leaves the river and heads toward the desert. This is where armored vehicles have likely set up "checkpoints" as they "moved toward the city's center." The axis of advance is therefore from west to east into the city so that armored vehicles -- tanks, amtracs, and LAVs -- can be integrated into an urban fight there. This would not be possible to attempt if moving from east to west unless a river crossing were established. And as we know from Matador, the river crossing took much longer than had been planned. So the terrain is dictating the nature and direction of the advance in this case . . .

There is no mention of the operation having been planned for some time, as was the case with Matador. This is telling. Perhaps it is exploiting newly found intelligence, as a result of Matador, Squeeze Play, or some other source? Any guess would be pure speculation, but for now, this attack seems more like an exploitation than a deliberate offensive action planned over several weeks or months.

Cordon and search operations are meant to find something. But assuming either that the target is Zarqawi, or that the target is any one individual or group is to put a great deal of faith in our intelligence capabilities. Not impossible, but worth caution in inferring. Even more so, when coupled with this statement by the CO of Regimental Combat Team 2:

"A lot of this is like bird hunting. You rustle it up and see what comes up," said Marine Col. Stephen W. Davis.
Wretchard is right to point out that one thing not found thus far is fortified positions with defenses in depth:
So far -- and it is early days yet -- there have been no reports of the
fights to the death in fortifications that characterized Operation Matador.
If newly gathered intelligence has led to this operation, perhaps it is the result of the Information Dominance Center, as reported by Middle East Newsline:
The United States has introduced prototype technology to improve intelligence on insurgency movements in Iraq.

The U.S. Army has been testing technology meant to rapidly gather intelligence and reconnaissance data and distribute the information to other forces. The technology was meant to respond to a study conducted in 2003 that identified faults in intelligence gathering.

So far, the technologies introduced in Iraq have been regarded as effective. Officials said the army conducted a review in December 2004 that reported successes by U.S. commanders.

Introduced by the army, the Information Dominance Center has integrated intelligence from a range of sources as well as translated the data into graphs and other visuals. Officials said the center, based in Baghdad, would be linked to combat units throughout Iraq.

It seems like there are two things being discussed here: new technologies, which are unnamed and rightly so, and new organizations for processing and disseminating their collected take, of which the Info Dominance Center is a part.

On another note, Bill Roggio raised the question of whether our forces are using a "search and destroy" or a "clear and hold" set of tactics in Iraq.

A limiting factor in continually executing a clear and hold strategy is troop availability. The Marines used to execute Matador were pulled from local garrison duties to execute the assault. It appears there is no significant rapid reaction force available to conduct operations such as Matador.
This is an interesting jumping off point for a discussion of the concept of the reserve. Reserves are, as we know, forces held back to be committed when absolutely necessary, or to fill a gap that opens, or to reinforce the committed forces. The joint doctrinal definition is, "Portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement."

Here we see that the common conception of a "reserve" is the opposite of its true intent. The usual perception is that a reserve is meant to be husbanded and preserved for future use in other, different engagements or actions. But a more realistic way of seeing the reserve is that of a force that is integral to the execution of a planned engagement. In the offense, the reserve would be the fresh troops that relieve other that have been badly bloodied at a key moment in time or space. In the defense, a reserve might be the counterattack force -- and having a counterattack force is the key to any good defense: when committed at the right time, a counterattack can overwhelm the offense.

The question of whether the US has significant "rapid reaction forces" for operations like Matador or New Market is an interesting one. I believe that while operationally (that is, within division-sized areas of operations), commanders are ensuring they have a reserve in the form of a rapid reaction force, at the theater level (that is, the theater of Iraq as a whole), there is no reserve to speak of.

Take Anbar Province. At the operational level, comprising the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force and its 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Air Wing and 2nd FSSG, plus attachments, I think the Division has created a reserve consisting of its non-infantry combat battalions: 2nd Amphibious Assault Battalion, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and the 2nd Tank Battalion. These units are usually employed in supporting roles for the infantry. I believe some portion of them are normally set aside in a rapid reaction role, and some others can be shifted as needed to attach to task-organized units for particular operations. Finally, aircraft and air units are probably forming a large part of a reserve/rapid reaction force. So, conceiving of the reserve as a combined-arms concept is the best way to unravel it. This seems to be the way folks are doing business.

At the theater level, for Iraq as a whole, I don't believe there is a theater reserve. There does not seem to be a certain combat unit or units that are regularly shifted about the battlefield to reinforce smaller engagements at the battalion or regimental level. Take the 2nd Battle of Fallujah in November. That operation involved six infantry battalions in the city, with an Army regiment surrounding it to cut it off. Moving enough forces into place for this battle took some significant planning and lead time: The Black Watch was moved from the British sector north and attached to the 24th MEU temporarily. This allowed an Army battalion to be attached to the 1st Marine Division for the battle. Also, the 31st MEU, including 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, was attached to the 1st Marine Division for the fight. This was certainly not a hasty move. MEUs are strategic-level or national-level assets. Committing one of them to a battle far inside Iraq took at least a couple of weeks of planning at the very least, not including transit time from wherever they were. All of these indicators lead me to believe that there is no single unit dedicated to being a theater-level rapid reaction force or reserve, however you choose to conceive of it.

Written by Chester at 11:42 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 12, 2005

Bandwidth Issues

I have some monthly bandwidth quota issues, so I'll be removing the maps now. They were largely flawed anyway, based on the newest news articles. You'll have to rely on the press! Scary!

Written by Chester at 1:10 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 11, 2005

Wednesday Live-blogging Commences

[This post will be updated through the evening. All times US Central.]

12:22 pm New map will be up in a new post in a few moments.

12:08pm This is frustrating. There is little news at all coming out of the battle. I don't think it is quite over yet. If it is, then we should see a deluge of final, wrap-up accounts. There may be a news lull right now while things are happening. Only one new story, from WaPo: Demise of a Hard-Fighting Squad. The story, while fundamentally interesting, is flawed in two accounts. First, it paints a particularly defeatist attitude. Sure, it is factual, but where are the stories about the dead enemy? Has the author not been with the Marines as they inspected fighting positions and bodies, possibly even weapons caches, etc? This is caused by the second flaw: the reporter was nearly killed herself:

This correspondent had just gotten off the Amtrac and the reconstructed squad from 1st Platoon was rolling toward the Euphrates in a row of armored vehicles, headed for more house searches, when the vehicle rolled over the explosive.
Understandably, she wants to focus on the deaths of those whom she has spent some length of time with. But such "human interest" memoirs are best told by the Marines themselves, and are best at the end of the battle -- when they might be contrasted against its outcome. As it is, the battle is still underway and she focuses solely on friendly casualties. Since she's only with one small unit, we can't expect her to give a bird's eye view of everything, which is fine, but friendly casualties are certainly not all that is happening to Lima Company.

11:50pm Here's an RFI for folks out there: Is New Obeidi the same as Obeidi? And is Q'aim right on the river or removed a bit, as plotted below? Knowing those two things would help a great deal.

11:33pm Milbloggers are highlighted in this story in tomorrow's USA Today: 'Milbloggers' are typing their place in history. It would be interesting to see what kind of traffic these folks get from readers who normally use USA Today online for news.

11:18pm Fox had a report that said the US was denying two rumors going around Iraq. First, that two Blackhawk helos had been shot down in the battle at Q'aim, and second that over 40 Marines had been killed there by roadside bombs. Perhaps spreading these types of rumors is the way the terrorists hope to inflluence the Iraqi populace. See the below from the Word Unheard.

10:42pm Just released from CentCom: Last week the Poles and Iraqis completed Operation COBWEB.

10:26pm The Word Unheard: Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq Calls Rout by Marines "Good News" calls attention to a "Baghdad Bob"-like press release by some element of the insurgents in Iraq. Interesting . . .

9:59pm On All Things Considered today, NPR covered the car-bombings in Baghdad during their top of the hour news, but said nothing at all about Matador. This is sad. The terrorists are hoping that enough car-bombs and the resulting coverage will give them their Tet moment. NPR is only abetting them when its coverage is not balanced . . . where do those car-bombers and bombs come from? Al Q'aim, where we're raking the sand with their bodies.

This raises an interesting question: the MSM in the US has agenda-setting power and still largely influences public debates . . . but what about the populace of Iraq itself? Several articles in the past year have mentioned the explosion of news outlets over there . . . Chrenk's roundups have sometimes mentioned such growth. Is Al-Jazeera dominant, or have some of them made it to the top of the heap in the resulting news competition? In other words, how can the terrorist insurgency adopt their message to the reigning media outlets in Iraq itself?

Aljazeera.Net currently has a large story about the car-bombings, but only a blurb about Matador, and it leaves out key details.

I wonder what some of the Iraqis over at the Carnival of the Liberated would say about terrorism and manipulation of the media?

9:49pm Could be some issues with Hosting Matters. I'm having trouble posting and you're having trouble loading. Nothing from bandwidth from what I can see. If things go south, I'll start posting at my old site: The Adventures of Chester, though some housecleaning over there will be needed.

9:46 pm Fox reported a moment ago that US KIA now number 13. Said one of them was a Lance Corporal who was a pallbearer at Reagan's funeral last summer and then requested to be sent to the sandbox.

9:45pm A couple of Alert Readers tell me there are issues in loading this page. Bandwidth is ok from what I can tell, so it may take a couple of tries.

9:26pm Thoughts about Zarqawi: This was the article that sparked a lot of speculation today: IRAQ: AL-ZARQAWI SERIOUSLY INJURED, SAYS IRAQI OFFICIAL:

Baghdad, 11 May (AKI) - The Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is "serious injured, possibly dead" according to Colonel Fouad Hani Hassan, commander of the fifth division of the Iraqi armed forces, cited by 'Elaph', a popular website in the Arab world. Al-Zarqawi, considered al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, is believed to have been injured in the major offensive US-led forces have been carrying out in the western Anbar province over the last few days.

Operation Matador is centred around the town of Qaim, just a few kilometres from the Syrian border, and is aimed at destroying the strongholds of foreign fighters coming over the border into Iraq to join the insurgency. It's the fourth day of violent fighting around the town, which has been surrounded by troops since Saturday night. Bombing is said to be heavy in Qaim, where there has been house-to-house fighting between troops and insurgents.

The satellite TV channel Al-Arabiya reported on Wednesday that two US military helicopters were brought down during clashes in villages near Qaim, where military aircraft had been carrying out bombing raids to root out Islamic militants from their hideouts.

On Tuesday, Raja Nawaf, the newly-appointed governor of the Anbar province was kidnapped near Qaim and his family was told he would only be released if US troops pulled out of the town. A US military spokesman responded to the news by reiterating that they do not give in to terrorist demands.

While Operation Matador is not specifically aimed at catching al-Zarqawi, Brig. Gen. James Conway told a Pentagon news briefing on Tuesday that "it would be a welcome event to come across him or his body."

This is the biggest US military operation since the offensive on the rebel-held town of Fallujah in November last year. More than 1,000 troops are involved and at least 15 US soldiers are said to have died in the fighting so far. The US military claims some 100 militants have been killed, but inside sources have admitted that they have encountered strong resistance in the town, with the insurgents demonstrating a high level of training.
That's the whole thing. Several issues jump out in terms of credibility: First, the source is an Iraqi Colonel. No Iraqi forces are participating directly in Matador. How would he know? What sources would he have there to tell him? If we've got his body, the US might be slow in releasing that info in order to verify, but it seems unlikely that people other than the verifiers would know enough for rumors to leak out. Another small red flag is that they demoted LtGen Conway to a BrigGen Conway. Not a huge mistake, since this is a foreign press service -- Italian, perhaps? -- but still raises an eyebrow. What else are they wrong on?


9:20 pm If anyone out there is interested in opting-in to my email list, email me at "terrier_manchester@yahoo.com" with "subscribe" in the subject line. You'll get one to three emails a week with one hyperlink each to something interesting here at Adventures. That's it. You can opt-out anytime.

9:13pm My goodness! There's little wisps of steam coming out of my browser now . . . Welcome LGF readers!

This evening I'll be creating a significant events log and attempting to tie it to the map I used yesterday. I'll also offer whatever else I can in terms of commentary . . .

Written by Chester at 9:11 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Noon Wednesday: Various Matador Updates

Several things to cover:

1. An Alert Commenter, Heartless Libertarian notes why rafts might have been used in the river crossing, rather than Amtracs:

Off the top of my head, I can think of a couple of reason for using rafts instead of amtracs. The first would be for stealth. Tracked vehicles are noisy. The squeeking and squealing of sprockets and the rumble of diesel engines can be heard from a long ways away. Rafts are quiet.

Second is the availability of suitable river entry and exit sites. It could be that the banks are too steep for the amtracs to negotiate when either entering or leaving the waters, or that they are too soft and would leave the vehicles at risk of becoming mired. It's also possible that suitable sites for the amtracs were defended, and the rafts were used to land troops to outflank those defenders.

Excellent! I had thought of the noise issue, but had not remembered the bank height issue. My engineer skills are getting rusty. I know Amtracs are there though, so they must have crossed via the pontoon bridges. I've read one instance of Amtracs being used as ambulances, which is a standard technique.

2. Another Alert Commenter says thus:

Ummmm. Do they have internet access in that town? Should people be posting detailed maps with Marine positions and descriptions of ongoing activities? Or is this info sufficiently dated to where we can be assured it is of no value to an already dead enemy?
These are of course very legitimate concerns, so let's address them.

First, who knows? They may have internet access and folks who can read English. But the bad guys are all probably pretty busy hiding right about now . . .

Second, yes, I think the info is sufficiently dated. The map describes a snapshot of activities on Sunday in Iraq. Today is Wednesday. These things move very fast. All articles in today's papers and news sites, which is about all there is to go on, describe actions that took place on Tuesday. And they are getting more detailed about the events of Sunday, but less detailed than Sunday's accounts of Sunday's events. The journalists probably had a pretty good idea of the plan for the attack, but are losing the ability to accurately report how events on the ground have departed from the plan.

Third, I've figured out that the map, as I stated it would, has mistakes. There were probably two river crossing sites, since the most recent news stories detail a crossing near New Ubaydi, and a crossing near Ubaydi. They also detail crossing from the south to the north, and receiving fire from the south side of the river during the crossing. The crossing plotted is from east to west. Also, I've received an email from an Alert Reader who points out that, yes, in fact 2/2 is deployed right now -- to 29 Palms. So there may only be two battalions participating in the fight, 3/2 and 3/25, or the third may have not been named yet. In any case, it's not 2/2. I'll have to investigate this later.

I don't think the map is any more detailed than those which usually appear in MSM outlets. Two graphics from USA Today and the NY Times from the Battle of Fallujah spring to mind. The difference is that I've used doctrinal symbols and terminology as much as possible. Reporters often mix up unit sizes, battalion vs company for example, or names, or ranks of officials. And they don't use doctrinal symbols. During these rapidly evolving situations, clarity is key though, that's why we have doctrinal symbols. Speaking of journalists, this brings me to . . .

3. It seems that the journalists are all relying on each other. Not many are actually there. Take today's USA Today story on page A7. The byline is a USA Today writer, but at the bottom it notes contributions by the AP. But the USA Today story is different from each of these. It's like the USA Today journalist took someone else's story, made a few phone calls of his own to expand on a few topics, then printed his own version. Nothing wrong with this, just want to point out how much this is like (gasp!) blogging.

4. An interesting question of terminology has arisen in two stories: First, Los Angeles Times: Marines Push Into Rebel Areas on Day 3 of Offensive in West Iraq:

Some U.S. commanders believe the area contains insurgent training camps and high-ranking members of the Iraq arm of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, including its leader, Abu Musab Zarqawi. As of early today, no camps or Al Qaeda leaders had been found.
Then, from USA Today, Iraq insurgents' strength surprises U.S. troops; Militants set up base near Syrian border:
BAGHDAD U.S. forces on an offensive across a remote desert region in western Iraq have encountered surprisingly stiff resistance from insurgents who have established a base of operations near the Syrian border.

The insurgent sanctuary has been used to launch a wave of deadly attacks in Baghdad in recent weeks, sometimes using foreign fighters coming through Syria, U.S. officers said Tuesday.

Apparently, Solomon Moore of the Times, who is on the scene and has been reporting on this battle for days, doesn't think that the terrorists who he watches the Marines fight actually live anywhere nearby. They just came in for the weekend. Or perhaps he expected a large camp in the desert, surrounded by barbed wire and a sign: "Zarqawi's Secret Lair - No Trespassing." When we've discovered
bulletproof armor and foreign clothes. In the towns, they reported finding caches of weapons and suicide-bomb vests, as well as car bombs rigged to explode,
it's fair to say that the towns out there are the bases. If a mere camp in the desert was what Mr. Moore was expecting, he should know better: we can destroy that without even using people, with a UAV and Hellfire special. His statement about "camps" is misleading at best. Tomorrow the LA Times will probably run an editorial asking how we could have let these bad guys coalesce out there . . .

Another new aricle, just out, and some video to boot: Chicago Tribune | `Floor it!' GI shouts amid hail of gunfire

Written by Chester at 12:17 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 10, 2005

Matador updates

[This post will be continuously updated through the evening. All times US central.]

1:28 Map is looking like money in the bank. Got it down to 44kb. Thanks for all the helpful emails.

12:27am Thanks for all the thoughts. I'm aiming for one am to get it out there.

12:08 am Bandwidth issues: Anyone know how to shrink a map in terms of file space? The one I'm working on is huge. Over 1 meg. Only about 2000 page views and then then adventures will end until next month. Got to figure this one out. Any ideas, please email me.

12:04 am See this opinion piece, also from WaPo, from a couple of days ago: What Do the Insurgents Want? I think that piece is more or less reflective of the conventional wisdom about these things.

12:03am A new WaPo story is out: 'They Came Here to Die'

11:46pm A SSgt emails a correction to my earlier post about RCT-2. He says that 2/2 was not part of RCT-2 for the invasion, but 2/8 was. I was close. Memory is slipping.

11:22pm A commenter asks for verification of the Syrians being captured. I heard this second hand from the show -- perhaps a transcript will be up soon?

11:18pm I'd be remiss if I didn't give a nod to Wretchard for this post back in November, predicting operations such as this one: The River War.


11:02 pm Welcome Instapundit, Michele Malkin, and Blackfive readers. For some background on this area of Iraq, you may be interested in this: The Strategic Corporal Shows Up in Husaybah. Note: Husaybah or Qusaybah, is the same as Q'aim.


10:23pm Looking at some maps which I hope to use sometime this evening here, I believe that the location of the river-crossing was probably determined by the road network in the area. The same is true for the location of the reconnaissance platoon reportedly positioned to call for air strikes on fleeing terrorists. Perhaps Matador refers to the desired maneuver effects on the enemy forces. But it all depends on how much they have cleared Obeidi. If the enemy stands and fights, then the reconnaissance elements and blocking force will be a precaution at best.


10:21pm There has been little mention thus far of Iraqi national forces participating in this offensive. How are they being used? Are they integrated with the Marines in small units as translators, etc?

10:02pm Here's some thoughts to chew on while the graphics are in progress:

The nature of the bridging mission brings up some interesting questions: Why did the grunts cross the Euphrates on rafts? Why not Amtracs?

Also, the pontoon bridge described in the press is probably already taken back down. It is not meant to be left up for long periods of time, and would be susceptible to enemy fire. More than likely, we used assault bridging like this to cross in an unsuspected place, and then we captured a bridge for sustainment purposes, or we rolled sustainment in from much further to the east on the north side of the river.

Here's all you could ever want to know about river crossing: FM 90-13 Chapter 9.


9:49pm I'm working on some graphics to post.


9:47pm Just overheard on John Batchelor radio program that rat lines are strongest to the south. Also that Syrian intel agents have been captured in Qa'im (Qusaybah).


9:31pm Looks like new news is scarce, but I'm searching for undercovered sources.

Written by Chester at 9:32 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Snap Reactions to "Operation Matador"

1:01pm The 2d Marine Division's 2nd Marine Regiment, task organized as Regimental Combat Team-2, is conducting Operation Matador in western Anbar province, along the Syrian border, and concentrating on several towns at the intersection of the border and the Euphrates River.

The 2nd Marines have been to Iraq before: they were the ground combat element of Task Force Tarawa during the invasion in 2003. TF Tarawa was the name given to the task-organized 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. RCT-2 fought a great deal in the city of Nasiriyah after the 1st Marine Division passed through. I would guess that about 75% of the unit has probably turned over since then, but Marine infantry units have pretty good historical memories -- and the remaining 25% have definitely risen in rank since then.

The 2nd Marine Division web site states that two of RCT-2's organic battalions are deployed, the "Warlords"of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and the "Betio Bastards" of 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines. Not sure which infantry battalion is filling out RCT 2 in place of 1/2, but it might be the reserve battalion 3/25.

News reports in several sources say that the force conducting the attack is about 1000 strong, so more than likely only one of these battalions is engaged in the operation, while the other two are continuing with their normal security and stabilization activities. The Regimental HQ is probably C2ing the attack because of the nature of supporting assets: possibly several squadrons of aviation assets from more than one service, and a massing of armored vehicles such as tanks, LAVs and AAVs. Also, having the regiment C2 the attack allows it to quickly move the remaining two infantry battalions into supporting positions, or even to reinforce whichever one is primarily engaged as the main effort.

1:18pm The "platoon" in the mountains ready to call down airstrikes on fleeing forces (see Belmont Club for sources) is most likely a Reconnaissance platoon, not a line infantry platoon. Recon platoons have a much higher density of people trained for Close-Air Support calls than a regular infantry platoon would. And it is highly unlikely that a regular infantry platoon would operate independently, or be asked to cover so much terrain. Those Marines in the Close-air overwatch are probably reconnaissance Marines.

1:19pm One more thought then I must return to work (Arrgh!). The latest CentCom press release on the operation has some interesting tidbits:

Soldiers from the Army's 814th Multi-Role Bridge Company constructed a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates River where intelligence reports indicate the enemy is located 9 May. Marines crossed over from the southern banks to the north and are now operating in the northern Jazirah Desert and are in pursuit of the enemy.
This shows the extent of planning that went into this operation. Transferring units from one headquarters to another is not done without lots of thought, especially when different services are involved. This was planned as a deliberate river-crossing. More on that later, and if anyone is interested, I may even break out a pub or two on that type of operation.

Next, this:

Ten terrorists, who surrendered to the Marines, are at a nearby detention center.
This is out of context, but the surrendered bad guys had just counter-attacked a Marine convoy. And they surrendered? Seems to reinforce the idea that the bad guys in this fight are trained military personnel, either from maybe Saddam's old forces, or from Syria, rather than Jihadists -- though its probably safe to assume a mix. Ten surrendering certainly doesn't sound like anyone eager to get to paradise like we've come to expect.

It will be interesting to see if there are torture chambers and the like in these cities. If these terrorists are secular in background, they may not have been torturing the populace like happened in Fallujah. They may merely have coalesced here for rehearsals (some of the company-sized terrorist attacks that have been mounted recently have needed detailed rehearsals) and for initial arming and manning after coming from Syria and before scattering through the rest of the country.

More tonight! As much as there is news to comment upon . . .

Written by Chester at 1:03 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Live-blogging Marine Operations on the Syrian Border

I'll attempt to offer some snap reactions during my lunch break, and some more posting tonight on the current US offensive along the Syrian border. Stand by . . .

Written by Chester at 12:42 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

May 5, 2005

Two Great Posts from Chrenkoff

I must point your attention to this: The disadvantages of pissing off America.

And to this: Live from Basra:

A good friend of this blog, Steven Vincent, the author of "In the Red Zone: A Journey into the Soul of Iraq", is back in Iraq and blogging from Basra.
As you loyal readers out there know, Vincent is also a good friend of The Adventures of Chester, and has written a handful of guest-posts (see here, and here for some of his Iraqi election commentary.)

More news from Chrenkoff:

Speaking of Steven's book, here's an offer from his publisher:
Every tenth person who emails us through the Red Zone blog will receive one free copy of "In the Red Zone". One email per person, please. This offer ends at noon, CDT, on Saturday, May 7, or when we reach 100 free copies, whichever comes first.
Don't miss out. My reading habits are undisciplined -- I skip around a great deal. Blame it on the short attention span that blogging induces. Anyway, I tell you this only to say that of the third of Vincent's book that I've read, I enjoyed every bit of it. An art critic lives in New York, is affected by 9/11 and travels to Iraq several times to see what he can make of it. It's just plain great stuff. You just can't make that up. And now he's there again. Must be his third time or so.

Written by Chester at 12:37 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

April 27, 2005

British Warrior Receives Victoria Cross

(h-t to Rantburg):

Pte Beharry, who was born on Grenada in the West Indies, is the first living soldier to be given the VC since 1969. He was at the head of a five-vehicle convoy when it came under attack in the town of al-Amarah on 1 May 2004. He guided the column through a mile of enemy ground to drop off wounded comrades, at great risk to his own safety, his citation said. Weeks later, his vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade round. Despite a head wound, he managed to reverse his Warrior to safety. Pte Beharry is still recovering from serious head injuries.
More here.

Written by Chester at 10:53 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

April 26, 2005

This is really cool (to me anyway)

IRAQ THE MODEL notes:

One of the brilliant Iraqi bloggers who had been using the Friends of Democracy Arabic blogging tool has started a blog in English.
Now you go and read his thoughts on Iraq and his city "Diwaniyah" in English here.
Cool. I lived in Diwaniya for 6 weeks. Now I'll have to keep track of this blog: diwaniya.

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Further Thoughts on the Almost-Capture of Zarqawi

Last night, we discussed the recent near-capture of Zarqawi in Iraq. Today, Bill Roggio offers his thoughts over at The Fourth Rail. The exact text of the original ABC story reads thus:

A source who had been inside the Zarqawi network alerted the task force to the meeting. Officials deem the source "extremely credible."
Bill believes that this source is still active within the network:
The fact that there is someone inside the Zarqawi network is what is startling. Al Qaeda in Iraq appears to have been penetrated, no small feat as al Qaeda is traditionally a very closed and secretive organization, admitting only the most ideologically pure of the Islamists within their ranks.

The mole is likely of Arab descent, perhaps an Iraqi, as genuine cover would be needed to break into al Qaeda's inner circle. This mole may be responsible for several of the arrests of high-ranking Zarqawi lieutenants over the past several months.

It is unlikely that our source is a) still active in the network, or b) a plant. One at a time:

a) Probably not still active: The article seems to state that the source is a former member of the network, perhaps one who has succumbed to interrogation. If the source is still active, it raises an interesting question: Would the US release the existence of such a source in order to incite paranoia within the network, or would the US keep it under wraps out of concern for the source's life? The latter is much more likely. The nature of the source's information would no longer be as credible if the source felt the US had put him in even more danger than his position would otherwise necessitate. Preservation of an agent's life is one of the first principles of human intelligence.

b) A mole or a plant? Rather than the idea that the US has successfully infiltrated an agent into the Zarqawi network, it is much more likely that we have co-opted an existing member. Probably with money, though safe passage back to a home country, or some other form of bribe are also possible. Consider each of the alternatives: To insert a plant, you must find someone who displays the necessary religious fervor to be accepted by the target group. Before you do that, you have to vet him against your own criteria to make sure he won't go native on you, or that he isn't already co-opted by the other side. Then you have to wait for a period of time, probably a long one, until your plant has reached a position of responsibility high enough such that he actually has information of value to you. All the while, you have to make sure he isn't discovered and killed. Now think of the alternative: you create goodwill with large numbers of locals; you being to get a feel for certain places, regions, and subcultures, perhaps even tribal ones. Through a series of goodwill-building gestures, you are able to learn more and more about the goings-on in a given place. When you use Iraqi nationals as go-betweens, your access can increase even more. After a bit, you have many options for gathering human intelligence, rather than putting all of your hopes in one or a few would-be plants.

It's sort of like the difference between networking your way toward getting a certain job at a certain company, or applying for the job on the company website. Which would work best? Warm calls always work better than cold calls, and espionage is no exception.

So if we do have a source on the inside, it is likely that he's been there awhile, is being paid or has received other guarantees of goodwill, and may even have an Iraqi national or two between us and him.

For further reading, consider this post from Strategypage: Getting Inside al Qaeda.

Also, in addition to the commenter from the last post, who noted the prevalence of Euros in the MidEast, another Alert Reader answers my earlier question about why Zarqawi would carry Euros:

Euros come in 1000E notes making them much more popular than dollars for use in nefarious purposes. Its the proverbial 'do you know how much $100,000 weighs? - No - A lot.' Now you cut that weight dramatically making it easier to transport large amounts of hard currency.
Very interesting . . .

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April 25, 2005

Zarqawi escapes by the hair of his chinny-chin-chin

A story from ABC News reports that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi seems to have come perilously close to capture on February 20th:

On Feb. 20, the alleged terror mastermind was heading to a secret meeting in Ramadi, just west of Fallujah, where he used to base his operations, the official said.

Task Force 626 — the covert American military unit charged with finding Zarqawi — had troops in place to grab the fugitive, and mobile vehicle checkpoints had been established around the city's perimeter. Another U.S. official said predator drones were also in flight, tracking movements in and around the city.

A source who had been inside the Zarqawi network alerted the task force to the meeting. Officials deem the source "extremely credible."

The senior military official said that just before the meeting was scheduled, a car was pulled over as it approached a checkpoint.

"Zarqawi always has someone check the waters," said the official.

A pickup truck about a half-mile behind the car then quickly turned around and headed in the opposite direction. Officials now believe Zarqawi was in the fleeing truck. U.S. teams began a chase, but when the truck was pulled over several miles later, Zarqawi was not inside.

Drat! Foiled again! A couple of takeaways from this:

1. We're using technical collection, human intelligence, vehicle checkpoints, and snatch-and-grab teams in a combined fashion to chase this guy and his henchmen.

2. The henchmen that we catch are singing like canaries. Note the "extremely credible" source.

What the task force did find in the vehicle confirmed suspicions that Zarqawi had just escaped. The official said Zarqawi's computer and 80,000 euros (about $104,000 U.S.) were discovered in the truck.
This is very interesting. Euros? Are they in easy circulation in Iraq?
Finding the computer, said the official, "was a seminal event." It had "a very big hard drive," the official said, and recent pictures of Zarqawi.
It takes little imagination to see that computer for the gold mine that it no doubt is.
The official said Zarqawi's driver and a bodyguard were taken into custody.
That makes two more, singing like canaries.
The senior military official said that they have since learned Zarqawi jumped out of the vehicle when it passed beneath an overpass, presumably to avoid detection from the air, and hid there before running to a safe house in Ramadi.
Can you hear them narcing on the old boss? How else did we learn when he jumped out of the car? This is his driver and a bodyguard. Impressive.

ABC lists this headline from February 28th as a related story: ABC News: Officials: Bin Laden Seeks Zarqawi Help in United States. You do the math. Now we know how the US figured out that little tidbit. See the fourth rail's commentary from back in early March on that story.

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Dadmanly goes toe to toe once again

While the blogosphere offers any possible variation or color of opinion one could ever wish to read about, level-headed debate is not always the norm. So three cheers for both Dadmanly, and Liberal Avenger, who manage to keep things civil while holding completely separate viewpoints on the course of the war: Dadmanly: A Liberal Avenger Responds. (hat-tip yet again to Mudville Gazette.)

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More Speculation about the recently downed helicopter . . .

Canadian blogger Bruce R., has some interesting thoughts about the recent helicopter shoot-down:

That RPG would almost certainly have had to be fired from under 300m slant range, probably much less, and probably either from directly in front or directly behind, to eliminate lead... a helicopter flying at any kind of speed perpendicular to the line of sight is a nearly-impossible shot with this weapon, even at close range... it suggests that this was either a very regular overflight route, or the ambush location was planned in advance. More than one RPG may have been fired, as well.
Read the whole thing.

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April 22, 2005

Are we winning or what?

Thomas X. Hammes, author of "The Sling and the Stone," which I am plowing through, had an editorial in yesterday's New York Times arguing that the war is not yet over by a damn sight, as the old saying goes:

In the end, of course, the most important thing we can offer the Iraqis is our patience. The bottom line is that counterinsurgencies take time. And like all political processes, they are complex and often ugly.

So while Americans can be heartened by the reduction in attacks on coalition forces, it is relatively worthless as an indicator of success. The effectiveness of the Iraqi government in allowing average Iraqis to go about their lives is key. And Washington is correctly, if belatedly, making that its aim.

A more on-the-ground view of how things are going can be seen via Mudville Gazette, in a must-read post linking exchanges between a liberal blogger in the US -- whose work was picked up by The Daily Kos, and a soldier or Marine serving in Iraq.

There are many who simply don't have the patience that Hammes asks for . . . they are content to declare defeat now. Pathetic.

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April 21, 2005

The Strategic Corporal Shows Up in Husaybah

Writing in January, 1999 in the Marine Corps Gazette, then-Commandant, General Charles Krulak, said this about the future of the Marines:

In order to succeed under such demanding conditions they will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress -- decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the Strategic Corporal.
Last week a "strategic corporal" showed up in Husaybah, a small outpost of American force on the border of Iraq and Syria, and he blunted a company-sized terrorist attack, combined with multiple suicide car bombings. The strategic corporal in this case is actually a Lance Corporal: (h-t: the fourth rail)
"Butler — that day, that Marine — that's the critical error the insurgents made," Capt. Frank Diorio says. "They thought they could keep the Marines' heads down. But he gets back up."

Butler, 21 and an Altoona, Pa., native, fired through the windshield of the first suicide bomber as he rammed a white dump truck through a barrier of abandoned vehicles the Marines had improvised. Barreling toward the camp's wall, the truck veered off at the last moment under volleys of Butler's gunfire.

(More here.)

Why are Lance Corporal Butler's actions considered "strategic"? Certainly, the heroism of those like Sgt Rafael Peralta is no less notable?

Lance Corporal Butler's actions played a major role in stopping a potential PR-bonanza for Al Qaeda. Just as the actions of the Marine who shot a wounded terrorist in Fallujah was noted by the global media, and used to the advantage of the enemy, this event has been noted by our own domestic media, and that same advantage that the enemy might have garnered by killing dozens of Marines, was stopped. Unfortunately, the pendulum doesn't swing entirely in the opposite direction: the US will not receive a corresponding boost in morale, or in good press coverage, because Marines repulsing an attack is considered the norm, and because such media coverage is not a zero-sum game.

The strategic aspects of the attack should not be underestimated. As Austin Bay has noted in The "Iraqi Tet" Fantasy, the insurgency seems to be grasping for its magical Tet moment when coalition gains will be immediately overturned via lucky media exposure:

But the Tet fantasy is so compelling. Though Tet was by most measures a disaster for the communists, as a media and hence political event, Tet snuffed "the light at the end of the tunnel." The Johnson administration had told the American public Vietnam had reached a turning point -- "the light" -- but Tet demonstrated that North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars and Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas were still capable of potent action. . . .

. . . Zarqawi's gang "used a fire truck at Husaybah as a car bomb. That's theatrics if you've ever seen theatrics," Pittman said. "They're trying to create a spectacular event, overrun a patrol or border outpost somewhere, an event with huge media value that would promote their cause and make them seem more powerful than they are."

Such theatrics are stopped by those like Lance Corporal Butler and other strategic corporals.

Junior Marines are often told to read "Rifleman Dodd," a book set in the wars on the Iberian peninsula in the late 1700s-early 1800s. In the story, Dodd finds himself completely cut off from his entire unit, and in enemy territory. Rather than surrenduring, or merely surviving in hiding, he continues fighting on his own. A salty Gunny once told me of his time in the first Gulf War, attached to First Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by then-LtCol Mattis. Mattis had just finished walking his entire battalion through the invasion plan on a giant scaled map in the desert, and then said, "Marines, if things go wrong, and you get cut off, or look around and can't find your lieutenant, or your sergeant or your corporal, you know what to do. You go toward the sound of battle and kill enemy personnel."

General Krulak later built on his "strategic corporal" concept and wrote about Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking:

Napoleon believed that the intuitive ability to rapidly assess the situation on the battlefield and make a sound decision was the most important quality a commander could possess. He referred to this intuition as coup d’oeuil, or "the strike of the eye," and thought that it was a gift of nature. More recently, however, practitioners of the military art have come to believe that while heredity and personality may well have an impact on an individual’s intuitive skills, these skills can also be cultivated and developed. Prior to and during World War II, the Japanese called this skill, ishin denshin, or the "sixth sense," and they observed that it began to appear after months of intense repetitive training in a cohesive unit. During the same time period, the Germans referred to the capacity to make rapid, intuitive decisions in combat as "character." They attempted to first identify innate intuition during their recruiting processes, and then cultivate the skill by forcing their officers to repeatedly make tactical decisions under stressful situations throughout their professional schooling. While some might point out that both the Germans and Japanese were on the losing end of World War II, we might be wiser to ask how they were able to achieve such great military successes given their relative size and resource limitations. Napoleon may be correct if he meant that intuition cannot be taught in the traditional sense, but both the Germans and the Japanese were successful in assuming that -- through repetition -- it could be learned.
Teaching or inculcating that innate decisionmaking ability into future Marines was Krulak's goal.

The time is not far off when corporals operating independently of supervision will be the norm. The strategic corporal will not be an occasional incident of a handful of troops cut off from above, or acting on their own. Instead, our forces will be so decentralized that lance corporals and corporals will be challenged as never before. The Marine Corps is already experimenting with a concept called "Distributed Operations." (See here too.)

Distributed Operations, a new concept, empowers small tactical teams that would fight independently, miles apart in the battlespace.

* Teams would have the ability to regroup and fight as traditional Marine Corps units.

* Decision-making would be pushed down the chain of command.

With Marines like Lance Corporal Butler at hand, it will not take long for distributed operations to be a reality.

Update: I'm linking to the Mudville Gazette since this may be of interest to those good folks.

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February 24, 2005

THE GOD COMPLEX II

By all accounts, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Is a bright young man, and a good Muslim. Born in Houston to Jordanian parents, he was a valedictorian at an Islamic high school in the Washington, D.C. area, where he spent his teen years teaching religious studies at the Dar Al-Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia. After graduating, he moved to Saudi Arabia in 2000 to study the Koran at the Islamic University of Medina.

Yesterday, federal authorities in Alexandria, Virginia, unsealed an indictment against Abu Ali, charging him, as the New York Times reports, with providing material support for terrorism and training with Al Qaeda overseas. According to prosecutors, in 2002 the American citizen allegedly contacted terrorists in Saudi Arabia, and received training from them in the use of weapons and in document forgery. Moreover, the feds claim, in 2002 and 2003 Abu Ali and Al Qaeda discussed plans for Abu Ali to assassinate President of the United States George W. Bush, by shooting him or detonating a car bomb in his vicinity. Abu Ali denies the charges.

He may be innocent. At this point, the indictment seem rather weak its based mainly on the testimony of unnamed co-conspirators-- and Abu Ali claims he was tortured while in Saudi custody. Moreover, federal accusations lodged against American citizens for assisting terrorism have often proved wrong, as witness the Brandon Mayfield case. Still, if nothing else, Abu Ali's indictment opens a window onto Saudi-supported Islamic education in America, and the degree to which the ideology of religious supremacy has crept into our nations mosques and Islamic cultural centers.

As the New York Times reports, Abu Ali's high school, the Islamic Saudi Academy, is a private institution that serves hundreds of Saudi citizens and is subsidized by the Saudi government. As for the Dar Al-Hijrah Islamic Center, according to a recent report by the Center for Religious Freedom, this organization was one in which researchers discovered hate literature published by the Saudi government. A sample of the material found in the Center includes the following passage:

Zionism, which is the worst racism in history because of its violence, atrocities, selfishness and arrogance, invests all the means available to it, together with the other enemies to destroy this religion [i.e., Islam] and exterminate its followers, weakening and paralyzing them to say the least.
Interestingly, Abu Ali's father works for the Saudi embassy in Washington. CRF researchers discovered Saudi-subsidized hate literature in two religious and cultural sites in the city, the Islamic Center of Washington, and Masjid Al-Islam. More interestingly yet, researchers found Saudi-sponsored hate literature in Abu Ali's hometown of Houston, specifically the Al-Farouq Mosque. One screed called upon Muslims to
...form a society that is committed to the Islamic way of thinking and Islamic way of life, which means to form a government that implements principles of justice embodied in sharia...Until the nations of the world have functional Islamic governments, every individual who is careless or lazy in working for Islam is sinful.
Another quotes one of the founders of modern Islamic radicalism, Sayyid Qutb.
[Believers] should realize that their self-value derives only from Islam, without which they are like animals or worse. They must know, however, that true honor can never be achieved unless they continue actively to involve themselves in the Islamic Movement. Those who remain in isolation will be in the Hellfire.
There is no proof that Abu Ali or his father read, or were affected by, these documents. Still, it seems clear that the young man lived and worked in an atmosphere permeated with Saudi hate literature and Islamofascist ideologyan atmosphere, moreover, that has produced foul results. As the CRF notes, quoting the 9-11 Commission report, Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders draw on a minority tradition in Islamic teaching that extends from at least Ibn Tamiyya, through the founders of Wahhabismitself one of the foundations of Saudi Arabia through the Muslim Brotherhood to Sayyid Qutb.

As I noted in a previous post, The God Complex I, Qutb's manifesto Milestones is a veritable handbook of Islamic grandiosity and will to power that contains such passages as

The earth belongs to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified for Him unless the banner, No Deity Except God, [i.e., a core Islamic belief] is unfurled across the earth.
What Qutb could not have foreseen were the vast resources of Saudi Arabia pumping out Islamofascist literature to the ummah across the globe. Nor could he and other radical Islamic thinkers have foreseen how the internet--as Olivier Roy notes in his Globalized Islam--allows for a deculturalized form of the religion to possess intelligent, angry and impressionable Muslim minds. Whether Abu Ali is part of this mindset remains unclear. What is clear, however, is the problem of Islamic grandiosity, an abyss into whose depths we are only beginning to peer.

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Steven Vincent contributes weekly to The Adventures of Chester. Don't miss his blog In the Red Zone, or his book by the same name, in the sidebar.

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February 21, 2005

THE GOD COMPLEX I

He was a loner obsessed by guns and explosives. A social outcast, he developed a "lurid fascination" with Columbine High School killers Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. And on February 13, 24 year-old Robert Bonelli, Jr. entered the Hudson Valley Mall in Kingston, New York, and fired 60 rounds from a Hesse AK-47 into crowds of shoppers. Miraculously, no one was killed.

People in Iraq were not so lucky. Last weekend, suicide bombers murdered over 60 people, most of them Shia worshippers observing Ashura. These attacks were but the latest in an ongoing series of homicidal martyrdoms carried out by Arab Muslims in places ranging from Iraq to Israel to lower Manhattan.

Despite their geographic and cultural distance, killers like Bonelli, Harris and Klebold share numerous characteristics with suicide bombers. They choose death over life; attention over anonymity; the ecstasy of violence over the frustrations of daily life—and view other human beings as stage props in a drama in which they play the starring role. In short, they exhibit a narcissism so malignant it seems to consume their egos in a monstrous will-to-power. Rejecting human limitations, they desire instead the infinite, the omnipotent, the transcendent. Seeking the unlimited, they embrace death.

Take, for instance, the shaheed. He or she belongs to a culture, as Syrian scholar Sadik Al-Azm wrote in a recent essay, which has not come to grips with its decline and fall.

[A]s Arabs and Muslims, we continue to imagine ourselves as conquerors, history-makers, pace setters, pioneers and leaders of world-historic proportions.
When this grandiose self-image collides with the “impotence, frustration and insignificance” of the actual Arab-Muslim world
a host of problems ensues: massive inferiority complexes, huge compensatory delusions, wild adventurism, political recklessness, desperate violence and, lately, large-scale terrorism.
We have heard much about the Muslim-Arab sense of inferiority; few observers, however, consider the flip side of this complex: feelings of superiority. And indeed, deep within the Muslim-Arab weltanschauung lurks a sense of grandiosity fueled by oil wealth and the parochial nature of tribalism. Recently, Hasan Mahmaud, a member of the Muslim Canadian Congress told me “Arabs have been made to live an unreal existence by their leaders. They give us a picture that we are still the center of the world.”

Exacerbating this self-aggrandizement is Islam—a religion that stresses its spiritual and doctrinal superiority, while enjoining its followers to “kill the infidels wherever you find them.” As Sayyid Qutb wrote in his salafist manifesto, Milestones,

Islamic society is, by its very essence, the only civilized society, and the jahili [infidel, ignorant] societies, in all their various forms, are backwards societies. It is necessary to elucidate this great truth.
And to kill those who won’t accept it.

For most of Islam’s existence, cultural bonds - music, food, customs, family ties—ameliorated this grandiosity and rooted Muslims in everyday life. Beginning with the rise of Wahhabism in the late 17th century, however, radical strains of Islam began to attack traditional culture as ignorant and deluded. These assaults increased as the Muslim world fell further behind the West. Islam was not responsible for this backwardness, many argued: rather, it was secular society. “Islam is the solution,” claimed intellectuals like Qutb, Maududi and Al-Banna. “Islam is the answer.”

Over the last 25 years, Muslim immigrants have spread across the globe, particularly into Western countries. Surrounded by alien cultures often at odds with their traditional ways of life, many rely on Islam to provide the main organizing principle of their identities. But a new kind of Islam, argues French scholar Olivier Roy in his recent book Globalized Islam: the Search for a New Ummah—a radicalized, “deculturalized” religion freed from specific ethnic and national customs. An Islam that particularly appeals

to an uprooted, disaffect youth in search of an identity beyond the local cultures of their parents and beyond the thwarted expectations of a better life in the West.
Promulgated in cyberspace, this 21st century Islam is a “dream that finds on the internet its virtual existence. Websites and chat rooms compensate for the lack of real social roots.” Recruiters of suicide bombers look precisely for these young men and women: confused but secretly grandiose souls who find fulfillment in a never-never land of pure Islam—or an Islam realizable only on the web, where the boundary between the limited self and infinite cyberspace identity is increasingly blurred. Add to this the supremacy complex and it makes for some an irresistible temptation to slip the bonds of ego for the paradise of immortality.

But why violence? Because without limits, channels, cultural and traditional restrains, narcissism turns to power, power to domination and violence. When Bonelli stood in that New York mall, armed with an assault weapon—did he not feel for a moment like God, bestower of life and death? When a suicide bomber sits on a crowded bus and contemplates his soon-to-be victims, does he not feel an exhilarating power over the fate of so many people? What sense of godhood flitted through Mohammad Atta’s mind as the World Trade Center came into view? That the Bonellis, Klebolds and Harrises act out of a sense of resentment while the shahadah justifies his or her actions in the name of Allah makes no difference. In the end, both extremes meet in the void beyond the human ego. The Arabs, in fact, have a word for this: haram. It means at once the divine and the obscene, and implies the worst possible of all desires: to become God.

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[Starting today, author Steven Vincent returns to The Adventures of Chester on a more regular basis -- once or twice a week. Don't miss his blog In the Red Zone, or his book by the same name, in the sidebar.]

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February 20, 2005

The insurgents are starting to negotiate

Power Line was the first to draw attention to these stories on the blogosphere this weekend. First, from Reuters, via Yahoo News:

U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers are conducting secret talks with Iraq's Sunni insurgents on ways to end fighting there, Time magazine reported on Sunday, citing Pentagon and other sources.

The Bush administration has said it would not negotiate with Iraqi fighters and there is no authorized dialogue but the U.S. is having "back-channel" communications with certain insurgents, unidentified Washington and Iraqi sources told the magazine.

Powerline notes:
The so-called insurgency has long consisted of two main elements, the al Qaeda-linked terrorists, most of whom are not Iraqis, and Baathist Sunnis whose objectives are more narrowly political. It sounds as though some of the latter group, at least, are ready to throw in the towel. Their violence had two main strategic objectives: first, to prevent President Bush from being re-elected; second, to prevent the Iraqi election from going forward. Both failed. If they give up, the terrorists will be isolated and can much more easily be defeated.

Powerline also draws attention to another AP story, "Sunnis Seek Place in New Iraqi Government:"

Just west of the capital, U.S. Marines and Iraqi security forces launched a joint operation to crack down on insurgents and terrorists in several troubled cities, the military said.

The operation was underway in several Euphrates River cities in Anbar province, including Heet, Baghdad, Hadithah and the provincial capital Ramadi, where authorities imposed a nighttime curfew, the military said.

Meanwhile, a powerful Sunni organization believed to have ties with the insurgents sought Sunday to condemn the weekend attacks that left nearly 100 Iraqis dead.

"We won't remain silent over those crimes which target the Iraqi people Sunnis or Shiites, Islamic or non-Islamic," Sheik Harith al-Dhari, of the Association Muslim Scholars, told a news conference.

Iraqis, he said, should unite "against those who are trying to incite hatred between us."

This is significant. While hard-core former Ba'athists make up the secular side of the insurgency, they cannot operate, or maybe even exist, without the support, active, tacit or otherwise, of Sunni religious and political groups. If these groups see themselves as losing in the long run, they will pressure the military elements of the insurgency to continue negotiations.

Wretchard at Belmont Club has his own take:

The available data suggests that the Sunni insurgents are still capable of showing strength within their strongholds and menacing traffic on the Baghdad streets. However, even within their bailiwicks, their capabilities are not decisive. They have been unable to impede or even delay the political goals set by the US as evidenced by their failure to stop the January 30 elections. Moreover, they are unable to project any significant combat power in Shi'ite and Kurdish areas. Faced with the loss of oil revenues, a growing Iraqi security force and the gradual depletion of their stored weapons and suffering a terrible attrition rate their relative power is irretrievably on the wane.
A close examination of the original Time story, Talking with the Enemy is in order. Notable excerpts . . . first, it was the insurgents themselves that tipped off Time that they are talking:
An account of the secret meeting between the senior insurgent negotiator and the U.S. military officials was provided to TIME by the insurgent negotiator. He says two such meetings have taken place. While U.S. officials would not confirm the details of any specific meetings . . .
Time does its best to leave things unclear as to who has initiated the negotiations, and whether it is a sign of weakness for either side. Is it the US that is war-weary?
Over the course of the war in Iraq, as the anti-U.S. resistance has grown in size and intensity, Administration officials have been steadfast in their refusal to negotiate with enemy fighters. But in recent months, the persistence of the fighting and signs of division in the ranks of the insurgency have prompted some U.S. officials to seek a political solution.
Or is it the enemy?
But in interviews with TIME, senior Iraqi insurgent commanders said several "nationalist" rebel groups--composed predominantly of ex--military officers and what the Pentagon dubs "former regime elements"--have moved toward a strategy of "fight and negotiate." Although they have no immediate plans to halt attacks on U.S. troops, they say their aim is to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis and eventually negotiate an end to the U.S. military's offensive in the Sunni triangle. Their model is Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, which ultimately earned the I.R.A. a role in the Northern Ireland peace process. "That's what we're working for, to have a political face appear from the battlefield, to unify the groups, to resist the aggressor and put our views to the people," says a battle commander in the upper tiers of the insurgency who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Marwan. Another negotiator, called Abu Mohammed, told TIME, "Despite what has happened, the possibility for negotiation is still open."
Whoever has begun the talks, it seems clear that side negotiating from a position of weakness is the enemy. Their forces are being attrited, their funds and weapons caches are being seized, and they have failed to break the will of the Americans.

From the enemy standpoint, there are two choices: they can continue on, effecting some level of instability in Baghdad and Anbar province, but having little power in either -- all the while fearing that the elected government will make an Iran-inspired theocratic shift, or, they can negotiate their way into participating in politics and take their chances that they might retain some minor semblance of their former power.

The key to the negotiations is the new Iraqi government. It will be the ultimate arbiter between a rejection of any claims of the Ba'athists, or an accomodation such that they will be included in the government.

What good is it to attempt to include them? Is this a failure? Does it mean we are floundering in our attempts to destroy the insurgency? These are certainly the narratives that will be spun in the press to explain such a move, but they are true not in the slightest. Many, many positives can come from some form of political inclusion of the Sunnis:

1. The legitimacy of the new government will increase dramatically.
2. By merely negotiating with the insurgents, the US and Iraqi government can gather information about its leadership and the centralized or decentralized nature of its organization. For example, if we request that some act be taken in good faith, whether or not the insurgent commander is able to guarantee it and then have it done indictates what he is in charge of vs what he is not.
3. If the Sunni/Ba'athist side of the insurgency can be included in the political process in some way -- some careful tightrope arrangement between the poles of having former Ba'athists actually in the government and that of having them only mildly associated with it and still controlling attacks by subordinates, then there is a great prize to be had: they can be co-opted and can give up information on the other side of the insugency. The other side is the "mayhem" side, the Zarqawi/Al Qaeda side, the religious side. What level of coordination does it possess with the Ba'athists? Can the Ba'athists give it up?

These are the questions that will drive negotiations and their outcome.

Meanwhile, the US is continuing to tighten the screws on the Sunni Triangle.

Iraqi, U.S. Forces Kick Off Operation River Blitz

The 1st Marine Division of the I Marine Expeditionary Force and Iraqi Security Forces kicked off Operation River Blitz, which includes a curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. and other measures to enhance security in and around Ramadi.

“We were asked by the Iraqi government to increase our security operations in the city to locate, isolate and defeat anti-Iraqi forces and terrorists who are intent on preventing a peaceful transition of power between the Interim Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Transitional Government,” said Maj. Gen. Richard F. Natonski, commanding general, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force.

The security measures in and around the provincial capital are designed to ensure the safety of the populace by controlling access into the city. Access control points leading into the city will screen vehicles for terrorists and criminals as well as weapons, munitions and materials to produce improvised-explosive devices.

In conjunction with implementing the security measures in Ramadi, increased security operations also began in several cities along the Euphrates River, including the cities of Hit, Baghdadi and Hadithah.

Whether this is a limited operation, or something more substantial like Plymouth Rock remains to be seen . . .


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February 17, 2005

First Lieutenant Pantano

Marine Lieutenant Pantano has been charged with pre-meditated murder for shooting two insurgents in Iraq in April of 2004. This has been all over the talk radio stations today and seems poised to take off in the blogosphere as well. Van Mendenhall offers his take on matters:

Both these cases bear similarities to the NYC Police shooting of a man whom the police had stopped, but then decided to run. Again they stopped the man, at which point the man turned around, reached inside his jacket in the same manner as if going for a gun in a shoulder holster. At this point, the cops open fire and killed him. But the man was unarmed and it turned out he was reaching for his wallet. The cops had order him to stop and put his hands up. Twice the man refused to comply.

Note here that a suspect rapidly reaching for his wallet is exactly the same action as reaching for a gun. In this case, the cops were charged and found not guilty. The point is that in such a situation, a cop or a soldier has only a split second to make a life or death situation. And while it is reasonable that a cop who works in a civilian environment should have his actions closely examined, it is completely irrational to apply this standard to war. One would think that the military would understand this and behave accordingly. Alas, not, apparently because they are caving to media pressure.

Meanwhile, WorldNetDaily notes that the very same Lt. Pantano was quoted for by a Time magazine article, also during April of 2004.
The Marine Corps officer charged with murder for killing two Iraqi insurgents was featured last spring in a gripping, first-hand account by an embedded Time magazine reporter who illustrated the hair-trigger intensity U.S. fighters endured facing an increasingly sophisticated foe on the outskirts of Fallujah.

The story showed 2nd Lt. Ilario Pantano's deep frustration with high-level decisions as forces preparing in late April for an onslaught of the terrorist-stronghold were ordered to pull back . . .

Pantano was among the many in Easy Company who, according to Quinn-Judge, "viewed the decision as a retreat from the U.S. pledge to drive the 'bad guys' out of Fallujah."

The story quotes Pantano saying: "Does this remind you of another part of the world in the early '70s?" referring to the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.

The Time reporter said that while it was understood the decision provided an opportunity for the Iraqis to prove they can take control of their own security, the Marines "felt angry, frustrated and deeply skeptical that the deal would work."

"As they packed up their equipment and cleared out from their forward operating base, they were fuming," the reporter wrote.

Despite the agreement, the Marines still were taking heavy fire from the insurgents.

"This is so surreal," Pantano said, after being briefed on the agreement. "I had to write it down in my journal to make sure I wasn't making it up."

Prior to the decision to pull out, Quinn-Judge recounted how Pantano, as platoon commander, led his men to the southern edge of Fallujah to help destroy two bunkers insurgents were using to fire on their positions.

More about the incident:
Pantano's attorney, Charles Gittins, emphasizing the high casualty rate at the time, said the April 15 incident took place when the officer's quick-reaction battalion was dispatched to capture an arms cache at an insurgent hideaway. After finding weapons, the Marines stopped two Iraqis fleeing in an SUV by shooting out the vehicles tires.

Pantano, armed with an M-16, had the Iraqis search the vehicle in case it was booby trapped. While performing the search, the Marine said he heard the two men talking among themselves then saw them turn.

The lieutenant thought the Iraqis were coming at him and ordered them in Arabic to stop. When they didn't obey, Pantano shot them with "many rounds," according to Gittins.

The lawyer acknowledged the Iraqis turned out to be unarmed, but insists his client didn't know it at the time.

Pantano immediately reported the incident to his superiors and an internal investigation cleared him, allowing him to continue in combat duty for another three months. After returning to Camp Lejeune, however, he learned he had been accused by a subordinate Gittins describes as a "disgruntled" sargeant who had experienced "difficulties" in the unit.

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February 16, 2005

Iraq's Most Wanted

CentCom has a list of the most wanted Ba'athist terrorists plumb full of details. Aside from Zarqawi, the top guy is:

‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri'

As former Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri was part of the inner circle and very close to Saddam. Al-Duri is believed to be the current leader of the New Regional Command and New Ba’ath Party. As such, Al-Duri provides guidance, financial support and coordination of the Former Regime insurgency. His financial support for the insurgency, derived from the expropriated wealth of Iraq, continues to facilitate attacks against coalition forces, the Interim Iraqi Government, Iraqi National Guard, the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi people. As a member of the former Saddam regime, ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri has been designated under United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1483 for stealing assets from the Iraqi people. Under this United Nations Security Counsel resolution all member nations must freeze any funds, other financial assets or economic resources associated with ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and immediately return them to the Iraqi people. Any of these assets recovered from al Duri will be immediately dedicated to the reconstruction of Iraq. Additionally, the Multi National Forces in Iraq are offering a reward of $10 million for information leading to the capture of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri.

UPDATE: Strategypage.com notes the role of cell phones in thwarting attacks and capturing bad guys, and also takes a look at the difficulty of following the money:

ttacking the money isn't easy, as Baath has decades of experience in getting around the international banking system rules. Long established smuggling networks can get cash,  major appliances, or weapons and people, into the country. That access is being attacked by building up the border patrol. Over a hundred border forts, and the establishment of a highway patrol. In the past, smugglers would cross the border at some remote, roadless, area, move to a main highway, and then drive to a major population center to deliver the smuggled goods. The border patrol forts, with their new electronic sensors and night vision equipment, plus the highway patrol stopping trucks and inspecting cargo and documents, will complicate smuggling operations considerably.

The Sunni Arabs were always better organized, and up for trying new things. Most of the scientists and engineers in Iraq are Sunni Arabs. Most new businesses are established by Sunnis Arabs. The first ones to adopt new ideas are Sunni Arabs. But within the Sunni Arab community there is a major debate over the wisdom of continuing to support "Arab Socialism" (the Baath Party). Even before the 2003 invasion shut down Saddam's tyrannical government, many Sunni Arabs were turning to Islamic radicalism. Others backed democracy, but the socialists and religious radicals were more willing to use force. Guns speak louder than ballots, or so the Baath and al Qaeda zealots thought. But day by day, more cell phone tips come into the police from Sunni Arabs.

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Prime Minister Shopping . . .

The Christian Science Monitor reports that Ibrahim Jaafari may emerge as the choice of the election victors for Iraq's new prime minister:

Though there's still room for change, aides to both Mr. Jaafari and members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the party of his main rival, say they're close to a deal that will deliver him the premiership.
The Monitor wonders if Jaafari's ascension might be a blow to Washington, which would prefer a more secularist leader:
aafari's rise will put a Shiite Islamist in charge of the government for the first time in Iraq's history. It also underscores waning US influence over Iraq's politics. The US would have preferred to see a secular leader emerge, not an Islamist who once lived in Iran. Jaafari's party is also unlikely to support expanded ties with Israel, a goal articulated by the US at the start of the war.
But other interpretations of his intentions and beliefs exist:
But his friends and allies say no contradiction exists - that he's a pragmatic politician who sees Islam as the best guarantee against more turmoil, and who believes that a modern interpretation of Islam's political role can be found that's acceptable to most who live here.

"Iraq's minorities must be protected, and they must be given their rights,'' Jaafari said in a recent interview with the Monitor. "But we must also respect the majority, so Islam should be the official religion of the state ... and we shouldn't have any laws that contradict Islam."

"He looks at Islam as a bridge to all humanity, not just for on particular type of people,'' says Mr. Khadimi. "He doesn't want an Islamic republic like Iran's, or a system like Saudi Arabia's. He wants to see something modernized and that recognizes that Iraqis are closely tied to their religion and traditions. He's going with what the Iraqi people want."

"I wouldn't say he's secular, or religious either,'' says Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at Queen Mary University in London.

2005 looks to be a very interesting year . . .

Meanwhile, Egypt's newsweekly Al-Ahram reports that the Shi'ites are laying the political order of the new Iraq, and notes that one point of contention is whether all legislation must spring from Islam. As usual, Ayatollah Sistani's mere mention is influential:

Confident of victory the UIA appeared to have already started to dictate the rules of the political game when, early this week, a fierce debate broke out over the role religion should play in delineating Iraq's new political map. Should Islam be the only source of legislation or one among several? Statements attributed to Al-Sistani first indicated that the grand ayatollah, along with other members of the religious seminary, had cautioned against any attempt to separate religion from the state. A statement issued on Sunday in Najaf insisted that "the religious seminary will only accept a constitution that acknowledges Islam as the sole source of legislation and that any item will be rejected if deemed in contradiction with the Islamic creed."

On Tuesday, however, Al-Sistani's aides, while stressing the ayatollah believed legislation must respect Iraq's Islamic identity, insisted he had not made the remarks attributed to him.

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February 3, 2005

Two Anti-election Flyers from Iraq

The relatively new blog, I Should Have Stayed Home, has two of the anti-election threat flyers reprinted. Excerpt:

All the poll stations will be targets for Al-Mujahideen, and they will not be a safe place. Here we are warning people who got cheated by the democratic lie. We are warning the innocent people (don’t go to the election). Otherwise we will not treat you as innocent because you choose to support the infidel’s side which it doesn’t have any beliefs, and you took the infidel occupationer’s side and his agents.

Anyone who will sell his vote and his honor to any of the agent parties, like Kurdish parties or Ayad Alawi’s party, will execute himself and he chooses to be with infidels.

ALL THE POLLING STATIONS WILL BE UNDER FIRE SO DO NOT GO THERE.
ALL THE MUSLIMS HAVE TO BE BESIDE THE BELIEVERS IN GOD AND REJECT THE ELECTIONS……

Talk about discredited.

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Neat stories from Spirit of America

1) How Americans helped with Iraq's elections
On this post there are some great quotes of Iraqis expressing thanks for the liberation of Iraq. There is also a summary of election-related projects done by SoA that the generosity of Americans made possible and we couldn't have done it without the funds from the Blogger Challenge. So, thank you!

2) Anatomy of a purple finger
Over at Friends of Democracy there is a 3-photo post showing the anatomy of how an Iraqi voter got a purple finger on Sunday.

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February 1, 2005

This is just plain mesmerizing

In case you missed it yesterday:

Low res:
http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv

Hi-res:
http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election_HiRes.wmv

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January 31, 2005

Steven Vincent Video: Fox and Friends

Guest-blogger Steven Vincent was on Fox this morning. In case you missed it, Johnny Dollar has just put the video up.

Great job to Steven by the way.

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Fanfare for the Common Iraqi . . . redux


[I just might repost this every other post tonight to make sure people see it.]

Low res:
http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv


Hi-res:
http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election_HiRes.wmv

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Going Forward

[This is Chester: This is the final post by our guest-blogger Steven Vincent. We thank him for joining us over this historic weekend. He's welcome back anytime. Be sure to check out his blog here. And don't forget to see the link to his book "In the Red Zone," in the sidebar. I am just getting into it and can already recommend it.]
----------------------


As is the wont of things, after the euphoria comes the sobering reminder that a single success does not solve a multitude of problems. Nowhere is this truer than Iraq. With the risk of seeming like dreary chunk of Juan Cole in the Christmas stocking of Iraq's elections, let me outline some of the challenges immediately facing the Land Between the Rivers.

The Kurds. The flashpoint is the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk. Here, Kurds are vying against Sunni Arabs and their Turkomen allies for control of the oil fields of Baba Gurgur. Although Kirkuk technically falls outside Kurdistan, the Kurds have long eyed the city eyed the city as the capital of an independent nation. When the Iraqi Electoral Commission last month ruled that Kurds displaced by the Baath Party's "Arabization" program could vote in local elections, Arab candidates withdrew. Turkey, meanwhile, is registering ominous objections to Kurdish maneuvering for autonomy. Kurdish Democratic Party leader Massud Barzani hardly helped matters when he announced in a recent interview that "an independent Kurdish state is indeed going to be happening."

The Shia. Of immediate interest is the post-election unity of the victorious Party of Ali. As the Los Angeles Times' Ashraf Khalil notes, the United Iraqi Alliance fused together by Ayatollah Sistani comprises a number of religious and secular Shia groups, many of which--such as Dawa Islamiyya and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq--are traditional rivals. As Khalil observes, a splintering of the slate could provide an opportunity to secularists like Ayad Allawi to pick up some dissenting Shia to form a ruling coalition; on the other hand, a collapse of unity risks weakening the prestige of Sistani (the most unifying figure today in Iraqi politics) and alienating Shia from the democratic process.

Other things to look for: The fate of Moqtada "Mookie" al-Sadr. He was a big loser yesterday--especially because his fatwa to boycott the elections was generally ignored. In the Shia world, one's advancement in influence and power is determined by how many people pay attention to your pronouncements (rather like blogging); he may have slid a ways down the marja totem pole. Also, keep an eye on Ahmad Chalabi. While fighting Defense Minister Shaalan over mutual corruption charges and the Arabists in the State Department and CIA, this consummate in-fighter seems posed to play an important role in the new "secular" face of the Shia leadership. He didn't do much for Iraqi unity last week, however, when he seemed to call for Shia "autonomy" over the oil-rich southern provinces.

The Sunnis. We'll have to see their turn-out totals, especially in areas not dominated by anti-Iraqi forces. If it turns out, as I believe true, that Sunnis wanted to vote, but were prevented by fear, the "voter boycott" was in fact "voter suppression." And this, in turn, could erode the legitimacy of the Muslims Scholar's Association's "leadership"--a positive development. The MSA's politics of resentment, grievance and non-participation in democracy (with the telling exception of oil-rich Kirkuk) echo the PLO tactics and could doom the Sunnis to similar cycles of despair and violence. To save their clerical skins, the MSA and their allies will use any sliver of plausibility to decry the elections as illegitimate (especially if voter turn-out results drop below 50 percent). But even they seem to see less room for maneuvering, as evident in their demands that they have a seat at table when it comes time to hammer out a constitution. Sunnis, thy name is chutzpah.

The Anti-Iraq forces. Allah be praised, they were the biggest losers of the day--although there will no doubt be further attacks. But the political, rhetorical and psychological terrain has changed. In the past, the homegrown Iraqi militants got a lot of mileage from their claims that they fought a "foreign occupation." Whatever little merit that argument possessed has vanished with the election: now the ex-Baathist Saddamites appear in their true light--fascists attempting to overturn a democratic government. At what temperature does the legitimacy of reactionaries burn? Fahrenheit 9-11.
As for the foreign jihadists, Z-Man declared war against the elections and then couldn't stop them. History--despite what would-be restorers of the Caliphate might say--is not on his side. The fighting will continue--that's what jihadists do, after all--but the legitimacy of the mujaheddin has been shot by ballots not bullets, and time will bring an end to their nihilistic bloodshed. This isn't Afghanistan, 1990s, Z-Man, and you're not fighting a doomed dictatorial state. Something you will no doubt reflect upon when you're sitting in an Iraqi prison, as you will most surely be soon.

The Left. Hopeless. Shameful. History will record that the U.S. could have saved tremendous loss of life and treasure had we liberated Iraqi with more troops and a proper "after-victory" plan. But the chronicles will also show that America could have saved time, money and--most especially, lives--had the Left contributed its valuable resources to the liberation effort as well. Imagine if feminists, labor leaders, environmentalists, civil rights activists, artists and the media had joined in the struggle instead of sitting on the sidelines--or worse, assisting the fascists? Imagine if the clarion cry of freedom and democracy had arisen from a unified progressive front consisting of conservatives and liberals? Just as we've learned how much succor the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong took from the anti-war protesters of the 1960s, we will someday learn how the parochial, small-minded, narrow-souled opposition to the establishment of democracy in Iraq stiffen the fascist backbone of the "insurgency." But of course, the Michael Moores, Robert Fisks, George Galloways, Ted Kennedys and innumerable Hollywood celebrities and academics of this world will not care--they will always find reporters, voters, fans and tenure committees willing to dull the sting of conscience.

Our soldiers. Job well done. But it ain't over till its over. And it won't be over until Iraq reaches one benchmark: the government has the monopoly on violence. In other words, not until an Iraqi army and police force takes the guns away--literally or metaphorically--from the country too-many armed militias can our men and women go home.

The Iraqi people. From now on, we will identify the true Iraqi Resistance fighter as an average man or woman brandishing the weapon of a blue-tipped index finger.

Bloggers. I can't imagine how the liberation of Iraq would have progressed without the hundreds, the thousands, of blogs that cut through the anti-war bias of the MSM. By giving a voice to people and viewpoints which otherwise would have gone silent, bloggers helped articulate the cause of democracy and civil rights that lies at the base of this conflict. Which make me wonder: how would bloggers have affected the course of Vietnam War?

On that note, I will close out my guest appearance on Chester. I can't thank Josh enough for the opportunity to address you all. I only hope my contributions added something to your appreciation of the war, the election and the Iraqi people. Now, with a wave of my own blue-tipped fingertips, I shall bid you farewell.

Written by Chester at 8:17 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Fanfare for the Common Iraqi

[Got about 5-8 quality posts for you tonight folks . . . here's the first.]

WOW. Amazing. Go see this immediately. You will not be disappointed:

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election.wmv

Thanks to Alert Reader James for posting that link earlier and emailing it as well. Truly spectacular. Give it a sec to load.

This is private diplomacy at its finest.


UPDATE: There's a Hi-res version too.

http://adamkeiper.blogs.com/comparevideo/files/Iraq_Election_HiRes.wmv

Send Adam Keiper an email complimenting his work if you like.

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The Latest Good News From Iraq

Chrenkoff has just published the latest in his Good News From Iraq Series.

See it also here.

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January 30, 2005

The "ink of freedom"

An Alert Reader emails:

On Fox News an American Muslim cleric called the ink on the finger "the ink of freedom."  What an awesome thought.  An Iraqi said, "I dipped my finger deep as if into the eye of all the world's tyrants."
Great stuff.

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Good Election Commentary at the fourth rail

Bill Roggio provides a great roundup of what Al Qaeda said they would do vs. what they did in Iraq on Sunday. See it here. Looks like Zarqawi and AQ just can't quite walk the walk.

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Geraldo on Civilian Casualties: "This makes any civilized person absolutely sick."

Go see now: Iraq, The Vote: 'This Makes Any Civilized Person Absolutely Sick'.

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The Voting Rights Act, 2005

[Chester here: This is another post from guest-blogger Steven Vincent. Be sure to check out his book "In the Red Zone" in the sidebar, and his blog here.]
--------------------------


Nasir Hasan once told me that on April 9, 2003--the day Saddam's statue fell in Baghdad's Firdusi Square--he learned that "history can actually smile."

Well, my friends, history has just smiled again.

I write this just after the polls have closed in Iraq. Over 70% turnout, we hear. Minimal violence. Election results, of course, are not yet known--except this: the big winners were the Iraqi people. And democracy.

Let us pause to consider: In a week when we commemorated the liberation 60 years ago of the Nazi death-camp at Auschwitz--on the day that, 72 years ago, Weimar president Paul Hindenburg appointed Adolph Hitler Chancellor of Germany--the forces of democracy and freedom have won their greatest victory since the fall of the Berlin Wall. There are few words to describe the magnitude and magnificence of this moment. Just as there are no adequate words to describe the sacrifices of the Iraqi people and American soldiers that brought the world this moment.

Look at these pictures from Iraq (scroll down). No doubt we'll be seeing many more shots like this. Average people. Two years ago few of us (including myself) gave much thought about them; they were unknown, unseen, blotted out by the abysmal shadow of Saddam Hussein. Yet today, they were the focus of the entire world. Today, the course of history pivoted on their fingertips--fingertips stained not with the blood of tyranny, but the ink of democracy.

And their enemies, what of them? What of those who indulged in grandiose fantasies of "blood baths" and "massacres" rather than engage in the quiet, humble process of elections? They--thank God--could not make good their threats in full. Oh, we can guess their next tact will be to claim the elections were "illegitimate" (unlike, of course, their nihlistic "insurgency"). But, as Osama bin Laden once said, history rides with the "strong horse." In the competition between Al Qaeda and democracy, Al Qaeda lost. Big time. Who's the strong horse now?

What to look for in the next few days: Sunni voting results from areas not under threat of terrorism. If we can determine that Sunnis would have voted if not in fear of their lives, then we can gauge the measure of their committment to democracy. If, as I suspect, it is high, then we must immediately replace the concept of a "Sunni boycott" with "Sunni vote suppression." Boycotts are voluntary acts of non-participation; suppression is when you use force to prevent someone from acting. And if terrorists and their clerical allies suppressed voting, then doesn't that "de-legitimize" their claim to represent Sunni Arabs? In this case, contending that Sunnis didn't vote because they supported Zarqawi and the Muslim Scholars Association would be like saying blacks didn't vote in the post-bellum South because they agreed with Jim Crow and the KKK.

And what of our friends on the Left? I'm sorry they can't share in our joy--because there is no reason they should not. Alas, like the Muslim Scholars Association, they, too, decided to "boycott" the elections. For example, here is what the great lefty website Daily Kos had to say yesterday:

The war is long past lost. Time to pack it in, and save the lives of our men and women in uniform that will otherwise face a barrage of bullets and RPG rounds during their extended stay in the desert.
Clearly, Dean-shill Marko Zuniga has an odd perception of liberalism. On a day when millions of Iraqi citizens stood up against the specter of fascism to exercise their rights as free and dignified human beings, Zuniga claims the election is "simply an exercise in pretty pictures." Tell that to the Iraqis who danced and cried for joy at the chance to vote, Mr. Zuniga. Tell that to people who have suffered for decades under a tyrant whose crimes were brutal to the point of madness. Tell that to the men and women who died to make this day a reality.

But Zuniga can't top the outrage posted on TalkLeft. First, the site runs this excerpt from Chris Allbrittion's blog from Iraq:

So far, not as much violence as everybody feared. The question is why? Is the insurgency taking a pass on this one? (It's possible. Our sources in the insurgency say the election will make no difference to them, so why expend a lot of energy?) Is the insurgency much weaker than previously thought? Or is the level of security sufficient to keep it in check? If that's the case, then that is discouraging, too, because the measures that have kept today safe (so far) are truly draconian. No driving, dusk to dawn curfews, states of emergency. If that's what it takes to provide security in Iraq, why erase one police state only to replace it with another?
Beneath this tactless, heartless passage, they post a photo of a U.S. soldier in sunglasses. Message received: the U.S. has formed a police state similar to Saddam's regime. Tell that to the Marines, folks.

But let's let that pass. Today is not for us, it is for the Iraqis. No doubt there will be further victories to enjoy and disappointments to mull over in the days to come. For now, let's contemplate the meaning of democracy and the spread of freedom in a hitherto dark land. And let us celebrate, for today history did more than smile. It cheered.

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Election Followup


10:29 This ends the live-blogging. More coming later today here at The Adventures of Chester. Probably at least two more posts -- more in-depth than the live-blogging. Thanks for stopping by!

10:24 Looks llike Central Command released some new stuff overnight: DECLASSIFIED AERIAL VIDEO FOOTAGE TRACKING INSURGENT ATTACK ON U.S. EMBASSY AVAILABLE, TASK FORCE BAGHDAD TROOPS CAPTURE SEVEN INSURGENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR EMBASSY ROCKET ATTACK, MEDIA ADVISORY: AERIAL VIDEO FOOTAGE OF CENTRAL BAGHDAD DISTRICT RESIDENTS GOING TO POLLING SITES AVAILABLE TO MEDIA, and in Afghanistan, COALITION FORCES RECOVER WEAPONS CACHES.

10:20 Michael Ledeen has this to say on The Corner:

The Iraqi elections are, we can all hope, a lethal blow to the racism of the CIA and the State Dept arabists, all of whom have been saying for decades that democracy just can't work in "that part of the world," because "those people" just aren't capable of democracy. They accordingly saw their role as identifying "our thugs," and getting them into power. The big, brave turnout was an explicit and very dramatic confirmation of the president's view of the war between freedom and tyranny. The Iraqi people want freedom, and they are prepared to risk their lives for it, provided that they get support and half-way decent security.

I hope that the president and his aides draw the obvious lesson: that the other peoples of the region are similar, they are quite capable and fully prepared to govern themselves. If more than seventy per cent of Iraqis voted today, as it seems, imagine how many Iranians would vote. And Syrians, too. And Egytians, and Saudis, and the rest. Think revolution. Please?

In a similar vein, Powerline has this (ht: Instapundit.com):
Somehow, I had missed the fact that Iraqi expatriates are voting in Syria. Thus, Iraqis living in Syria can participate in a democratic process, but Syrians can't. A bit odd, that, but it's another example of the impact this election could have in the Arab world.

10:16 Just caught some of the political commentary at The Corner on National Review Online, where one writer speculates that it will be Kerry vs. Clinton for the 2008 Democratic nomination. This seems like great news. Most of the dumb things that Kerry said that came back to haunt him occurred in the primaries. Perhaps a repeat will ensue . . . enough about all that . . .

10:11 I'd love to see the ratings stats for Kerry's appearance on Meet the Press this morning. Bet they were low.

10:04 Check out Ali's thoughts at Free Iraqi:

This was my way to stand against those who humiliated me, my family and my friends. It was my way of saying," You're history and you don't scare me anymore". It was my way to scream in the face of all tyrants, not just Saddam and his Ba'athists and tell them, "I don't want to be your, or anyone's slave. You have kept me in your jail all my life but you never owned my soul". It was my way of finally facing my fears and finding my courage and my humanity again.

I slept really late but I woke up at 6.30. I shaved (I do this once every century) and dressed as I was going to a party. The phone rang and I let it ring for a while before I answered. "Hey Ba'athist! Why are you still asleep? Why not go and vote?" a friend's voice came through teasing me.

And, as he leaves the polling station:
As I left one of the guards said to me as he handed me back my cellular phone,"God bless you and your beloved ones. We don't know how to thank you. Please excuse any inconvinience on our part. We wish we didn't have to search you or limit your freedom. You are heroes."


9:55 Looks like a success! 72% turnout is the number being tossed around. Iraqi blogger Hammorabi has this to say:

Today is the day in which the souls of our martyrs comforted!

Today those who were killed in Iraq or wounded among our friends from the USA and other allies, who helped us to reach this day, are with us again to inscribe their names with Gold for ever!

And:
As we expected the enemies of God and freedom send their mentally retarded cockroaches in some suicidal attacks.

On the top of our privileged today are those who were killed in their way for voting. Their names should be perpetuated for ever! Their names should be written in Gold in Al-Fordos Square in Baghdad!

Our thanks go to George W Bush who will enter the history as the leader of the freedom and democracy in the recent history! He and his people are our friends for ever!

At this moment the voting closed and we will see the results then!

God bless Iraq and America.

Written by Chester at 10:03 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

January 29, 2005

Live-Blogging the Elections -- Refresh Often!

[All times US Central; Add nine hours for Iraqi time.]

4:25 Well folks, I've turned into a pumpkin. Actually that's not true. I could keep on until the polls close, but Mrs. Chester will wake up and see that I haven't slept and then unplug the computer and check me into an internet program. Tomorrow (Sunday) morning, guest-blogger Steven Vincent will be offering another piece on the election, and The Adventures of Chester will continue with commentary on the outcome later in the day. For more election coverage, go to Iraq Elections newswire and use the editor's links there.

Having been inspired by Geraldo Rivera's (now there's a line I never thought I'd type) comparison of the Iraqi elections to the civil rights movement in the US, here's a final quote for you, from LBJ, before he signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965:

I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy.

I urge every member of both parties -- Americans of all religions and of all colors -- to join me in that cause.

At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape a turning point in man's unending search for freedom. So it was at Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it was last week in Selma, Alabama.

So it is today in Baghdad.

Good night!

4:09am Meanwhile, in Kuwait, security forces have had a shootout with terrorists.

3:55 Just checked the time-zone map on sitemeter. If you are in Iraq and reading this, any updates you have are welcome. Shoot me an email with your own observations.

3:53 Another new photo is up at Cigars in the Sand. The Iraqis are displaying their inked fingers proudly.

3:50 Fox just reported a new suicide bombing in Baghdad killed two Iraqi policemen.

3:46 The latest update to the BBC Reporters' log: Iraqi elections is from Ben Brown in Basra, who notes,

Turnout here has been extraordinary. We've been to a few polling stations in the city centre and we've seen huge queues of men and women who were searched separately.

Some have had to wait for an hour before casting their ballot.

3:37 I guess that answers the bluefinger question: won't be a security issue if everyone has it.

3:36 Wow. That earlier pic is not the half of it. See Cigars in the Sand for several great election day photos. My favorite is the guy being wheeled to the polls. Ryan also writes this:

So far our team has made three round trips to the polling station. For the record, that's 63 Iraqis voting. Every busload has sang and danced the entire drive home.

After a large numbers of explosions this morning, things seem to have gotten quieter (at least in Baghdad). Let's hope it holds.


3:33 Iraq Elections newswire asks about the security aspect of marking voters' thumbs with blue ink. I wondered about this too. Seems like an easy way to identify voters. Wonder how long it lasts . . .

3:30 Here's a photo of Iraqis lining up to vote in Baghdad (hat-tip: Mudville Gazette, where you'll also find a roundup on the atmosphere in several key Iraqi cities yesterday.)


3:17 Here's an opinion piece in Al-Ahram which asks for greater debate between political parties in Egypt. You've really got to wonder how the Iraqi elections will be perceived in the Arab world . . . Next week's MEMRI translations should be good . . .

3:11 Here's a link to the frontpage of Al-Ahram Weekly, an Egyptian newsmagazine. It features four stories, and the one which I read had a pretty predictable viewpoint about the difficulties surrounding the elections.

3:06 About to start plumbing the depths of the Arab news for stories . . .

3:01 Quick admin note: If anyone out there is interested in being on the email list for The Adventures of Chester, just shoot an email to "terrier_manchester@yahoo.com" with "subscribe" in the subject line. You'll get one email a week with details of what's going on 'round these parts. A couple of folks asked to be unsubscribed and then they got another update anyway -- sorry, I was out of town and couldn't fix. I'll take you off the next one. Though I guess if you want to be unsubscribed, you probably aren't reading this. Oh well. By the way, I don't share email lists with anyone.

3:00am This is the midpoint of election day and all the indicators point to a success so far -- lots can still go wrong, but seems to be going off pretty well so far.

2:50 Chrenkoff has a new post up contrasting two emails he's received, one from an Iraqi describing the family getting ready to go vote, the other from the father of a Marine who was injured for life on New Year's Day.

2:45 Just stumbled upon Ali's thoughts (formerly of Iraq the Model fame). Ali is now blogging at Free Iraqi.

2:32 The Fox ticker just reported that 6 car bomb blasts had gone off outside US and multi-national forces facilities near the Green Zone. Said no US casualties had been reported. Maybe that's cause US forces disrupted the attacks such that they were not successful . . . pure speculation . . .

2:24 When I lived in Diwaniyah in Iraq, we had hired some contractors to rebuild the looted university building we were living in. Every now and then, I'd be in my quarters and the head contractor would come in and measure something or check out the electrical sockets. Stuff like that. Once he had his two sons with them and I gave them some candy (melted) that friends had sent me. I talked him up a little as he spoke English enough to get stuff across. He asked me how old I thought his sons were. I would have guessed about 8 or 9 judging by their size. But before I could answer he told me they were 13 (they were twins) and the reason they were so short is because milk had been hard to come by under the sanctions. But this gentleman wasn't bitter about that. He blamed Saddam. Then, using some hand motions and simple English he told me he wished Iraq could be the 51st state in the union. I bet that guy is voting today.

2:22 This bodes well. Rantburg strikes again:

Many Iraqis living near Saddam Hussein’s hometown said they will vote today because the ballot not violence will end Iraq’s occupation by U.S.-led coalition troops.

The small town of Alam, 10 miles northeast of Saddam’s home city of Tikrit, is relatively quiet unlike other Sunni Muslim areas west and north of Baghdad that roil with militancy and fierce opposition to the national elections.

The local leader of one of Iraq’s largest clans here is bidding for a seat in the 275-member National Assembly that will govern the country and draft a permanent constitution.

Mashaan al-Jbouri, who heads the 37-member Liberation and Reconciliation Front, has said the country can be freed from occupation only through peaceful means.

Hasan Mohammed Khazaal, a 24-year-old university student, backed that notion.

"We will have a new constitution and I can get rid of the occupiers through elections. This is the only way to evict the occupiers,’ said Khazaal, who decorated his car with posters of al-Jbouri, the local chief of the Jbour clan.

Al-Jbouri served as the governor of Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city, for a few months after the fall of Saddam’s regime in April 2003. He is now a member of the transitional National Council, a government oversight body.

Maj. Gen. Suleiman Youssef Ahmad, a retired officer who served in Saddam’s army, has gone house to house in Alam explaining to people what elections are and why they should vote.

"I am not only going to vote. I am guiding the people how to do it,’ he said.

Another official, 50-year-old Brig. Gen. Mattar Saleh, said he was voting as a means to get foreign troops out of Iraq.

"We are Iraqis who oppose sectarian division, and our aim is to liberate our country from occupation,’ he said. "I can tell the government that I will elect to ask the occupiers to leave the country through peaceful means.’

2:16 Didn't know Sistani was born in Iran. Interesting:

Although he shaped almost every facet of today’s elections, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani has no plans to vote, one of his representatives said yesterday.

The cleric leads this nation’s 15 million Shiite Muslims, 60 percent of the population, and he may be the most powerful man in Iraq. But Sistani was born in Mashhad, Iran, he is an Iranian citizen, and, according to the rules of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, he is not eligible to vote, the representative said.

"I assure you Sayed Sistani won’t vote in this election, because he doesn’t meet all the required conditions as spelled out by the IECI," said Sayed Murtdha al Kashmiri, Sistani’s representative in London. "He will not vote, but at the same time, Sayed Sistani obliges every Iraqi to vote in the elections."

2:00am Fox now breaking that a suicide bomber hit a polling station/school in West Baghdad, but the reporter is quick to note that it is 4 hours into polling and the terrorists had promised 400 suicide bombers -- only only a handful so far. Maybe some got to their targets and decided to vote . . . Shepard Smith (I think) also notes that 11 hours into the calendar day of Jan 30th, not a single US soldier has been killed. Let's pray it stays that way.

1:53 More on Geraldo's finest hour: Thanks to an Alert Reader for posting a link to the transcript of Geraldo's report. An excerpt:

GERALDO RIVERA [FOX NEWS]: I don't want to overstate, because I'm very emotional right now. Because I was in that town, just behind me. These GIs have done it, they've created an environment, despite the explosions, despite all the news you've heard of the suicide bomber, snipers, this and that. In this town, in this community, with 15,000 registered voters, we have just returned from the polling place. It is absolutely packed. Roll the video. There are men, women, families coming. They are casting their ballot for the first time. It was so inspiring. It was one of the most amazing things I've ever seen in my entire life. It really is like the Berlin Wall going down in 1989. It really is like the beginning, like the dawn of the civil rights era, when black people could vote for the first time. It is the most amazing sight. Only a hard-bitten cynic, only a person with absolutely no upside to their feeling of optimism, could look askance at what is happening, truly happening today. People are applauding themselves, they look like Rocky coming out of the polling place. There are women voting for the first time, and it's just the most incredible thing. It's so heartwarming to see it.
Wow. Go read the whole thing: Iraq, The Vote: 'One of the Most Amazing Things I've Ever Seen'.


1:47 The Fox reporter in Mosul just finished a report and the anchor thanked him for his "bird's eye view of this great event." Would a CNN anchor even deign to call this a "great event?"

1:44 Update from Iraq Elections newswire: Long lines of folks are queued up in Mosul waiting . . . and the Iraqi Election Commission reports that all 5200 polling places opened on time . . .

1:37 Something tells me there are two things wrong with this story in Al Jazeera (Al-Yawer: Most Iraqis won’t vote in Sunday’s elections): 1. Al-Yawer's remarks are out of context, misinterpreted, or mistranslated, 2. Al Jazeera is wrong. Check this out. Apparently it's like Independence Day down in Najaf:

Despite the presence of thousands of special police and Iraqi National Guardsmen, Najaf had the festive air yesterday of a country in celebration.

"This is the glorious day Iraqis have been awaiting so patiently," said Raad Abdali, 26, a police officer standing guard at the al-Shekeri Mosque. "Election day will open like a flower, revealing our future."

The jovial atmosphere offered a marked counterpoint to much of the rest of Iraq, which has been plagued by anxiety and fear, with an intimidation and bombing campaign targeting voters and polling sites.
And we don't read enough of these stories, of which there are no doubt plenty:
Like many of the city’s men, Abdullah spent several short stints in prison in the 1980s for being a member of the Islamic Da’wa Party, one of a handful of opposition groups that fought Hussein’s rule from inside Iraq.

In 1991, Abdullah fought in the short-lived Shi’ite uprising that followed the war in Kuwait. For 19 days, he helped run the gold-domed shrine of Imam Ali, a revered pilgrimage destination and a funnel for enormous amounts of money tithed by devout Shi’ites.

Hussein’s army quickly quashed the rebellion, and Abdullah proudly displays the scars from the torture he endured in Abu Ghraib prison: a burn mark across his left shin from a heated metal bar, the disfigured muscle above his left knee.

His posture is awkward from being hung from the ceiling by his arms, which were tied behind his back.

The election, he said, offers a powerful salve against those dark memories. "We are thirsty for this day," he said.

1:26 The Fox ticker is reporting that Qatar is speeding up its plans to privatize Al Jazeera due to pressure from the US government . . . good news by my watch. Watch the left cry foul on this one, but shouldn't they rejoice anytime a state gives up control of a media outlet? I bet the US gov't pressure took the form of something like "hey -- we have spent billions to relocate our CentCom HQ to your country and this is the thanks we get?" I bet the Qatari economy gets a pretty nice injection from the presence of a large US installation . . .

1:20 Posted this a moment ago, but lost it: Just had a thought that if only the self-disenfranchising terrorists had gone the political route, they could hire some DNC operatives to plant false exit poll results in another hour or so . . . Imagine the headlines: "Imprisoned Saddam wins as write-in candidate with 100% of the vote."

1:10 Forty-five reasons to care about the elections in Iraq (hat-tip: Iraq Elections newswire)

1:03 This is Geraldo's finest hour. He can't contain his excitement on the ground in Baghdad -- he just said, "I refuse to speak in measured tones. This is truly exhilirating." And he called this, his sixth trip to Iraq since the war started, as the best one yet. Fox is just letting him go. He just compared the election to the fall of the Berlin Wall and 1776.

12:59 While scouring the internet for news, I just stumbled on the thoughts on one expatriate Iraqi who has just voted in the past few days. Very interesting. See here.

12:48 Here tis: The Watchdogs of Fallujah - By Bing West. Lots of down and dirty on UAVs.

12:37 About that Green Zone attack . . . Several observations to make. First the details: at 7:30pm in Iraq yesterday, 30 minutes after the evening curfew began on election eve, terrorists fired a rocket into the Green Zone in Baghdad and killed two US citizens. Now: Fox was playing video released for the US gov't, downloaded from a UAV that watched the terrorists gather in a group of 7, then there's a puff of black smoke -- probably the launch of the rocket -- then the bad guys scatter away -- perhaps because they've learned to be afraid of counterbattery fire. They obviously didn't know the UAV was watching. The overall effect is like one of those police videos out of LA where the criminals have nowhere to run. The US military found 7 people and 5 of them had explosives residue on their hands. The Fox anchor made some comment to the effect that little info about these UAVs and their capabilities had been released before, but loyal readers of The Adventures of Chester may remember a couple of links way back two or so months ago . . . stand by . . .


12:33 On the Fox ticker: Reuters reports a bomb has exploded at a school used as a polling station in Basra . . . just had a flaskback to those Homeland Security alerts over the summer about documents being found in Baghdad detailing the layout of US elementary schools . . . anyway, no word on casualties in Basra or the size and location of the blast . . .

12:27 Yesterday, US soldiers detained two individuals suspected of polling center attacks. Quote from Central Command:

CAMP LIBERTY, Baghdad -- Soldiers attached to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, detained two suspects at 3:50 p.m., Jan. 29, in the western Baghdad district of Mansour. The pair is suspected of plotting attacks against polling centers in the Baghdad area.

The suspects were detained at a check point where their names were matched to a list of suspects.

The two men are being held for further questioning.

12:18 Friends of Democracy carries two audio clips with info from yesterday in Najaf:

Hussein Al Qadi, reporting from Najaf, sent us two audio feeds in English:

1. The police and border forces found caches of weapons on farms west and south of the city.

2. Downtown Najaf was closed for the annual Shi'ite festival at the shrine of Imam Ali

I bet the Friends of Democracy bloggers in Iraq are out and about gathering info, etc and we'll have updates later on the FOD site . . .

12:16 Fox news has removed its breaking news banner about the possible bombings . . . and CNN reports a blast hit behind a polling station . . . (via Iraq Elections newswire).

12:12 Just found a one page roundup of the sentiment among Iraqi bloggers: Try this.

12:08 Just decided to switch the format. Updates now at the top of the post, old stuff at the bottom. . .

12:01 am, Sunday, 30 Jan: Most of the Iraqi bloggers haven't updated since yesterday, but their last posts are worth a visit. All ar dripping with pre-election excitement. See: IRAQ THE MODEL, Hammorabi, Live From Dallas . . .

11:57 CNN and Fox seem focused on Baghdad . . . what about Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Najaf? Must find more . . .

11:53 Slightly off-topic, while we wait on word of any bombings in Baghdad: just caught this story on cnn.com about a Marine who has survived nine different bombings intact. Used to be a minot-league baseball shortstop . . .

11:47 The Friends of Democracy site has a great map with the province names of Iraq listed: Friends of Democracy - Iraq Election News - Reports: Iraqi Provinces (Governorates). This is a great quick refresher for anyone who needs some quick situational awareness. Note: as it mentioned often, the four provinces which are not yet declared completely secure are: Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Babil, and Salah ad Din. As can be seen, these are more or less the Sunni triangle . . . great map.

11:43 Check out this post: The Damning "But" (ht: Instapundit.com).

11:42 Fox now says several loud blasts have been reported . . .

11:41 Fox reporting breaking news that a bomb may have gone off at a polling place in Baghdad . . .

Written by Chester at 11:43 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

Election Live-Blogging Commences . . .

The Adventures of Chester has just made the executive decision to live-blog the elections for the next couple of hours. Stand by . . .

Written by Chester at 11:38 PM | Link | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

T-minus 25 minutes until polls open in Iraq . . .

Just an FYI . . .

Much more to come later tonight and tomorrow here on The Adventures of Chester . . .

Written by Chester at 9:39 PM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

A Prayer for Iraqis About to Vote

[This is Chester: Today, guest-blogger Steven Vincent offers a prayer that the many Iraqis he met during his trips to Iraq will prosper under Iraq's emerging democracy . . . check out his blog at www.redzoneblog.com and be sure to click the link in the sidebar to have a look at his book on his travels in Iraq, "In The Red Zone."]
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Tonight, as Saturday in North America moves toward its close, the people of Iraq--most of them, insha'allah--will be preparing to vote. It will be a long night for us, but an even longer day for them, crowded with acts of courage and violence, despair and inspiration--everything we've come to expect in a land that, for some of us, has become more familiar than we could have guessed, or in many cases, wished. There's nothing we can do now, of course, save offer our thoughts to those Iraqis who choose to vote, and anxiously await the course of democracy.

We bloggers intend, or at least hope, that our words are read by as wide an audience as possible. Today, though, I write with but a few people in mind - friends, acquaintances, strangers I met in Iraq during my all-too-brief travels through the country. People whose faces and voices will forever remain with me, who today form the living fulcrum upon which the events of the morrow will turn. People for whom, 10,000 miles away, I offer my prayers.

Like bulky, bearded Esam, whose irrepressible charm disguised the despair most Iraqis feel about their brutal society: recently, I posted a letter from him describing life in a Baghdad bereft of electricity, where nights are broken by the roar of American jets and distant explosions. I pray, too, for Ahmed, perhaps the most easy-going Iraqi I met, who broke my heart last week when he sent me a terse text-message reading "I am OK...not OK...miss you." Perhaps their new democracy will bring, along with accountable government and an independent judiciary, some electricity and heat.

I offer prayers for Zena, the Baghdad housewife who struggles to raise three small daughters in a city where kidnapping children is as common as car bombs. The internet cafe where we met is closed, a victim of the insurgency's targeting of foreigners. She spends her days now in hours-long queues, waiting to fill her car with gas. She is tired, worried, distraught. May the new democracy bring her additional supplies of fuel, along with law and order to the streets.

And Rand, the Christian woman who also worked at the internet cafe. She left the cafe to work for Iraqna, the cellphone company, which provides her the amazing opportunity to travel to Egypt and Syria. Back home in Baghdad, however, the church she used to attend was bombed by Zarqawi. Her Christian friends have begun to fear for their lives. May the new democracy bring the capture of the terror master and his malignant ilk--as well as comfort to the Christians of Iraq.

And Naseer, brilliant, tormented, forever perched on the edge of melancholy and despair. His insights into the Iraqi soul had a profound impact on my own views of his nation. Recently, in a Frontpage essay he expressed a steely resolve to vote and--as he put it--"resist" the paramilitary fascists. He above all the Iraqis I met bears the emotional scars of Saddam and a thirst for justice. May democracy bring an end to the "insurgency" and peace to my dear, tortured friend.

Nor can I forget Nour, my beautiful Basran comrade, guide and protector. For me, she embodied the indominable but endangered spirit of women in a land that treats females as second-class creatures. Her faith that moderate Islam and democracy represent the best hope for her country caused me to re-evaluate my notions of religion and politics. My prayers are never far from her. And by Allah's good grace, she seems to be doing well: an e-mail from her today tells me she is busy working with international journalists covering the elections. May He continue to bring her good fortune, democracy and the freedom she so desperately desires and deserves.

There are others. Mohammad--a good-natured bear of man whose fondest wish was to design books for children; Ahmad, handsome, cosmopolitan, plagued by rumors that he spied for Saddam's secret police; Qasim, the silver-haired, silver-tongued, crypto-Baathist impresario of the Hewar Gallery; Dhia, who took me through the Sunni Triangle at peril to his life; Samir, who rescued me at a religious festival when Zarqawi killed over a hundred people with suicide bombs. May democracy bring them what they never had under the shadow of Saddam, and what the paramilitaries would once again deny them: a future.

Some Iraqis will not vote out of fear, resentment or apathy. Many will not because they are forever beyond the ballot box or the terrorist. They number in the thousands, these men and women, transformed in a flash from living beings to figures on a casualty sheet too long to comprehend. And so I pray for one, an Iraqi woman who worked for the CPA, whom I know only from a faded photograph in a makeshift memorial--although I saw the wreckage caused by the sucide attack that killed her. May democracy bring meaning to her life; may Hadeel not have died in vain.

There are more, many more, enough to tax a reader's patience, and so I will close. But not before I offer a final prayer--for our troops, standing guard over the first stumbling steps of the Iraqi infant America has helped bring into the world. May tomorrow's elections and the democracy it promises bring them something, too: a journey home.

Written by at 10:41 AM | Link | Comments (1) | Print Article

GREAT Places to Follow Iraq Election News!

If you click on the topmost BlogAd in the sidebar, you will be taken to Friends of Democracy, a great new site set up with help from Spirit of America. It truly is really cool. Lots of reporting, blogging, interviews, photos, etc, about the election in Iraq. Spirit of America tells Chester this:

The information is not "candy coated" - it simply does more than emphasize terrorism and violence. It provides good news and bad. Please link to the site and check it for news. It will be especially good on election day. We'll have reports and photos coming in from all corners of Iraq.
This site will certainly be one to keep an eye on. More:
We are hosting a small conference in Washington, DC on Sunday (Jan. 30) from 1.30pm to 4pm that will provide a consolidated picture of Iraq's elections featuring prominent Iraqis, special guests (e.g.,Cliff May from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Christopher Hitchens), live call ins from the Friends of Democracy correspondents and bloggers, photos, video and stories. It will provide a picture of Iraq's elections people will not get anywhere else.
Spirit of America also offers a story on their own site: Iraqis Defy Insurgents for Spirit of America. An excerpt:
The background behind this story involves our stellar corporate partner, Triad Hospitals. Triad's CFO, Whitman Burke, who is a Marine Reservist, reponded to a call for medical supplies and equipment to be donated via the Marines to hospitals in Iraq. Triad donated medical gear from 6 hospitals and SoA involved another of our magnanimous partners, FedEx, to ship the medical supplies to a main warehouse in Texas where they were palletized and transported by FedEx to the 1st Marine Division in Iraq.

The 1st Marine Division took posession of the supplies and then arranged to have them delivered to the 2nd Marine Division. No small feat given the intense terrorist activity in the 1st MarDiv area. But, as the Marines always do, they pulled it off! The donated supplies included everything from tubing for IVs to gurneys to EKG machines.

The Adventures of Chester wholeheartedly supports Spirit of America and aks you to consider a donation to this outstanding organization! Read their site, visit Friends of Democracy, and help Iraq on the road to freedom.


UPDATE: More news from Spirit of America:

Great news! We've just received confirmation that C-SPAN is planning to cover Spirit of America's Iraq election event this Sunday from 2pm to 4pm Eastern (11am to 1pm Pacific). Please watch. Your support has made this possible. Please forward this message far and wide and encourage people to tune in.
Well, this is one blogger who knows where he'll be Sunday afternoon. Note: those times are between 11pm and 1am in Iraq . . . maybe they'll have declared a winner? Should be fascinating stuff . . .

Written by Chester at 12:45 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

MEMRI: Part 4 of the Iraq Election Series

The Middle East Media Research Institute has just published its latest election analysis, Iraqi Elections (IV): Platforms and Campaign Strategies. As always, MEMRI makes many interesting points. The conclusions:

There are recurrent themes in the various platforms that were highlighted. The platforms all support:

Creating a democratic, egalitarian, and federal system of government that guarantees the political freedoms of the various ethnic and religious groups.
Ending the occupation (with various degrees of urgency).
Building a strong but non-political army that protects the country's borders.
Preserving the Arab-Muslim identity of the country.
Putting an end to terrorism.
Supporting a bigger role for women in politics.
Assuring non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.
Addressing economic reconstruction with various degrees of specificity and detail.
Fighting growing corruption in government.

Most of the platforms, however, fail to address in specific terms the most burning issues facing the voter: the loss of sense of security; unemployment; shortage of food supplies, electricity, drinking water, and, ironically, gasoline in a country rich with water resources and perhaps with the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East. There is hardly any reference to future economic policy with regard to private investment in the oil sector, the role of the private vis-à-vis the public sector, and the privatization of inefficient public entities.

The government that will be established after the elections will face enormous challenges. To succeed it will need to come up with a crash program, a "New Deal," that would provide quick and palpable relief.

Well that's MEMRI's take on things. Interesting. The rest of their piece is good as well, discussing each of the favored political organizations in detail.

Written by Chester at 12:17 AM | Link | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0) | Print Article

January 28, 2005

The Shadow of Karbala

[MAJOR CONTENT ANNOUNCEMENT: Steven Vincent, the author of "In the Red Zone," has agreed to do some guest-blogging this weekend as the Iraqi elections draw near. See his own blog here. And look for his book linked in the sidebar! The below piece is his, though it says "posted by Chester."]
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Two more days until Iraqi elections, the voting’s already begun in Australia, and, of course, the disloyal opposition is registering their presence, as well.

Meanwhile, you have to admire a people with the ability to alarm kings, sultans, terrorists, military officers, newspaper columnists, CIA officials and State Department panjandrums, not to mention thousands of citizens who once supped at the table of their worst enemy. I’m talking, of course, about Iraq’s Shia population.

Focused as we are on the spread of democracy through the region, we are less attuned to what may be the true revolution in this election. Numbering some 150 million out of Islam’s 1.2 billion adherents, the Shia have always suffered minority status in the Muslim ummah. Only in Iran and tiny Azerbaijan do a Shia majority rule their nation. But now, thanks to American military might and their own astonishing discipline and maturity, the Party of Ali is poised on the brink of achieving what they discarded eight decades ago in their revolt against British mandatory rule: political control of Iraq, the heart of the Muslim Middle East.

And their neighbors are afraid. Along with other observers, I’ve noted earlier ("Our Man in Waziristan") that Sunday’s elections will create a “Shia crescent” running from Lebanon into Syria (where Bashar Assad’s minority Alawite sect is an off-shoot of Shi’ism), Iraq, Iran and then hooking around to Bahrain, which lies adjacent to Saudi Arabia—where two million more Shia sit atop the Wahhabi kingdom’s richest oil fields.

This fear of rising Shia power lies behind many of the negative comments we read about the upcoming Iraqi elections. For example, on December 8, King Abdullah of Sunni-dominated Jordan warned that a Shia victory in Iraq would “open us to a whole new set of problems” that may destabilize the (Sunni) Middle East, including (Sunni-Wahhabi) Saudi Arabia. Reporting yesterday, Soraya Nelson and Huda Ahmed of the Knight-Ridder News Service quoted a retired Jordanian (Sunni) general “summing up the view of many critics” that the Iraqi elections are “mission impossible…without the acquiescence of the Sunnis.”

And here’s (Sunni) Qatari academic and political analyst Mohammad al-Misfer, quoted on Wednesday by Agence France Press:

[Sunni-dominated Gulf regimes] will not be in a stable situation if the Iraqi elections produce a Shiite leadership, because many Shiites in the region will no longer accept to be subordinate [to the Sunnis] after they see fellow Shiites in control in Iraq in addition to Iran. (my emphasis)
In (Sunni) Egypt, Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif warns that Iraq could plunge into a civil war, while former foreign minister Ahmed Maher cast doubts cast doubts on the real motives for the elections:
What is suspicious is the insistence of the American and Iraqi authorities to hold the elections within the timescale. This arouses fear and doubt over the real intentions of the supporters of the vote. Elections which…impose the domination of the majority, some of whom are bent on vengeance, could have destructive consequences that extend throughout the region.
These fears are not confined to the Muslim world, but exist in Washington, as well. As Fouad Ajami wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece on Wednesday,
The power of the Arabist view lingers in the State Department and in the ranks of the CIA, which retain a basic sympathy for the Sunni order.
We see these sympathies in the CIA’s support for Ayad Allawi, who—not to overlook the incredible bravery of the man (Shia-born, we should note)—halted the de-Baathification program in Iraq and attempted to bring Baathists into the government, resulting, some argue, in creating a network of insurgent spies and informers within the interim administration. Nor should we overlook ex-CIA analyst Michael Scheurer’s offensive near-idolization of Osama bin Laden (“The Trouble With Hubris”), who seems to be positioning himself as the Sunni-Wahabbi standard-bearer against renascent Shiism.

The State Department also seems to exhibit signs of Shia-phobia. As an observer in a neo-conservative Washington think-tank recently told me, “They want nothing to do with religion—they don’t get, they don’t like to touch it.” After all, it was a Shia theocracy in Iran that burned the diplomatic and foreign intelligence services during the 1979 Khomeini revolution.

Why is this important? Because the news we receive about Iraq and, in particular, the upcoming elections, passes through many filters, not least of which is the difficult-to-understand Shia-Sunni split. Officials in both the Middle East and Washington have their allegiances and biases, which they convey, sometimes unconsciously, to reporters, who in turn pass them to us, often themselves unaware. But they exist, and they are important. Ghosts from the Battle of Karbala, fought 14 centuries ago in Iraq, reach to the halls of Washington, the front pages of our daily newspapers, and the television screens of our homes.

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January 23, 2005

The Latest from Al-Hakim

Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim is popping up more and more as the mainstream press begins to realize that he will win Iraq's election. Today's Sunday Times (in the UK) features a story quoting him in short bursts on a variety of topics. Here is what he said:

“No people in the world accepts occupation and nor do we accept the continuation of American troops in Iraq,” said Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

“We regard these forces to have committed many mistakes in the handling of various issues, the first and foremost being that of security, which in turn has contributed to the massacres, crimes and calamities that have taken place in Iraq against the Iraqis.”

***
[speaking of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Kuwait] “These countries have past experiences and good security forces and with good relations we can solve this problem together,” he said.

“Should the security problem continue, it will not end at the border of Iraq but extend to their countries.”

***
“Iraq can rely on itself and its people and it does not want foreign troops in its country.”

***
“Iran is a friendly neighbouring country that stood by Iraqis of all sects in the past, something that will not be forgotten by the Iraqi people,”

"However, this does not entitle it to interfere in Iraq and its people or to impose itself on us. We even told the Iranians this when we last visited them and got their reassurance that they, too, believe in the principle of non-interference.”

***
[Asked to comment on the idea of stepping aside for Allawi]: “One should not predict intentions in advance.”

It seems difficult to reconcile the two most glaring statements of Hakim (to Western eyes):
“Should the security problem continue, it will not end at the border of Iraq but extend to their countries.”
and
“Iran is a friendly neighbouring country that stood by Iraqis of all sects in the past, something that will not be forgotten by the Iraqi people. However, this does not entitle it to interfere in Iraq and its people or to impose itself on us."
Here we witness a glimpse of a new foreign policy, never before seen or imagined: the democratic state of Iraq's relations with its neighbors. It is a shame that the Times chose to summarize Hakim's remarks, rather than publishing them in full. [They have yet to learn from the blogosphere . . .] Hakim could mean many different things in these statements:

1. If security problems persist, Iraq will look to its neighbors for assistance.

2. If security problems persist, Iraq's neighbors will have to assist because the same forces that seek to undo the government of Iraq are a threat to the neighbors as well.

3. If security problems persist, Iraq will closely examine the role its neighbors are playing in those problems.

Hakim, a man who spent years in exile in Iran, pursues a wise course here. Rather than making the statements US officials are wont to do, blaming "Iran" or "Syria" for interference in Iraq's security, Hakim leaves open the possibility of working with those governments while at the same time fighting against the terrorists who operate within their boundaries, and fight against the Iraqis. In short, he gives his neighbors face-saving ways to support his internal security requirements. Expect further such statements from Hakim, since they are rhetorically deft. He says, "Of course, Iran and Syria wouldn't support anti-Iraq terrorists, and of course Iran and Syria will assist us in chasing down any terrorists who appear to be based in their countries." A more famous example of this rhetorical device is thus:

Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears
I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.
The evil that men do lives after them;
The good is oft interred with their bones.
So let it be with Caesar. The noble Brutus
Hath told you Caesar was ambitious.
If it were so, it was a grievous fault,
And grievously hath Caesar answered it.
Here under leave of Brutus and the rest --
For Brutus is an honorable man;
So are they all, all honorable men --

What role for the US in Iraq, post-election? We are the bad cop to Hakim's good one, the big stick to his soft-spokenness, and shortly, the Caesar to the Brutus of his immediate neighbors.

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January 22, 2005

Latest Iraq Prognostications from George Friedman

George Friedman, the founder of Strategic Forecasting (or Stratfor), has issued his latest thoughts on the future of Iraq, "After the Election." he believes that the election vote will be certified, and that the Shi'ite groups will win, after which time, a sovereign Iraqi state, with an elected Shia leader will be the result. He believes the Shia will take advantage of this opportunity to completely crush the terrorist insurgency. Says Friedman:

The Shia understand they cannot simply remain in a defensive mode. They have been passive in the run-up to the election, but after the election their credibility as the government of Irraq will depend on how they deal with the guerrillas. They must either suppress the guerrillas or negotiate a deal with them. Since a deal is hard to imagine at this time, they will have to act to suppress them. If they don't, the government will either be destroyed by the insurgents, or Iraq will split into two or three countries, an evolution unacceptable to the Shia or to Iran.

Therefore, the Shia will fight. The Shiite leadership has made it clear it wants the United States to remain in Iraq for the time being. This does not mean it wants a long-term American presence. It means it wants US forces to carry the main battle against the Sunnis on its behalf. In the same way that al-Sistani wanted the Americans to deal with Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr during the An Najaf affair, he wants the Americans to carry the main burden now.

The United States is prepared to carry a burden, but it is not prepared to single-handedly deal with the Sunnis any longer. The Shi hav substantial armed militias. It is these forces -- not the failed Iraqi army the US has tried to invent -- that will be the mainstay of the regime. The Shia don't want this force ground up because it is the guarantor of their security. The United States is not going to protect the regime without these forces engaged.

At this point, something interesting happens. The Shia have a greater vested interest in the viability of this government than even the Americans. The Americans can leave. The Shia aren't going anywhere. For the first time, the United States has a potential ally with capabilities and motivation. Most important, it is an ally that is not blind on the ground. Its intelligence capability is not perfct among the Sunnis, but it is better than what the Americans have.

All of this raises several interesting questions.

First of all, what are the capabilities of the Shi'ite militias? The most well-known of the Shi'ite militias, the Badr Brigade, was founded by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the head of which is Abdul-Aziz Al Hakim, the top candidate of the Unified Iraqi Alliance, one of the groups running in the upcoming election. Hakim has offered to commit his Badr Brigade to security tasks for the elections, and his organization has in the past "declared war on Al-Qaeda," whom it sees as being behind the assassination of its founder, Hakim's brother Mohammed. [See a previous post about this, here.] But now it appears the the Badr Brigade has been retooled into a policing organiztion, as this PBS interview with Al-Hakim reveals:

[Interviewer:]You have your own army, the Badr Brigades. How large a force are they, and what role will they play in the future of Iraq?

AH: The Badr Brigade is no more an army, because it has turned [from] an army into an organization. Before, the major task of this brigade was to eliminate or to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. But now that the government, the ex-regime, is no more in place, the Badr Brigade has been turned into an organization that is entrusted with keeping law and order and--

Interviewer: Policemen--

AH: Yes. As regards [to] the actual number of the Badr Brigade, I don't know that, because there are members and there are supporters. There was a grand parade for the army or the brigade...where 100,000 fighters paraded. That number does not represent all the number . . .

The retooling of the Brigade is mentioned by the Council of Foreign Relations:
Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, who has taught strategy and military operations at the National War College . . . [says,] The Badr Brigade [a militia tied to a Shiite political group, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq] is now the Badr Reconstruction Corps, and they have licensed their weapons.
What of the Mahdi army, disbanded in August, at the order of Muqtada al-Sadr? Does it retain any capability at all?

Perhaps the true clout that a newly-elected Shi'ite government could bring to coaltion efforts against the terrorist insurgency is better reflected as a call to arms than as trained and ready military forces. Perhaps the newly elected leadership will be able to convince Iraqi citizens to join the upstart national security forces in more numbers than has been the case thus far. Or, if the idea of armed forces rooted in the concept of Iraqi nationality does not appeal to Iraqis, or does not seem to work, perhaps a more entrepreneurial security force might be obtained: both the US Coalition Provisional Authority and Iyad Allawi's interim government outlawed militias which were not affliliated with political parties, and which were not in the process of being rolled into national military organizations. The new Iraqi government could encourage private citizens to raise their own forces and then integrate them into the new security apparatus -- similar to the raising of armies as it happened in the US in the American Revolution. So long as these forces are integrated into a national force, could this be a possibility . . . Al Hakim may be a Shi'ite, and believe in the primacy of Islam, but he has been characterized as a nationalist above all else by former CIA officer Marc Reuel Gerecht. [and commented upon by Belmont Club, though Steven Vincent takes a more ambiguous view as to Al-Hakim's rejection of theocracy, and to the motives of the Badr Brigade.]

Whatever the role of hereto under-employed militias, in what ways will they interact with US troops? There is much chatter in the mainstream press that the halls of power have all but decided that it is time for the US to leave Iraq. But at the same time, stories have surfaced about integrating US troops more with Iraqi forces in advisor-like roles . . . Troops as advisors, expanded Iraqi security forces, and a sovereign Iraqi government that wants the US gone as soon as possible all point to a drawdown of US forces . . .

Friedman's essay does not consider another point about the effect of a sitting elected Iraqi government on the security situation in Iraq. Most of the speculation about whether the US will take military action in Syria has focused on whether the US views Syria as a threat. But these questions should actually ask whether a new Iraqi government views Syria as a threat. If the Iraqis have good intelligence of Syria's involvement, harboring, or support of the terrorist insurgency, it is entirely possible that the Iraqis will tell the US that Iraq will do something about Syria with or without the Americans . . .

Could it be that the Shi'ites, who are the most feared for their supposed theocratic predilections, will in the end hold Iraq together by defeating the terrorists, integrating the Kurds, and subordinating their religious beliefs to the idea of Iraqi nationalism instead? returning to the interview with Al Hakiim:

Interviewer: One of the fears that Ambassador Bremer and this U.S. administration have is the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq. What is the nature of the Islamic government you are calling for?

AH: I think this is a question to be asked to Ambassador Bremer.

As regards [to] the government that we want, we don't want an Islamic government. We want a constitutional government that preserves the rights of everybody and a government that believes in the public rights; a government that works for the interest of the Iraqi people, and believes that the people are the source to derive all the important decisions that concern the future of the Iraqi people.

Interviewer: You have, though, called for a government that holds Islam supreme, where Islam would be the guiding force behind the government, without real separation of church and state. Am I incorrect?

AH: The conference in London was attended by all the sects of the Iraqi people including the Shiites and the Kurds, and the Sunnis, and the secular people. They all agree that the major religion of the state should be Islam. But to respect Islam is one thing, and to establish an Islamic government is something else.

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January 20, 2005

Iraq Elections Newswire

The Iraq Elections Newswire has frequently updated links to all mainstream stories dealing with the elections. Check it out.

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January 19, 2005

MEMRI: Captured Terror Leader Admits Syria and Iran Ties

MEMRI is on a roll. This is a transcript of the confession of "Muayed Al-Nasseri, who commandedSaddam Hussein's "Army of Muhammad" throughout 2004." A video of the confession, as it was broadcast in Iraq, is available at the site for download. Highlights:

Interrogator: "How is the Army of Muhammad related to the Ba'th party?"

Muayed Al-Nasseri: "The Army of Muhammad is militarily independent. After Saddam Hussein's capture in December 2003, for a period [of] four months, the Army of Muhammad had no connections with the party, but after April 2003, there was a meeting with the party and we are currently coordinating with them.

"In addition, Saddam Hussein distributed a communique via the party, back then, instructing all his supporters or whoever wants to fight the Jihad for the sake of Allah, to join the Army of Muhammad because it is the army of the leadership."

On Syria:
Interrogator: "Who are the leaders of the Ba'th Party in Iraq?"

Muayed Al-Nasseri: "Today, the leader of the party is 'Izzat Ibrahim. He is the leader of the party in Iraq. Next in line is Fadhl Al-Mashhadani, who is responsible for the local organizations within Iraq. Then, there is Muhammad Yunis Al-Ahamd, who is responsible for the organization outside Iraq. He is currently in Syria."

On Iran:
Interrogator: "Did you get support from the countries of the region?"

Muayed Al-Nasseri: "Yes, sir... Many factions of the resistance are receiving aid from the neighboring countries. We in the Army of Muhammad - the fighting has been going on for almost two years now, and there must be aid, and this aid came from the neighboring countries. We got aid primarily from Iran. The truth is that Iran has played a significant role in supporting the Army of Muhammad and many factions of the resistance. I have some units, especially in southern Iraq, which receive Iranian aid in the form of arms and equipment."

Interrogator: "You're referring to units of the Army of Muhammad?"

Muayed Al-Nasseri: "Yes. They received money and weapons."

And:
Muayed Al-Nasseri: "As for other factions of the resistance, I have reliable information regarding the National Islamic resistance, which is one of the factions of resistance, led by Colonel 'Asi Al Hadithi. He sent a delegation to Iran from among the people of the faction, including General Halaf and General Khdayyer. They were sent to Iran in April or May and met with Iranian intelligence and with a number of Iranian leaders and even with Khamenei."

Interrogator: "You mean they personally met with Khamenei?"

Muayed Al-Nasseri: "According to my information, they met with him personally, and they were given one million dollars and two cars full of weapons. They still have a very close relationship with Iran. They receive money, cars, weapons, and many things. According to my information, they even got car bombs."

Finally, this bombshell:
"Through the Ba'th party - the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party operates in Syria with complete freedom. It maintains its relations and organizes the Ba'th members outside Iraq. The Syrian government is fully aware of this, and the Syrian intelligence cooperates fully, as well as the Ba'th Party, in Syria.
Some thoughts:

1. Whether this is all true or not, it has now been broadcast in Iraq for Iraqi viewing. While some of it seems sensationalized -- and a colonel under interrogation certainly knows many tricks to shift blame -- it still clicks with other reporting streams examined on this site. In the video he does not appear to be under extreme stress -- he speaks without prompting -- or it has been edited -- and he seems at ease, considering the circumstances.

2. While possible US action in Syria is always examined from the perspective of US interests, little thought is given to the interests of the Iraqis in seeing the end of the insurgency. Soon, there will be an elected Iraqi parliament, not a sovereign appointed by the US. The elected parliament members will find themselves in the security accountability hotseat very quickly. There will be pressure for *Iraqi* action against any perceived Syrian involvement in the insurgency.

3. The US will not let that action happen without its help, whether US policy-makers would prefer to act in Syria or not. Syria therefore remains an excellent candidate for low-level raids, infiltrations, intelligence-gathering activities by combined US and Iraqi forces.

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January 18, 2005

It's Official: Chester takes 4th Place in Spirit of America Blogger Challenge

Thanks to all of you loyal readers and contributors who made it happen!

A message from Spirit of America:

First, I want to thank you for participating in the Friends of Iraq Blogger Challenge. The Challenge raised $93,869 for Spirit of America and projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is OUTSTANDING, just
wonderful. I know the benefits of your efforts extend well beyond the direct funds contributed via the Challenge. Overall, in December we received $409,133 in donations. I'm sure many of those donors learned about us and were inspired to give because of you and your fellow bloggers.

I can't fully express via email how much we appreciate you going to bat for Spirit of America and for those we are working with in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the participating bloggers have never met me or an SoA staff member. Your leap of faith is something we take very seriously. I think we understand well the responsibility that comes with raising money. I assure you, we do not measure our success by funds raised. Our commitment is to do our best to create results with those funds that all of us will be proud of. Fundraising is hard but is comparatively easy and sexy compared to getting things done in places like Iraq.

I know it's a bit of a cliché but it's true: the point of this was getting a group of us working together toward a common aim and to have some fun doing it. The "winners" are not the point. That said, we've allowed a month for checks to come in and be processed. Here are the official, final results. Our top fundraiser was Iraq the Model whose fundraising was done for the benefit of Friends of Democracy. Iraq the Model was a come-from-behind surprise. Some last minute donations just before the December deadline pushed them into the lead, surpassing the Northern Alliance (hope you're staying warm!) and Little Green Footballs (I know you're warm, it's 80 degrees in LA).

TOP 5 BLOGGER TEAMS
Northern Alliance: $12,293
Castle Argghhh! Fighting Fusileers for Freedom: $7,305
Team Pajamahadeen - Operation Viral Freedom: $5,060
TTLB EcoTeam: $1,837
Lizardoid Nation: $1,180

TOP 5 INDIVIDUAL BLOGGERS
Iraq the Model: $17,240
Little Green Footballs: $16,706
Roger Simon: $11,192
Adventures of Chester: $2,163
Chrenkoff: $1,485 (go Aussies!)

The complete results are here.

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MAJOR CONTENT ANNOUNCEMENT - The Whole Truth Series

Did you already see this? Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan takes the press to task for its poor and lopsided coverage of events in Iraq:

Just read yet another distorted and grossly exaggerated story from a major news organization about the "failures" in the war in Iraq. Print and video journalists are covering only a small fraction of the events in Iraq and more often than not, the events they cover are only the bad ones. Many of the journalists making public assessments about the progress of the war in Iraq are unqualified to do so, given their training and experience. The inaccurate picture they paint has distorted the world view of the daily realities in Iraq. The result is a further erosion of international public support for the United States' efforts there, and a strengthening of the insurgents' resolve and recruiting efforts while weakening our own. Through their incomplete, uninformed and unbalanced reporting, many members of the media covering the war in Iraq are aiding and abetting the enemy.
How does this make you feel? Disagree? Knew as much all along?

Well, it made this blogger angry. Call it a well-worded straw to break the camel's back. Read the whole post. I have received several emails just like this one. Some I've posted on the site here. Each tells a story you don't read in the papers or see on the news. Maybe a story of heroism, or of successful interaction with the locals, or a critique of a media article by someone who was there and saw the way it went down.

So, today The Adventures of Chester announces The Whole Truth Series. Here's how it works:

If you are in the US military and in Iraq, and have:

1. Witnessed an event that is notable, but not reported;
2. Been interviewed by a reporter, yet feel he didn't quite get it right;
3. Been present at a reported event, and have quite a different take on it than was reported;
4. Had someone in your unit awarded a Silver Star or higher for valor;

. . . then this is the series for you. Email what really happened to Chester, and include a link to any news stories you reference, or at least a headline and date, or a citation excerpt if a decoration was awarded. Be specific: who was there, what went wrong, what went right, etc. Don't just send emails with general comments like, "Everything is going great here! The media is horrible." We want details.

Let's see what other stories are out there . . . The Adventures of Chester will compile and publish weekly.

FAQ

Q: Chester, how will you know you aren't being sent made-up stories?
A: You'd be surprised how smart the blogosphere is. Someone will probably figure it out. I'll be the initial filter.

Q: Chester, doesn't Arthur Chrenkoff already do this?
A: Not quite. He rounds up published news stories that slip under the radar -- and does an excellent job. I'm not out to best him or compete. This series should be complimentary to his.

Q: Chester, what if nobody writes you?
A: Then we'll give it another week. Might take a bit to get the word out, so if you want to link to this post or email it, feel free.

Q: Chester, what's in this for you?
A: The same thing for you: Victory! I want to know if we are winning against the terrorists.

As is said on the rifle range, "Don't be afraid to make bold adjustments." So here is one for The Adventures of Chester. Let's see what happens.

UPDATE: As an Alert Commenter noted, LTC Ryan's thoughts were picked up by Drudge today, and his article is published in The World Tribune as well. The Tribune article carries an added paragrah by LTC Ryan:

Postscript: I have had my staff aggressively pursue media coverage for all sorts of events that tell the other side of the story only to have them turned down or ignored by the press in Baghdad. Strangely, I found it much easier to lure the Arab media to a "non-lethal" event than the western outlets. Open a renovated school or a youth center and I could always count on Al-Iraqia or even Al-Jazeera to show up, but no western media ever showed up ever. Now I did have a pretty dangerous sector, the Abu Ghuraib district that extends from western Baghdad to the outskirts of Fallujah (not including the prison), but it certainly wasn't as bad as Fallujah in November and there were reporters in there.

UPDATE 2: Here is an example of the kinds of things in mind for this series, received in email over the past few weeks. From a Marine gunnery sergeant in Anbar Province, Iraq:

As you know, I asked for toys for the Iraqi children over here and several people (Americans that support us) sent them over by the box.

On each patrol we take through the city, we take as many toys as will fit in our pockets and hand them out as we can. The kids take the toys and run to show them off as if they were worth a million bucks. We are as friendly as we can be to everyone we see, but especially so with the kids. Most of them don't have any idea what is going on and are completely innocent in all of this.

On one such patrol, our lead security vehicle stopped in the middle of the street. This is not normal and is very unsafe, so the following vehicles began to inquire over the radio. The lead vehicle reported a little girl sitting in the road and said she just would not budge. The command vehicle told the lead to simply go around her and to be kind as they did. The street was wide enough to allow this maneuver and so they waved to her as they drove around.

As the vehicles went around her, I soon saw her sitting there and in her arms she was clutching a little bear that we had handed her a few patrols back. Feeling an immediate connection to the girl, I radioed that we were going to stop. The rest of the convoy paused and I got out the make sure she was OK. The little girl looked scared and concerned, but there was a warmth in her eyes toward me. As I knelt down to talk to her, she moved over and pointed to a mine in the road.

Immediately a cordon was set as the Marine convoy assumed a defensive posture around the site. The mine was destroyed in place.

There's no reason why several stories like this one can't be collected into a published piece, either on this site, or by a news organization.

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MEMRI: Iraqi Elections (III): The Islamist and Terrorist Threats

The Middle East Media Research Institute has published its third installment examining the Iraqi and Arab press reactions to the upcoming Iraqi elections. MEMRI articles are always worth a look. Among other things, this one details the organization and leadership of the National Council of the Iraqi Resistance [go to their site to view the sources]:

The National Council of the Iraqi Resistance, also known as the United Council of the Iraqi Resistance, was born in June 2003, and comprises Ba'th activists (referred to as militants), remnants of the Iraqi army, and the Republican Guard, and what are described as the "heroes of the national security apparatus." [12]

The structure of the leadership of the Council remains secret, although in an interview by the Jordanian weekly al-Majd with the former Iraqi vice president, Izzet Ibrahim al-Duri, he was identified as the leader of the resistance. General Abu Mu'tassim ( nom de guerre ) was also identified as "a leader of the Resistance" and "a field general" of the now defunct Republican Guard. [13]

Unlike the previous terrorist groups, the National Council is a secular organization made up entirely of Iraqis and its opposition to the elections is grounded more in political ideology than in theology. The group shares a common loyalty to Saddam Hussein and a belief that Iraq should continue to be run by the Sunnis. [14]

Donations from Gulf countries and Iraqis overseas finance the activities of this group. According to General John Abizaid, the Chief of U.S. Southern Command which oversees the military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a level of tactical coordination originating from Syria and from Saddam's former birthplace, Tikrit. The U.S. is seeking the detention of 34 former Ba'th officials who are reportedly running the rebellion from Iraq and Syria [15]

The military arm of the National Resistance Council is Jaysh Muhammad (Muhammad's Army), established by Saddam Hussein shortly before the invasion of Iraq. It was led by Colonel Mu'ayyid Ahmad Yaseen, a former officer in the Republican Guard. Yaseen was arrested in Fallujah in November and so was his successor Ra'ad al-Duri as well as the leader of Saddam's Fida'iyyoun, Hassan al-Saqlawi. The arrest of all three leaders was announced by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi at a press conference in Baghdad. [16] In a document found in Fallujah after its invasion by the multinational forces, Jaysh Mohammad offered advice to the other terrorist groups about field security. It advised them to avoid contact with anyone from the "enemy side even if he wore the cloak of the Pope or al-Sistani." [17]

In a video played before journalists by the Iraqi Minister of Defense Hazem al-Sha'lan, Col. Yaseen confirms receiving considerable amount of assistance from Iran and Syria. [18]

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